On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience by Ronald Dworkin

On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience by Ronald Dworkin

In the essay “On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience,” by Ronald Dworkin, the rule of law is considered to be more complex and intelligent compared to the idea that all breaches of law must be punished. Dworkin provides three possibilities a good citizen has when faced with a law of dubious constitutionality. In the first option, Dworkin argues that if the law is doubtful, it remains unclear on the question of whether it allows individuals to act in a manner they want. As a result, they must assume the worst and act based on the assumptions that the law does not allow them to do so. As good citizens, they should obey the respective executive authorities responsible for commanding them, even if they believe that those authorities are wrong. They should use the political process if possible, to change the law.

In the second option, Dworkin argues that when the law is doubtful, good citizens may follow their own judgment by doing what they want or acting in a manner they feel or believes that the case permitted by law is more robust compared to the case that law does not allow. In case of a doubtful law, people should only use their judgments until other authoritative institutions such as Courts decides the right/correct way in a case they are involved in or someone else. A good citizen must comply with the decision made by authoritative institutions, even if they believe that it was wrong. According to Dworkin, individuals’ option is “foreclosed by the contrary decision of any Court,” even the lowest Court in the judicial system, especially when the case is yet to be appealed.

In the third possibility, Dworkin claims that if an individual is confronted with a doubtful law, he/she may follow his/her own judgment, even after the highest Court has made a contrary decision of the land. However, to apply this option, a good citizen should take into account the contrary decision of any Court when making his/her own judgment of what is required by the law. Otherwise, the judgment may not be reasonable or honest, given the fact that Courts’ application of the doctrine of precedent has significant impacts in permitting Courts’ decisions to change or amend the law. Dworkin believes that the third option or approach must be the correct one, mainly because the doctrine of precedent offers different weights “to the decisions of different Courts, and greatest weight to the decisions of the Supreme Court.” Dworkin argues that the doctrine of precedent does not make any Courts’ decision conclusive. In some cases, especially after a contrary ruling by the Supreme Court, it is possible for an individual to reasonably believe that law is still on his/her side. Although such cases are rare, they are most likely to occur in disputes over constitutional law, primarily when civil disobedience is involved.

The role of constitutional “case or controversy” requirement in Dworkin’s argument is to describe the system or structure in which conflicting interpretation of the law by individuals or parties must seek Courts’ help for resolution, specifically if the Court exercises its jurisdictions to interpret the questions of law presented and provide substantive relief. Dworkin used the constitutional “case or controversy” requirement in the arguments because theoretical understanding or interpretation of legal or authoritative institutions such as Courts is not commensurate with their relevant significance. The concept allows the jurisprudential significance of various legal doctrines, such as the doctrine of precedent applied by Dworkin, to escape unnoticed. The constitutional “case or controversy” requirement is derived from Article III of the Constitution. It provides a way in which issues regarding the constitution may arise, especially when they need to be addressed by the Federal Courts. It dictates more specialized notions of mootness, standings to sue, ripeness, and of course, prohibits any institution form considering specific constitutional issues, expects as “necessary incident to the resolution of a concrete ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’

When Dworkin concludes that our allegiance is to the law and not to any person’s interpretation of it, he neither undermine the authority of the Supreme Court nor the rule of law. Dworkin does not argue that an individual may disregard the Court’s decision. Given the fact that the doctrine of precedent is considered to be the core of our legal system, people make a reasonable effort to follow the rule of law by allowing the Courts to make various changes and grant Courts power to alter with precedent law using their rulings. However, Dworkin tries to argue that if the constitutional issue presented before the Court for consideration include “fundamental personal or political rights,” a contrary decision by the Supreme Court amount to reasonable mistakes, mainly because affected parties are within their social rights when they refuse to accept that Court’s ruling as conclusive.

The United States Constitution typically injects a significant amount of citizens’ political morality into the question of whether a specific law is valid. These include provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, among others. Therefore, when the law is considered doubtful or uncertain, based on the fact that a plausible case may be reached on both parties, then an individual party that follows his/her judgment does not constitute to disobedient of the Court’s ruling nor undermine the rule of law. Such a citizen does not behave unfairly, mainly because plausible cases could be made on every side, and the United States Constitution allows and encourage him/her to follow the judgment he/she seems valid.

As a result, the United States government has a “special responsibility” to protect those individuals, as well as soften their predicament. In this case, Dworkin does not mean that the government should guarantee those individuals affected by the controversial law or the Supreme Court’s decision immunity. They strongly believe that the law supports their views, although whether they have not reached such a conclusion may not be traced to validate their lack of legal sophistication. Therefore, when Dworkin argues that individuals hold their own views or judgments on the law when it is doubtful, which are not a mere prediction of the Courts’ ruling, he does not intend to develop such metaphysics.