Politics and Security of the Korean Peninsula: South and North Korea

Politics and Security of the Korean Peninsula: South and North Korea

Republic of Korea (ROK) /South Korea vs. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) /North Korea

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Some Historical Background:

1. Competition among Japanese, Chinese, and Russian in East Asia

• Korea’s historical isolation ended when the major Western powers and Japan sent warships to forcibly open the country. Japanese, Chinese, and Russian competition in Northeast Asia led to armed conflict.

Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Korea was formally annexed by Japan in 1910.

• The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9 (1945), respectively, had led the Japanese government to search for ways to end the war. On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally.

• On August 8, 1945, during the final days of World War II, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria and Korea. By then, Japan had been depleted by the drawn-out war against the United States and its Allies and Japanese forces were in no position to stave off the Soviets.(unique_solution)

2. Two Koreas:

• After World War II, a republic (Republic of Korea/South Korea) was set up in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula while a communist-style government (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea/North Korea) was installed in the north. The Korean War (1950-53) had US and other UN forces intervene to defend South Korea from North Korean attacks supported by the Chinese.

• On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.)/South Korea was established. Syngman Rhee became the Republic of Korea’s first president. On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)/North Korea was established in the North under Kim IL Sung. Both administrations claimed to be the only legitimate government on the peninsula.

• In November, 1947 the General Assembly ruled that UN-supervised elections should be held. The Soviet Union and Korean authorities in the North ignored the UN General Assembly resolution on elections. Elections were carried out under UN observation in the South, and Armed uprisings in the South and clashes between southern and northern forces along the 38th parallel began and intensified during 1948-50. Deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union: Division of Korea.

3. Outside the US Defense Perimeter:

• At the end of 1948, Soviet occupation forces were withdrawn from North Korea. This decision contrasted strongly with Soviet policies in Eastern Europe.

• By June 29, 1949, United States occupation forces had been withdrawn, save for a handful of military advisers (500), and Korea had been placed outside of the United States defense perimeter.

• When President Harry S Truman announced the Truman Doctrine and the containment policy in the spring of 1947, Korea was very nearly included along with Greece and Turkey as a key containment country;

4. THE KOREAN WAR (1950-53) and Chinese Intervention

• North Korea launched its attack on South Korea in June (June 25^th) 1950: The Korean War

• Between 1946 and 1949, large numbers of North Korean youths–at least 10,000–were taken to the Soviet Union for military training. A draft was instituted, and in 1949 two divisions–40, 000 troops–of the former Korean Volunteer Army in China, who had trained under the Chinese communists, and had participated in the Chinese civil war (1945-49), returned to North Korea.

• The events following the June 1950 invasion proved the superiority of North Korean military forces. South Korea’s army was simply overwhelmed; Seoul fell within three days. By early August, South Korean forces were confined in the southeastern corner of the peninsula to a territory 140 kilometers long and 90 kilometers wide (Pusan perimeter). The rest of the territory was completely in the hands of the North Korean army.

“Chinese People’s Volunteers”

• Chinese “volunteers” intervened in October (1950): enabling North Korea to eventually restore its authority over its domain. (International Conflict through internal strife: e.g., The Korean War, The Vietnam War)

• After initially falling back to the southeastern Pusan perimeter, UN forces conducted a successful surprise landing at Inchon and rapidly advanced up the peninsula. As the main UN force approached the northern Yalu River, however, large numbers of “Chinese People’s Volunteers” intervened, forcing UN troops to withdraw south of Seoul. The battle line thereafter stabilized north of Seoul near the 38th parallel.

5. An armistice was signed in 1953 splitting the Korean Peninsula on a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at about the 38th parallel.

• On July 27, 1953 the military commanders of the North Korean Army, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and the UNC signed an armistice agreement at Panmunjom. Neither the United States nor South Korea is a signatory of the armistice per se, though both adhere to it through the UNC (UN Command).

• No comprehensive peace agreement has replaced the 1953 armistice pact; thus, a condition of belligerency still technically exists on the divided peninsula.

• The armistice agreement, which ended the three-year Korean War in 1953, was signed by four combatants – the United Nations, the United States, North Korea and China.

• A large number of Chinese volunteer troops remained in North Korea until October 1958, and China began to play an increasingly important role in Korean affairs. United States continued to station troops in South Korea, over the strenuous objections (?) of North Korean leaders.

• The war also spurred Japan’s industrial recovery and the United States’ decision to ‘rearm’ Japan. (Reverse course)

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Thirty-Eighth Parallel:

• The Japanese surrender and the Soviet landing on the Korean Peninsula (already in Korea as Aug 15, 45). President Harry S Truman hastily proposed to Stalin the division of Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel, which Stalin agreed. Stalin did not wish to confront the United States by occupying the entire peninsula.

• An armistice, which was signed in 1953, split the Korean Peninsula on a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at about the 38th parallel.

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North Korea: Political Culture and Its Implication of Security

1. “Songun” Policy:

• North Korea insists Army-centered policy, which means the “Songun” policy.

• The army-centered policy is a sure guarantee for preventing the danger of a war on the Korean Peninsula and achieving independent reunification of the nation. The army-based policy is a patriotic policy for safeguarding the sovereignty and dignity of the nation.

• The army is immediately the party, the state and the people.

• Those who are mindful of the destiny and future of the country and the nation should support the army-based policy, wherever they are, irrespective of ideology and system, religious belief and property status.

• The People’s Army, comprising an army, navy and air force, has 1.17 million troops. Of the 1 million troops in the army, about 700,000 are stationed within 100 kilometers of the DMZ. In addition, North Korea has more than 6 million reservists. South Korea’s forces, meanwhile, total 690,000, and the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea used to be a total ‘37,000.’

• North Korea has 100,000 troops in its special forces, making it the world’s largest. If war broke out, the special forces would be assigned to infiltrate the South, destroy military bases and communication facilities, and assassinate important people. There also

[Kim Jong-il has been the leader of North Korea since 1994. He succeeded his father, Kim Il-sung, who had led North Korea since 1948. He was elected using a system whereby he was the only candidate for the role of leader. Known as the “Dear Leader,” Kim holds the positions of Chairman of the National Defense Committee and General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). ]

2. The “Chuche” Ideology: Self-reliance and Independence

• Chuche means: “the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one’s own powers, believing in one’s own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.”

• Chuche was proclaimed in December 1955, when Kim Il Sung underlined the critical need for a Korea-centered revolution. Chuche is designed to inspire national pride and identity and mold national consciousness into a potentially powerful focus for internal solidarity centered on Kim and The Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).

• Chuche is sanctified as the essence of what has been officially called “Kim Il Sung Chuui” (Kim Il Sung-ism) since April 1974.

• North Korean leaders advocate Chuche ideology is the basic cornerstone of party construction, party works, and government operations.

• Chuche is an ideology geared to address North Korea’s contemporary goals–an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defense posture.

• In his annual New Year’s message on January 1, 1992, Kim Il Sung emphasized the invincibility of Chuche ideology: “I take great pride in and highly appreciate the fact that our people have overcome the ordeals of history and displayed to the full the heroic mettle of the revolutionary people and the indomitable spirit of Chuche Korea, firmly united behind the party.”

• During the 1970s, Kim Jong Il (The current North Korean leader, son of Kim Il Sung who died in 1994; Kim Jong Il died in 2011) suggested that Chuche ideology be renamed Kim Il Sung Chuui: Kim Il Sung-ism, epitomizing Chuche.

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Nuclear Issue: ‘Historical’ Developments of the Different Formats of Talks

• Below is to examine the different formats of nuclear talks with North Korea that have been developed in recent decade, which have led to the inaugural Six-party Talks in August, 2003. The Six-party Talks have so far ( as of December/06) been held six rounds, which all ended in stalemates.

1. Bilateral Talks: US and North Korea

• North Korea’s call for direct talks with the US is aimed to confirm whether the U.S. has a political willingness to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK (North Korea) or not. As the DPRK is not a signatory to the NPT (withdrawal as of Jan 10, 03), there is no ground to internationalize through UN Security Council the nuclear issue and any attempt to do so would make its solution quite impossible: the nuclear issue is a matter to be settled between the DPRK and the U.S

2. Three-Nation Talks: North Korea, China, and US

• The three-nation talks in Beijing (April, 03): North Korea has demanded bilateral negotiations with the United States, seeking a guarantee of non-aggression from what it views as its main enemy.

• US: will not reward North Korea (DPRK) for bad behavior. demands North Korea’s irrevocable and verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program.

• North Korea’s insistence on three-way talks as stemming from its belief that the nuclear problem is an issue between Pyongyang and Washington, whereas China can mediate or act as guarantor as it was a main player in the armistice treaty, which ended the Korean War (1950-53).

Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting:

• The delegations of the United States, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Japan; A three-way meeting between South Korea, the United States and Japan for discussion of North Korea’s nuclear issue.

3. Four-party Talks

• Multilateral talks that include four-way negotiations in Geneva between North Korea and South Korea as well as the United States and China between 1997 and 1999.

• The first four-party plenary session took place in Geneva in December 1997, with subsequent sessions in March 1998, October 1998, January 1999, April 1999, and August 1999. The four parties have focused their efforts on achieving progress in two subcommittees focusing respectively on tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a permanent peace regime there that would replace the 1953 military armistice.

4. Five- Plus- Five Talks: The “10-party talks”

The United States (2003) proposed to the DPRK the holding of a “5+5” meeting to end the ongoing nuclear standoff. The meeting would comprise the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus North Korea, South Korea, the European Union, Australia and Japan. The proposal was firmly rejected by Pyongyang/North Korea: Multilateral (US) vs. Bilateral (North Korea)

5. The ‘first’ Six-party Talks (Aug 27-29, 2003)/ Beijing, China:

• The first six-party talks (China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and North and South Korea) were held in Beijing: Six rounds of the six-party talks have so far (as of Dec/06) been held to try to resolve the nuclear confrontation between the United States and North Korea: North Korea accused the United States of adopting a hostile policy towards Pyongyang.

• North Korea: announced (Feb 10/05) for the first time that it has nuclear weapons and said it needs the armaments as protection against an increasingly hostile United States.

• WITHDRAWAL FROM NPT: North Korea has played its nuclear card often. In 1993, it announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). After it signed with the United States the 1994 Agreed Framework for freezing its nuclear arms development, it continued clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons. In March 2003, Pyongyang officially withdrew from the NPT.

• North Korea has pledged several times not to develop nuclear weapons:

1. When it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT);
2. When it and South Korea released their North-South Declaration in the early 1990s;
3. When it created the Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994;
4. And when North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan made the Pyongyang Declaration in 2002.

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Historical Developments of Differing Views of Nuclear Issue: The Six Party Talks

1. Hostile Policy vs. Deterrence?

• Nuclear Deterrent and North Korea: North Korea repeated that it would not give up its “nuclear deterrent” unless it gets guarantees from Washington that the U.S. will not attack and also end its “hostile policy” towards North Korea.

1. Survival of the Regime : Regime Guarantee

• North Korea is extremely sensitive to the threat of “regime change,” which has been advocated by some in the United States and elsewhere.  China has no interest in toppling the regime in Pyongyang and the ‘messy’ consequences that would entail.

1. CVID:

• US: so far firmly ruled out offering North Korea any concessions until it unilaterally abandons its nuclear program in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible” dismantlement (CVID). The United States said that it has no intention to threaten, invade or attack the DPRK.

1. Declaration of Nuclear Weapons:

• In February/05: North Korea declared it had produced nuclear weapons and was pulling out of the talks.

1. Peace treaty (?): North Korea and US

North Korea has long demanded a peace treaty, which would replace the 1953 armistice ending the Korean War. But the demand has so far been rejected by US.  Recently, however, US may reconsider a broad new approach to dealing with North Korea, which might include negotiations on a peace treaty. US might talk about a peace treaty to take place on a parallel track with six-nation talks on nuclear disarmament:

1. Nuclear Test:

• North Korea had its first nuclear test in Oct/2006.

1. Joint Statement: The Six-party Talks

• Joint Statement: Fourth round of the Six-party Talks (Sept 19/2005):

*The Sept. 19, 2005 agreement: in which North Korea committed to closing down any nuclear-weapons program and arsenal, rejoining “at an early date” the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and resubmitting to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, including the readmission of international inspectors to its nuclear facilities. The United States promised that it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea, and has no nuclear weapons deployed in Korea. South Korea affirmed a no-nukes policy on its territory.

*The Sept. 19/05 statement refers to a statement issued at the end of six-party talks (Fourth round), in which North Korea ‘agreed’ to abandon its nuclear weapons program in return for economic aid and other diplomatic benefits.

*The South and the North agreed to make efforts to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free and to swiftly implement the Sept. 11 Joint Statement.

*North Korea, however, soon disagreed ‘text’ of the statement.

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[Text of Joint Statement]

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005:

Following is a text of the joint statement at the conclusion of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, as released in Beijing on September 19, 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks
Beijing 19 September 2005

The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005. Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alexandr Alekseyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this context, to the following:

1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DARK (North Korea) with nuclear or conventional weapons.

The ROK (South Korea) reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.

The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies. The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action”.

6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

(The end of the text)
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1. Six-Party Talks Concludes: Fifth Round/(Nov/05): ‘First Phase’

Fifth round of six-party talks: To realize the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at an early date and contribute to lasting peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

• So far, the US and North Korea are still divided over when North Korea should open up to disarmament inspectors and whether in return it would receive compensation including a new light-water nuclear reactor for energy.

• The US side claimed that North Korea should first abandon its nuclear program and create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, then other issues could be discussed: When North Korea is back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the IAEA safeguards at an appropriate time, US then would have a discussion about the subject of the provision of light water reactor.

• North Korea: all concerned parties to take simultaneous actions to narrow the differences in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.” The US should lift the financial sanctions on North Korea.

• Some view: A nuclear-armed North Korea would pressure Japan and South Korea to consider building their own atomic arsenals.

• North Korea also argues: the United States had to remove its nuclear threat from the Korean Peninsula before North Korea would give up its nuclear program.

• North Korea: demanded the U.S. withdraw its “OPLAN 8022-02”, a war scenario for preemptive nuclear attack upon North Korea, which worked out by it in top secrecy.

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1. Fifth Round Talks: ‘Second Phase’ (Dec 18-22/06):

• The six-way talks resumed (Dec 18-22/06) after a 13-month suspension. Formally known as the second phase of the fifth round since 2003. North Korea in the meantime conducted missile trial tests (July/06), and a nuclear test (Oct/06): Both tests give rise to tension in the East Asia region: It was the first talks since the North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on Oct. 9/06.

• US: If the DPRK (North Korea) agrees to take concrete measures to give up its nuclear program, the American side will provide DPRK with a written security pledge.

Yet North Korea’s vehement reaction to US’s de facto financial sanctions: The United States has imposed financial sanctions upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) for a year.

• The North Korea has boycotted the talks since September/06, citing American efforts to close down the banks it uses overseas. The US says: the move against the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao stemmed from North Korean counterfeiting of American dollars and the laundering of proceeds from drug running.

• The US said the financial issue had no direct relationship to the nuclear talks. The US got fed up with North Korea’s covert activities, including the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, and imposed economic sanctions. That led to greater mistrust between the United States and North Korea.

• North Korea had declined to discuss disarmament in formal sessions, insisting it would do so only after the United States removed financial measures that have further isolated North Korea from the international economy.

• In the meeting: North Korea had strict instructions from their capital that they not engage officially on the subject of the six-party talks until they have the BDA issue (financial sanction) resolved.

• North Korea has been adamant in refusing to return to the negotiating table for the six-party talks on its nuclear issue unless the United States lifts sanctions on a Macao-based bank suspected of laundering money and counterfeiting for North Korea.

1. The Feb 23 the Six-party Talks (Feb 23/07):

Under the Feb. 13 Six-party ‘agreement’   (2007):

• North Korea agreed to take initial steps toward denuclearization, including shutting down and sealing the Yongbyon nuclear facility and allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors back into the country within 60 days (April 14/07).

• In return, the other five parties agreed to provide North Korea with 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, the first installment of 1 million tons of energy aid promised to Pyongyang provided the North Koreans meet the eventual goal of complete denuclearization.

• North Korea failed to meet the deadline due to a financial dispute with the United States over the roughly $25 million in funds that were frozen at Banco Delta Asia SARL in Macao. North Korea has refused to proceed with the six-party deal until it recovers the frozen funds. The Macao monetary authorities have unblocked the funds but the recovery of the money by North Korea has been stalled by what diplomats have described as technical financial problems.

• The U.S. government is considering allowing, as a one-time special case, the transfer of frozen North Korean funds held by a Macao bank, via a U.S. bank to a third country. Washington hopes to resolve the issue soon: US press Pyongyang (NK) to immediately implement initial denuclearization steps under a six-party accord reached on February 13^th. and pave the way for resuming another multilateral nuclear talks (the six-party talks)  as early as possible. North Korea has refused to take the initial steps and return to the talks until it confirms the release of the funds frozen at the Macao bank/China. The United States agreed (Feb/07) to end a banking investigation that had frozen about $25 million in North Korean money.

• Some view: US is too soft (?) on North Korea. It seems to have ‘given up’ hope of ever making Pyongyang abandon its nuclear program and is now trying to start “arms control” negotiations: the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” has developed a huge hole. Among Japanese, some are also starting to voice such a distrust of the United States. Yet many Japanese view it is important to maintain deterrence under the Japan-US. security alliance,” in coping with the North Korean nucleoli issues.

• US: Executive Order 13382 aimed at stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction authorizes U.S. sanctions against companies and individuals involved in or supporting weapons of mass destructions or missiles by such means as freezing their assets or banning transactions with them. Based on the order, the United States has imposed such economic sanctions on 11 North Korean companies.

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‘Another’ Six-Party Talks :Sept 27- Oct 3/07

• Brought the proposed agreement on “Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” (Sept 19/06) back home for final review and approval;  North Korea’s Leader Kim Jong Il apparently signed off on the Chinese-produced draft (as did his U.S., South Korean, Russian and Japanese counterparts) and the “breakthrough” was subsequently announced on 3/07.

• Oct 3/07: The joint document on the second phase of measures to denuclearize North Korea released by the six nations; stipulates that North Korea will disable three nuclear facilities in Yongbyon (North Korea)  by the end of 2007 and declare the details of its nuclear programs; The Oct. 3 implementation plan is a “complete and correct declaration of all  North Korean nuclear programs.

• In return, the United States will start the process of removing North Korea from its list of countries supporting terrorism and will stop application of the Trading with the Enemy Act; The six countries also reconfirmed economic, energy and humanitarian aid equivalent to 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. The implementation plan recalls Washington’s commitment to begin the process of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and states that the U.S. will fulfill this commitment “in parallel” (?)  with North Korea’s fulfillment of its Oct. 3 .

• North Korea (Sept/07): a key nuclear reactor in Yongbyon will be one of the facilities that will be disabled as part of the second stage of the country’s denuclearization. [Ri Gun, director general of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s American Affairs Bureau, confirmed the plan after attending a two-day meeting of a working group under the six-party process on North Korea’s denuclearization.]
• The accusation by the United States in 2002 that North Korea was running a program to ‘enrich uranium,’ which can be used in nuclear weapons: However, North Korea has denied the accusation and the uranium. This issue will keep remaining a sticking point for the denuclearization talks to come.
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North Korea: ‘Nuclear Power’ (?)

• North Korea: now that it has tested a nuclear device and declared itself a nuclear weapons state.  North Korea portrays itself as a nuclear power. But the United States has had no intention to welcome the country into the nuclear club.  North Korea renewed threats to “improve its nuclear deterrent.

• North Korea: the country would not abandon its nuclear weapons unless the United States abandoned its “hostile policy” against it. North Korea is not likely to give up its quest to become a full nuclear power and that any talks are merely a stalling tactic or an attempt to foster good will from China, which is North Korea’s main aid supplier.

• North Korea: The problem will be resolved when the US ‘hostile policy’ is changed to a policy of co-existence.

Talks to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program ended without tangible progress: ANOTHER Stalemate

China and North Korea:

1. China’s leverage:

• China: As North Korea’s largest aid donor and trading partner, Beijing holds considerable leverage over its traditional ally in pressuring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. China is the North’s leading ally. China, which sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers to fight and die in the 1950-53 war on the Korean peninsula (Korean War), is one of the signatories to the armistice.

• China has leverage (?) over North Korea with its massive provision of food and oil, which meet a major part of the North’s needs. China: provides most of North Korea’s oil, and for a few days (2003) it shut off the spigot. It was a technical problem (?): It was a reminder (?) that if the North Koreans pushed things too far, they could suffer a high price.

• China rejected a U.S. proposal to cut off North Korea’s oil supply as a way to pressure N. Korea government to return to disarmament talks: China rebuffed the U.S. idea, claiming it would damage their pipeline as well. China complained the US was focused on too narrow a range of tools for China to influence North Korea.

• Any violence, instability or collapse in North Korea could find China entering the territory under terms of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance: the Chinese presence might deter U.S. adventurism if Washington tried to force a solution of the Korean Peninsula crisis in a way that was perceived as directly affecting Chinese interests.

1. China’s ‘ambiguity’ (?)

• But China: adopts a strategy of calculated ambiguity about whether to come to North Korea’s defense.

• North Korea asked (?) China to share its nuclear weapons technology following China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, but Chairman Mao refused. Shortly thereafter, North Korean relations with China began to deteriorate and they worsened during China’s Cultural Revolution.

• Close Sino-North Korean ties continue, but Beijing is striving to maintain a balance in its relationship with the two Koreas: a far cry from its previous four decades of dealing solely with Pyongyang. China welcomed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, making clear its preference for a non-nuclear Korea. Beijing also urged North Korea to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

• China, which has been crucial in realizing the multilateral talks, attempts to enhance its international status by continuing its mediation between North Korea and the United States.

1. China’s concerns:

• China has been active in seeking a settlement to the nuclear issue because North Korea’s nuclearization can arm other countries like Japan and Taiwan, and that could lead to a negative impact on its economic development. It also does not want to see U.S. influence strengthened in Northeast Asia.

• China: Concerned about the “nuclear domino effect” in Asia.

• China has been active in seeking a settlement to the nuclear issue because North Korea’s nuclearization can arm other countries (Domino Effect) in Northeast Asia like Japan and Taiwan, and that could lead to a negative impact on its economic development.

• China: has sought to maintain a neutral position while urging both parties to continue negotiating; to play the role of mediator when North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s regime became increasingly inclined to resort to brinkmanship diplomacy

• China, under the new leadership of Hu Jintao, asked North Korea (2003) to renegotiate their half-century-old mutual defense treaty. North Korea reportedly replied that the timing was not good, with the United States pressuring North Korea over its nuclear program. Mutual defense treaty between the two neighbors: the China-Korean Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation of 1961 — is still valid (2006).

1. China and Denuclearization:

• China holds that the Korean peninsula should be nuclear free and reasonable security concerns of North Korea of Korea should be addressed:

(1) North Korea would abandon its nuclear program and agree to intrusive inspections.

(2) The United States would provide a firm security guarantee and, along with its allies, offer aid, investment and other economic incentives to the cash-strapped country.

• China: hopes to avoid being dragged into a conflict between its longtime ally, North Korea, and a vital trading partner, the United States.

• China’s strategy at the talks: China proposed a four-point declaration stating:

1. That all sides agree that the Korean peninsula should remain nuclear free,
2. That the issue must be resolved peacefully,
3. That North Korea’s security concerns must be addressed,
4. and that talks should be continued in the near future.

Even the Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea) would not support possible US “preemptive” attack on North Korea, not to say China, Russia and Japan.

• Since August/2003, China has hosted fifth rounds of six-party talks. Fifth rounds (as of Nov 2005) of the six-party talks, hosted by China, have so far been held to try to end the nuclear confrontation between North Korea and the United States.

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North Korea’s Nuclear Test and UN Resolution:

• After test-launching ballistic missiles (July/06), Pyongyang (North Korea) went ahead with its first nuclear test (Oct/06).

• In the wake of the nuclear test, even China and Russia voted with the rest of the international community in favor of a United Nations Security Council resolution for sanctions against North Korea.

• China’s view: North Korea’s missile tests and a nuclear test (2006) have made the Northeast Asian situation more ”complex and challenging.”

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• There are Different Schools of Thought on the Motivations behind North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program:

1. External Threat: North Korea’s nuclear motivations constitute a serious external threat. This school of thought has been based on the following evidences: North Korea’s initiation of the Korean War, acts of terrorism, forward-deployed military forces, a constitution that states that the DPRK (North Korea) is the sole legitimate government for all of Korea, and Korean Workers’ Party bylaws calling for a “completion of the revolution in the south.”

2. Defensive in nature: Another school of thought is based that North Korea is a state that is satisfied with the status quo; it seeks peaceful coexistence with South Korea and the international community. North Korea’s nuclear motivations are defensive in nature and they are designed to deter external threats to North Korea.

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Mutual Distrust: North Korea and The United States

• Since 1945 North Korea’s relationship with the United States has been marked by almost continuous confrontation and mistrust. North Korea views the United States as the strongest imperialist force in the world and as the successor to Japanese imperialism.

• The Korean War only intensified this perception. The United States views North Korea as an international outlaw/rogue state. (Recently dubbed as “axis of evil”)

• The uneasy armistice that halted the intense fighting of the Korean War has occasionally been broken. Perpetuating the mutual distrust was North Korea’s 1968 seizure of the United States Navy intelligence-gathering ship Pueblo, the downing of a United States reconnaissance plane in 1969, and the 1976 killing of two American soldiers at the Panmunjom “Peace Village” in the middle of the DMZ.

• North Korea’s assassination of several South Korean cabinet officials in 1983 in Myanmar and the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner in 1987 likewise has reinforced United States perceptions of North Korea as unworthy of having diplomatic or economic ties with the United States.

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The 1994 Agreed Framework: US and North Korea

• S.-D.P.R.K. (North Korea) bilateral talks: both nations in Geneva on October 21, 1994. This Agreed Framework committed North Korea to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon; North Korea agreed to freeze its existing nuclear program to be monitored by the IAEA.

• In return, the D.P.R.K. was to receive alternative energy, initially in the form of heavy fuel oil (HFO), and eventually two proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWR). Both sides agreed to cooperate to replace the D.P.R.K.’s graphite-moderated reactors for related facilities with light-water (LWR) power plants, to be financed and supplied by an international consortium (later identified as KEDO/Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization).

[KEDO: Regarding the implementation of the Agreed Framework, on March 9, 1995, the Governments of the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan agreed to establish the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, commonly referred to as KEDO. The 15-member European Union joined KEDO and became an executive board member on September 19, 1997.  South Korea, the U.S., Japan and the EU—will shoulder the financial burden for the project.]

• The Bush administration has called for an inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, while Pyongyang has demanded U.S. compensation for the long-delayed construction of two LWRs, one of which was supposed to be completed by 2003 under the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea: What is important is not inspections but compensation to North Korea for electricity shortages that resulted from the delay in construction due to KEDO’s lack of funds.

• Suspension of KEDO: Nov. 11/2003: The United States, Japan and South Korea halt oil supplies to North Korea promised under the 1994 deal

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North Korea and Iraq: A Comparative Analysis

One View:

1. Moral situations are different. Iraq first launched a war against Iran because of border disputes, later it invaded its neighboring country Kuwait, so morally, not any country in the world stood on the Iraqi side. The DPRK has not committed aggression against its neighbors, nor has it launched wars, so there is no moral basis for the United States to use force against the DPRK.2. Causes of disputes are different. The United States claimed that Iraq used chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran War and in its suppression of the Kurdish people.

The DPRK has not used any weapons of mass destruction.

3. The mindsets of neighboring countries are different. In the process

of US threat and attack on Iraq, the Middle East countries, except Iran and Syria, actually extended their support overtly or covertly, indirectly or directly, irrespective of their official attitudes. The question of the Korean Peninsula is quite another thing. Guaranteeing that the peninsula is nuclear free, solving Korea’s security issue and safeguarding the peninsula’s peace and stability are in the interests of all countries in the region. Even the Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea) would not support possible US “pre-emptive” attack on the DPRK, not to say China, Russia and Japan.

4. Potential consequences are entirely different.

Although militarily North Korea is no match for the United States, its strength is much stronger than Iraq. Seoul with a population of over 10 million is only 60-odd km from the 38th Parallel, once Korea was forced into a blind alley, the consequence would be inconceivable.

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Tension Reduction Between the Two Koreas:

• In 1991 both Koreas signed two major agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation (the “Basic Agreement”) and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (the “Joint Declaration”): The Joint Declaration on Denuclearization was initialed on December 31, 1991. Nevertheless, there was little progress.

• In 1992 North Korea agreed to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as well as a series of IAEA inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. In practice, North Korea refused to allow special inspections of areas suspected of holding nuclear waste, and threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)–bringing North-South progress to an abrupt halt in the process.

• On his inauguration in February 1998, R.O.K. (South Korea) President Kim Dae-jung enunciated a new policy of engagement with North Korea dubbed “The Sunshine Policy.” The policy had three fundamental principles: no tolerance of provocations from the North, no intention to absorb the North, and the separation of political cooperation from economic cooperation.

• Inter-Korean summit was held in Pyongyang June 13-15, 2000:

The full text of The South-North Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, which was made in the summit, is as follows:

China and Russia with North Korea’s Missile Test:

• North Korea test-fired seven missiles (Jul 5/06) . All of them fell on the Sea of Japan. The long-range Taepodong-2 missile apparently failed 40 seconds into its flight.

• China: the test firings a “regret” and Beijing was “concerned.”

• China and Russia have maintained close ties with North Korea, particularly China continues to support the North with oil and food aid.

• The United States and Japan: had urged North Korea to stick with the moratorium on long-range missile tests it declared in 1999, after it fired a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan in 1998.

Japan’s Reaction:

• Japan: terming the missile tests “violation” and “provocation” and calling for “sanctions” and “their referral to the UN Security Council.” Vowing “stern action” that may include economic sanctions and had included a half-year ban on the sole ferry linking the two countries (Japan and North Korea)

• Japan: a “grave issue” for international security and a violation of missile-launch moratoriums agreed to bilaterally with Japan as well as multilaterally with other nations; the 1999 missile-test moratorium agreed upon by North Korea after it fired a Taepodong-1 missile, part of which flew over Japan into the Pacific Ocean, in August 1998.

• Japan: it would violate the 2002 “Pyongyang Declaration” signed between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, in which the North pledged to maintain its moratorium on launching ballistic missiles.

• North Korea shocked the world in August 1998, when it test-fired the 2,500-km range Taepodong-1, part of which flew over Japan and into the Pacific.

• North Korea had observed a moratorium on long-range missile launches since 1999. It shocked the world in 1998 by firing a Taepodong missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.

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Two proposals: ‘Sanctions’ on North Korea

1. The Japan-U.S. proposal: which refers to Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter.

• Japan and the United States had maintained that the resolution should be adopted under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which would have paved the way for economic sanctions or military action against Pyongyang over the missile launches, to make it legally binding: The Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter provides legal grounds for imposing sanctions on North Korea

• But China and Russia, North Korea’s closest allies, strongly opposed any reference to Chapter 7 and China said it would veto a resolution containing such a reference.

• China and Russia expressed the desire for a weaker council statement — something that would avoid sanctions and the weight of international law.

• The Japanese draft is backed by the U.S., Britain, Slovakia, Greece and France. They say the Chinese proposal is too weak.

• The United States and other backers of the Japanese-sponsored resolution had agreed to postpone a vote to give Beijing time to lobby the North. But North Korea appeared to reject (?) diplomatic overtures by a visiting Chinese delegation to Pyongyang (July/06)

2. The China-Russia proposal:

• China and Russia want to refrain from invoking Chapter 7 and describing the North Korean missile launches as a threat. With Russia’s support, China has proposed a much weaker text that eliminates any threat of military force, and also drops mandatory sanctions. It calls on Pyongyang to re-establish a moratorium on missile tests and requests — but does not demand — that all U.N. member states “exercise vigilance in preventing” material and technology that could be used in missiles from getting to North Korea.

• They drafted a separate resolution denouncing the missile launches but stopped short of making sanctions mandatory. The resolution presented informally to Security Council members by China and Russia criticizes the missile launches, but stops short of calling for economic sanctions against North Korea.

• There is no reference in the resolution of China and Russia to Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter that could result in sanctions against Pyongyang. There is also no wording that says North Korea’s missile launches pose a threat to international peace and security.

Revision of US-Japan proposal:

• Japan and the United States submitted a revised draft resolution on North Korea’s missile launches to the U.N. Security Council after failing to come to terms with China and Russia over key provisions whether U.N. action will be made mandatory and legally binding.

The United States and Japan agreed:  to delete reference to Chapter 7 and accepted a compromise proposal France and Britain offered to try to break the impasse, calling for deleting reference to the chapter from a revised draft resolution Japan and the United States submitted previously.

• The latest revised draft, co-sponsored by Japan, the United States and six other Council members, also uses the word ”requires” rather than ”decides” that member states prevent weapons-related goods from being imported from or exported to North Korea.

• China pressed for keeping the council united on the issue.
  China and Russia had been working on passage of a nonbinding Security Council president’s statement. But they decided to go with a resolution because that would allow the Security Council to unite in sending a message.

• Japan once submitted a resolution for Security Council consideration that invoked Chapter 7, authorizing sanctions or military action, and referred to the flurry of missiles North Korea launched into the Sea of Japan as a threat to regional security.

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‘Unanimous’ Resolution by UN:

• The U.N. Security Council voted (July 15/06) unanimously to impose limited sanctions on North Korea for its recent missile tests: The resolution bans all U.N. member states from selling material or technology for missiles or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea, and from receiving missiles, banned weapons or technology from Pyongyang.

• The resolution demands that the DPRK (North Korea) suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and in this context re-establish its preexisting commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.

• Strongly urges the DPRK to return immediately to the six-party talks without precondition, abandon all nuclear- related weapons and programs and return to the Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

• While China is unlikely to intervene with North Korea on behalf of American nonproliferation objectives, further crisis escalation would entail great costs for China and/or South Korea.

• The DPRK: Totally rejects the resolution adopted by the UN Security Council.

• UNSC Resolution 1718 that calls on U.N. member nations to observe a ban on procurement of large weapons, including parts, from North Korea, among other measures to implement sanctions on the country.

• Yet only 68 countries have reported that they are in the process of implementing the sanctions. Of these, 31 already have appropriate legislation in place, while 27 others have informed the council that they have already taken or will take measures to put the sanctions in place. The total of countries in both categories constitutes less than one-third of the 192 member states and territories of the United Nations.

• The U.N. resolution leaves enforcement of ship inspections to individual countries. No nation, including the United States, dared carry out an inspection. If North Korea continues delaying the shutting down and sealing of its Yongbyon nuclear facility as agreed on Feb 13^th (07) deal at the Six-party Talks, it remains to be seen whether the UNSC can immediately reinforce the sanctions.

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North Korea’s Views and Responses: Missile Tests and The UN Resolution

• North Korea: The latest ‘successful’ missile launches were part of the routine military exercises: staged to increase the nation’s military capacity for self-defense.

• Missile tests: an exercise of its legitimate right as a sovereign state, which is neither bound to any international law nor to bilateral or multilateral agreements such as the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration and the joint statement of the Six-party Talks.

• The DPRK (North Korea) is not a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and, therefore, is not bound to any commitment under it. North Korea ”totally rejects” the resolution (The UN) on the grounds that since it was not a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime, it did not have any commitment to abide by it.
• As for the moratorium on long-range missile test-fire that the DPRK agreed with the U.S. in 1999, it was valid only when the DPRK-U.S. dialogue was under way. The US Bush administration scrapped all the agreements its preceding administration concluded with the DPRK and totally scuttled the bilateral dialogue.

• The DPRK had already clarified in March 2005 that its moratorium on the missile test-fire lost its validity.
• North Korea: justified the missile launches as a way of keeping balance and preserving peace and stability in Northeast Asia;  determined to continue conducting missile launch exercises.

• North Korea: We would like to ask the U.S. and Japan if they had ever notified the DPRK of their ceaseless missile launches in the areas close to it.
• The DPRK remains unchanged in its will to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula in a negotiated peaceful manner just as it committed itself in the September 19/06 joint statement of the Six-party Talks (see previously discussed).

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North Korea and US Sanctions:

• North Korea has been adamant in refusing to return to the negotiating table for the six-party talks on its nuclear issue unless the United States lifts sanctions on a Macao-based bank suspected of laundering money and counterfeiting for North Korea.
• The United States is even studying the feasibility of imposing economic sanctions against some Chinese banks that have business transactions with North Korean companies involved in development or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: But The banks being considered as targets of economic sanctions are small banks in China.

• The proposed new sanctions are aimed at putting more pressure on North Korea. The U.S. government seeks more ways to put pressure on North Korea as Pyongyang has refused to return to the six-way talks.

• Hard-liners within the U.S. government: see the current sanctions as being effective as they have made many Chinese and European banks hesitate to do any deals with North Korea.

• US: Executive Order 13382 aimed at stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction authorizes U.S. sanctions against companies and individuals involved in or supporting weapons of mass destructions or missiles by such means as freezing their assets or banning transactions with them. Based on the order, the United States has imposed such economic sanctions on 11 North Korean companies.

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[Concept of Operations Plan 5029:

• United States and South Korea agreed to give shape to guidelines for dealing with unforeseen crises in North Korea, which is known as Concept of Operations Plan 5029, by the end of 2007. The Concept of Operations Plan 5029 was devised in 1999.

• The plan aims to reinforce strategies to deal with sudden changes in North Korea, such as local rebel groups stealing its weapons of mass destruction and transferring them to a third country. ]

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North Korea and US: Denuclearization and Delisting (2007)

• Agreements made at the Six-party Talks in October/07 over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, including the planned dismantling of nuclear facilities and precise reports from Pyongyang on all nuclear projects by year-end/2007. Under the agreements reached by the six countries in October/07, North Korea has to disable its Yongbyon nuclear facility within the year 2007 and report all of its nuclear plans.

[An ‘assessment’ of the six-party talks: The six-party talks aim to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns as a result of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Since 2003, a series of meetings with six participating states has been held in China: North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and the talks were a result of its withdrawal. It is generally assessed that five rounds of talks from 2003 to 2007 produced little net progress, except the third phase of the fifth round of talks, when North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan. North Korea has not met its year-end (Dec 31/07) deadline as previously mentioned ]

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[North Korea and the list of terrorism-sponsoring states]

• Removal (?) of North Korea from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states: North Korea on the ‘Terrorist List’

• Under the Oct. 3 six-way deal/07, the United States is committed to beginning the process of removing North Korea from the list if Pyongyang moves ahead with its denuclearization obligations.

• US put North Korea on the list in 1988 after the bombing of a South Korean airliner the preceding year. The Korean Air Lines flight crashed into the Indian Ocean, killing all 115 people on board.

• States named on the U.S. list are subject to sanctions, including a ban on arms-related sales to the country. Removal from the list could pave the way for North Korea to gain access to aid from international financial institutions such as the World Bank.

[Conditions required for the delisting]

• US: mentioned three conditions that would have to be met before North Korea would be removed from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states.

• These are:

(1) Progress in the disabling of North Korea’s nuclear facilities;

(2)  Adequate reporting;

(3) and guarantees that Pyongyang would not proliferate nuclear technology.

• US: North Korea’s complete declaration of its nuclear programs and disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon (North Korea) are “political conditions” to remove North Korea from the list of nations supporting terrorism.

• The United States had demanded that Pyongyang make declarations on all:

* Nuclear-related materials, facilities and plans.

* Uranium enrichment programs.

* Transfer of nuclear technology.

[North Korea’s ‘Refusal’]

• North Korea had refused to declare its past uranium enrichment programs and nuclear technology transfers.

• Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. envoy at the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs said (Dec/07): North Korea has failed to meet ‘political conditions’ to be removed from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism at this stage.

• To achieve the goal, North Korea should cooperate with the United States through denuclearization. The fact that North Korea is showing a negative attitude on the declaration of its nuclear programs may impact on the future prospects of the six-party talks.  Hill made clear that negotiations at the six-party talks have degenerated into a standoff (?).

• North Korea: is ruling out stating the whereabouts of its nuclear arms in an upcoming initial declaration list of its entire nuclear activities but could disclose information about weaponized plutonium; the list is expected to center on information on plutonium and other fissile materials.

• Yet, the U.S. government’s action to remove North Korea from its list of terror-sponsoring countries would be delayed if Pyongyang’s declaration on plutonium is insufficient.

• US: North Korea has still not done enough to convince the United States that it is serious about dismantling its nuclear programs. US expressed concern about whether North Korea was accurately reporting on its nuclear facilities and if it was committed to working to prevent nuclear proliferation.  North Korea’s reporting of its nuclear facilities was incomplete and that the measures taken so far were insufficient (as of Dec/07).

• North Korea, however, has been seeking a normalization of relations with the United States; It wants to be removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism or removal of North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act of the US.

[Bush’s ‘personal’ letter]

• President George W. Bush urged North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to fully disclose its nuclear programs, atomic materials and ‘proliferation’ activities. In his personal letter, President Bush addressed Kim Jong Il: Dear Mr. Chairman” and stressed the need for North Korea to come forward with a full and complete declaration of its nuclear programs as promised. Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, handed the letter to the North Korea during his visit to Pyongyang (Dec/07). If Pyongyang agrees to provide a ”complete and correct” declaration of its nuclear programs by the end of the year 2007, it is likely that U.S. will drop the country from its list of state sponsors of terror.”

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[North Korea’s ‘Perception’ of the Delisting]

North Korea said: a six-party agreement on its denuclearization means the United States will take the country off its blacklist of terrorism sponsors once it disables its key nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.

• (As of Dec/07): North Korea is likely to miss its Dec. 31 deadline for declaring all of its nuclear programs due to the compensation measurers falling behind schedule; North Korea argues: The compensation has been slower than the  disablement measures taken by North Korea. South Korea, the United States and China have so far  provided to North Korea a total of 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and South Korea alone about 5,000 tons of steel plates.
• As of early Jan/08: North Korea missed its Dec. 31/07 deadline; North Korea has not met its commitments by providing a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs and slowing down the process of disablement. North Korea instead urged the United States to end what it called a ”hostile” policy toward the country, and called for the signing of a peace pact to officially end the Korean War. The 1950-1953 Korean War has never been formally concluded, ending in an armistice rather than a peace treaty.

• North Korea’s ‘another’ reason for not meeting the deadline: The compensation by US, among others that was agreed in the Six-party Talks has been slower than the disablement measures taken by North Korea. South Korea, the United States and China have so far  provided to North Korea a total of 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and South Korea alone about 5,000 tons of steel plates.

[Fulfillment of obligation vs. ”complete and correct” declaration]

• North Korea (Jan/08): insisted it has already fulfilled most of its obligations by disabling its nuclear facilities to the utmost extent and by declaring its nuclear programs to the United States; North Korea is not to blame for the failed 31 deadline to implement a six-way deal.

• US: calls instead on North Korea to submit a ”complete and correct” declaration on its nuclear programs; North Korea’s declaration should cover its suspected uranium enrichment program, separate from a known plutonium-based program, and the alleged transfer of nuclear technologies to other countries such as Syria.

• The United States does not regard North Korea’s account about its nuclear programs as a final declaration it was to make by the end of last year under a six-party nuclear deal. US has been notified about some of the contents from North Korea but US insist that the declaration should be received by the chairman of the six-party talks, that is, the Chinese.

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[Japan’s Objection to the ‘Delisting’ from terrorism-sponsoring states]

• Japan ahs been objecting to the delisting of North Korea from terrorism-sponsoring states.

• Japan: urged the United States to keep North Korea on the list until the abduction issue has been resolved. States named on the U.S. list are subject to sanctions, including a ban on arms-related sales to the country. Removal from the list could pave the way for Pyongyang to gain access to aid from international financial institutions such as the World Bank.

• US: North Korea cannot drive a wedge between the United States and Japan on the handling of Pyongyang’s decades-old abduction of Japanese nationals. U.S. President George W. Bush is tilting toward notifying Congress of his intention to remove North Korea from the terror list by the end of the year /2007 despite Japan’s strong objection to the move.

• The Japanese government has urged North Korea to have extracted plutonium, nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment programs subject to the declaration of Pyongyang’s nuclear development programs at the six-party talks.

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(Developments/2008)

• Aug/08: North Korea has stopped disabling its nuclear reactor and will consider restoring the plutonium-producing facility in anger over US’s failure to remove it from the US list of terror sponsors.

• Oct/15/2008: The U.S. removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

• Despite the delisting, most of the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on the regime will remain effectively in place. Following the U.S. decision, North Korea pledged to resume the disabling of its Yongbyon reprocessing plant. But the most challenging part: North Korea to abandon ‘all’ its nuclear programs.

• The United States put North Korea on the terror list in 1988 after the mid-air bombing of a Korean Air jetliner in 1987. The blast killed more than 100 people on board. In 1983, a bombing blamed on North Korea killed or injured many South Korean government officials during a visit to Myanmar (Burma) by then South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan. Chun escaped the terrorist attack unhurt.

Oct/08   After the US’s delisting:

• North Korea will resume disablement work at its Yongbyon nuclear complex and allow US and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to verify the process.

• North Korea would immediately return to disabling work at its Yongbyon nuclear facility.

• North Korea halted the disablement in mid-August in anger at the US over what it called a delay in the terror delisting. Yet, the removal from its terror blacklist is provisional, and North Korea will be put back on the list if it does not comply with the inspections.

• North Korea suspended the disablement work at the reactor and other facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex as of August 14 /08 because the US did not keep its promise to delist Pyongyang as a terror sponsor under last year’s (2007) deal.
• Removal from the terror list is one of the key concessions offered to the North Korea in exchange for shutting down and disabling the reactor under a landmark six-nation deal reached in 2007.

Verification issue: 2008

• Nov/08: North Korea said to slow disablement of its main nuclear plant after US said energy aid to the state had been suspended due to failed talks on verifying the North’s operations. North Korea had failed to agree to specific steps on verifying its nuclear activities at multilateral talks (The Six-party Talks) in Beijing/Dec 08.

• All five countries negotiating with North Korea — Japan, Russia, China, the United States and South Korea — had agreed (?) that future fuel shipments would not go forward until there was progress on a so-called verification protocol with Pyongyang. This is an action-for-action process: future fuel shipments aren’t going to move forward absent a verification regime. But Russia said there had been no agreement about suspending fuel shipments; the Russian delegation had not agreed upon any joint arrangements with the United States about a delay or suspension of fuel oil shipments to North Korea as an offset against dismantling of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre.

• North Korea would probably adjust the pace of disablement at nuclear facilities if (the aid) is suspended. North Korea has been in negotiations with the United States over its nuclear arms programme for more than a decade and the issue took on extra urgency after Pyongyang held its first nuclear test explosion in October 2006.

• Some view: North Korea is holding out on a verification protocol until the Obama administration takes over in January/09.

• By mid-November/08, North Korea had received about half of the amount promised by the five and the United States has provided about 200,000 tons of that, the State Department said. An unspecified amount of fuel was delivered by Russia and will finish being offloaded in North Korea.But US said Russia had made clear in recent six party talks (Dec/08) in Beijing that any future shipments would not be made until North Korea agreed to the verification protocol.

• Dec/08, chief U.S. envoy Christopher Hill and his DARK (North Korea) counterpart, Kim Kye Gwan, met in Singapore. The talks were reported to be substantive, but the two parties failed to reach a deal on sampling of atomic materials.

The Six-party talks/Dec, 08:

• The Chinese host called on the six nations to continue to adhere to the principles of “word for word, action for action” and” phased implementation.” ;  with the issue of verification topping the agenda;  discussed fuel oil, the issues of disablement schedule and verification. The difficulty lies in how to verify Dark’s (North Korea)  nuclear program. To produce a verification protocol and a clear road map of what parties need to do to complete the verification.
• Under an agreement reached at the six-party talks in February 2007, the DPRK agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and programs. It promised to declare all its nuclear programs and facilities by the end of 2007. In return, DPRK would get diplomatic and economic incentives. The six parties agreed to a disarmament schedule in October 2007. The DPRK said it has slowed down that process because of sluggish economic compensation.

Kim Jong Il’s health: Recent developments/As of 2008

(Kim Jong Il died of heart attack on Dec 17/2011)

Speculation over the health of North Korea  leader Kim Jong-Il: The 66-year-old Kim disappeared from public view in mid-August (14 0r 15) /08 and failed appear on two important national holidays (including Foundation Day of Sept 9), leading to speculation that he was seriously ill. United States and South Korean officials said : Kim had suffered a stroke and had undergone brain surgery, but North Korea has denied that he is unwell.

• North Korea released photos, showing Kim inspecting a military unit and appearing healthy, but it did not say when the pictures were taken. North Korea has denied claims that its leader Kim Jong Il is seriously ill and may have suffered a stroke; to dismiss what it said were “conspiracy theories.” A senior North Korean diplomat dismissed reports that Kim was ill as “a conspiracy plot,”

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(Developments/Dec 09)

• U.S. and North Korea ‘agree’ on need for 6-party talks: Stephen Bosworth, The US special representative for North Korea policy visited Pyongyang during the  Dec 09-Dec. 10 /09 period. The United States and North Korea have reached a ”common understanding” on the need to resume the six-party denuclearization talks and to implement a 2005 deal reached in the talks.

• In 2005, North Korea pledged to surrender its nuclear weapons in exchange for aid and security guarantees, but it later reneged and walked away from the six-party talks. A joint statement issued by the six-party nations in September 2005 said North Korea had “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”

• Bosworth’s trip to Pyongyang/North Korea was to persuade North Korea to return to six-party nuclear disarmament talks — which also group South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. Though failing to set a date for the North’s return to the six-party process, the US envoy said both sides agreed on the need to resume nuclear disarmament talks during what he termed “very useful” meetings.

(April/09: Withdrawal from the six party talks)

• In April/09: angry at international censure of its long-range rocket launch(April 5/09), North Korea declared the six-party talks “dead“. It later said it had resumed making weapons-grade plutonium.

• North Korea (People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) had threatened to conduct a second nuclear test in protest after the United Nations Security Council adopted a presidential statement condemning the country after it launched a rocket, which it claimed was carrying satellite, on 5 April 2009. The launch was condemned by several nations, describing it as an intercontinental ballistic missile test.

• An anchor of Korea Central Television (North Korea) announces the statement by the Foreign Ministry, “We will never participate in Six-party talk again,” April 14/09

[North Korea says it will stop participating in the six party talks and refuses to move forward on denuclearization agreements in response to the United Nations Security Council’s “presidential statement” about its recent rocket launch. This recent development means the Korean peninsula will see increased tensions for some time to come.

North Korea: The six-party talks have turned into a platform for infringing upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and forcing the DPRK to disarm itself and bring down the system of the DPRK,” ; North Korea “will no longer participate in the talks, nor will it be bound to any agreement of the six-party talks.”  North Korea also says it is going to restart activity at its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, after halting operations there in July 2007, and that it will begin reprocessing to extract weapons-grade plutonium. ]

May/09: North Korea also conducted an underground nuclear test (May 2009). 2009: The 2009 North Korean nuclear test was the underground detonation of a nuclear device conducted on 25 May 2009 by North Korea. This was its second nuclear test, the first test having taken place in October 2006. Following the nuclear test, Pyongyang also conducted several missile tests in 2006. The test was nearly universally condemned by the international community. Following the test, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1874 condemning the test and tightening sanctions on the country.

Pyongyang’s goal is to be considered a new member of the world’s nuclear-armed nations, a status the U.S. and other nations say they will never bestow.

(Diversionary tactics?: Some View)

Some view that the test was conducted as a result of a succession crisis in the country. After Kim Jong-Il suffered a stroke in the summer of 2008, arrangements were made for his third son, Kim Jong-un, to take power upon his death. It is believed the North Koreans conducted the nuclear test to show that, even in a time of possible weakness, it did not intend to give up its nuclear weapons program.

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[Recent developments: 2010]

The Sinking of a South Korean Warship:

• The sinking of a South Korean warship killed 46 sailors in March 26/2010.

• The ROKS Cheonan sinking occurred on 26 March 2010, when the Cheonan, a South Korean Navy ship carrying 104 personnel, sank off the country’s west coast near Baengnyeong Island (see below) in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 seamen.
• ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) was a South Korean Pohang-class corvette of the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), commissioned in 1989. It broke in two and sank near the sea border with North Korea.
• An investigation conducted by an international team of experts from South Korea, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden concluded that Cheonan was sunk by a torpedo launched by a North Korean Yeono class miniature submarine.
• North Korea has denied culpability.
• On 9 July 2010, the United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the attack but without identifying the attacker.

[Baengnyeong Island]

*The island is located on the South Korean (ROK) side of the Northern Limit Line (NLL: see below), the de facto boundary dividing South from North Korea (DPRK). The ship had a crew of 104 men at the time of sinking, and a total of 58 crew were rescued. Another 46 crew were dead. North Korea denied any involvement in the sinking of Cheonan.

 [The Northern Limit Line or North Limit Line (NLL)]

*NLL is a disputed inter-Korea maritime demarcation line in the Yellow (West) Sea between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the north, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the south. This line of military control acts as the de facto maritime boundary between North and South Korea. The 1953 Armistice Agreement which was signed by both North Korea and the United Nations Command, ended the Korean War and specified that the five islands including Yeonpyeong Island, Baengnyeong Island would remain under United Nations Command and South Korean control. However, they did not agree on a maritime demarcation line, primarily because the United Nations Command wanted to base it on three nautical miles of territorial waters, while North Korea wanted to use twelve nautical miles.

*After the United Nations Command and North Korea failed to reach an agreement, the line was set by the United Nations military forces on August 30, 1953. As a result, while the NLL was not part of the armistice signed in July of that year, the United Nations Command drew up the NLL the following month as a practical operational control measure based on straight line segments between 12 approximate channel midpoints, extended in an arc to prevent egress between both sides. On its western end the line extends out along the 38th parallel to the median line between Korea and China. The line was originally drawn to prevent southern incursions into the north. However, its role has since been transformed to prevent North Korean ships heading south.

*Whilst the NLL was drawn up at a time when a three nautical mile territorial waters limit was the norm, by the 1970s a twelve nautical mile limit had became internationally accepted, and the enforcement of the NLL prevented North Korea, in areas, from accessing significant territorial waters (arguably actual or prospective). In 1973, North Korea began disputing the NLL. Later, after the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the NLL also hindered North Korea’s ability to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone to control fishing in the area.

*It is unclear when North Korea was informed of the existence of the NLL. Many sources suggest this was done promptly, but in 1973 Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush stated, in a now declassified, “Joint State-Defense Message” to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul that “We are aware of no evidence that NLL has ever been officially presented to North Korea. However, South Korea argues that until the 1970s North Korea tacitly recognized the line as a sea demarcation line. The North records the NLL as a sea demarcation line on Chosun Central Yearbook published by North Korean authorities. ]

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Chronicles (years) of missile/nuclear tests of North Korea: as of Dec/2017

• Missile tests
  • 1993
  • 2006
  • 2009
  • 2013
  • 2014
  • 2017
• Nuclear tests
  • 2006
  • 2009
  • 2013
  • January 2016
  • September 2016
  • 2017

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1994: First agreement
North Korea and the U.S. sign an agreement for North Korea to stop and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In return, North Korea will get aid to build two power-producing nuclear reactors.

1998: Provocation
North Korea fires a rocket that flies over Japan and lands in the Pacific Ocean, proving it has the ability to strike its neighbor.

Later in the year, North Korea and the U.S. start holding talks over the suspected construction of an underground nuclear facility. The U.S. demands inspections.

1999: U.S. eases sanctions
North Korea allows U.S. inspections in return for help on its potato yields. Inspectors find no evidence of nuclear activity during its visit.

Later in the year, President Bill Clinton agrees to ease economic sanctions against the country. A U.S.-led international consortium also agrees to sign a $4.6 billion contract to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea.

2001: North Korea threats
Unhappy with the progress on its promised power plants, North Korea threatens to restart its nuclear weapons program. It says it will start testing missiles again unless normalized relations are resumed with the U.S.

2002: ‘Axis of evil’
In his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush says North Korea, Iran and Iraq are an “axis of evil” seeking weapons of mass destruction. Later in the year, the Bush administration says North Korea has admitted having a secret program that violates the NPT.

2003: North Korea says it’s a nuclear power
North Korea withdraws from the NPT, reactivates its nuclear power facilities and begins test-firing missiles.

On April 23, it declares that it has nuclear weapons.

2004: Six-party talks begin
Negotiations begin at a summit of six nations: North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia.

North Korea offers to freeze its program in exchange for aid, eased sanctions and removal from the U.S. list of terrorist sponsors. The U.S. wants North Korea to disclose all of its nuclear activities and allow inspections.

These six-party talks would be off and on for the next two years with no long-term agreement.

2006: First nuclear test
North Korea claims to have successfully tested a nuclear weapon at an underground facility in Hwaderi. Days later, the test would be confirmed by the outside world.

Responding to the test, the U.N. Security Council approves a resolution to impose sanctions against North Korea and require an end to nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

2007: Progress?
North Korea agrees to close its main reactor for $400 million in aid. A couple of months later, the U.S. releases about $25 million of frozen North Korea funds from a bank in Macao.

North Korea also agrees to disable its nuclear program by the end of year. Days later, South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun becomes the first South Korean to walk across the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. He meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il for a three-day summit.

2008: Talks break down again
North Korea misses its deadline to disable by the end of 2007, although the destruction of a water-cooling tower in June 2008 shows promise.

In October, the U.S. announces that North Korea is taken off the list of states that sponsor terrorism. But when six-party talks resume in December, North Korea refuses to allow unfettered access to inspectors at suspected nuclear sites.

2009: Second nuclear test
North Korea announces that it has begun reprocessing spent fuel rods. One month later, it announces its second nuclear test, and the U.S. Geological Survey confirms a seismic disturbance at the same underground site used for the first test in 2006. North Korea reports that the reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods has given it enough weapons-grade plutonium for one to two nuclear bombs.

2011: U.S., North Korea meet
U.S. officials meet with a North Korean delegation to talk about resuming the six-party talks that ended in 2008.

Late in the year, the two countries meet again to discuss possible food assistance in exchange for a moratorium on nuclear activity. Kim Jong Il passes away two days later, to be replaced by son Kim Jong Un.

2012: Moratorium announced

The U.S. and North Korea both report that an agreement has been reached to halt nuclear activity.

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Some chronicles of the North Korea’s missile tests and charts

·       (2012)

DPRK Missile Ranges and Third Nuclear Test: As of May 2012

• (May/2013)

North Korean missile range

• (September 2015)

North Korea’s Missile Ranges  

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• Hwasong-15 North Korea’s latest missile test as of Nov 29/2017:

QUIZ: WEEK 8

Why has China insisted on the denuclearization of the ‘Korean Peninsula’ instead of ‘North Korea’? Assess the unreality/reality of the Six-party Talks in solving the security issues in the ‘denuclearization’ of the Korean Peninsula.

Send the answer with less than one page in length TO

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