BP Macondo Well Case
The Macondo well is situated at approximately 50 miles off the Costa of Louisiana in the region of Mississippi in the Mexican gulf. Initially, it was meant to serve the purpose of an exploratory well, which was drilled to reach the hydrocarbons, which are extractable and also to examine the associated reservoir structures. 2010, disaster on the deep horizon is considered as the most massive spill of oil in the marine in the history of the U.S (Abbasi, Wajid, Iqbal, & Zafar, 2014). Approximately 5 million barrels of oil spilled into the Mexican gulf. The disaster involved one of the most reputable companies known as BP, which had initially proclaimed its responsibility to environmental sustainability and commitment to safety. The events which resulted in the Deepwater Horizon disaster can be associated with ineffective project management (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2012). Several issues were identified by the committee formed to investigate the case. The paper discusses three major issues involved in the disaster, together with the possible potential solutions to these issues and provides the pros and cons of every solution (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2012). It wraps up with a brief recommendation of what should have been done to mitigate the disaster using concepts from Project Management (PM).
Summary of Issues
The integrity of the Cement Job . Don't use plagiarised sources.Get your custom essay just from $11/page
The decision to displace the drilling mud by seawater was made without demonstrating the integrity of the cement job. Initially, BP had experienced numerous negative pressure test with the cement job, and this should have given them a warning against proceeding with their action (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2012). According to the report provided earlier, by the investigation team, the open hole section of the well comprised of numerous reservoirs with pressure, which reduces with depth.
Notably, to prevent the flow of saltwater from the reservoir, the weight of the mud should have been observed. The importance of the fractured mud was slightly above 14.2 Ppg, as seen from the circulation lost at the 18, 260 feet (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2012). It resulted in the creation of a margin of safety in the middle in the Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD) since the ECD and the fractured weight of the mud was very small (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2012). All the activities associated with pumping cement into the annulus without breaking the reservoir of low pressure were hence challenging.
Safety Approach
The policies, procedures, and actions of the involved corporations did not present an efficient system safety approach that addresses the risks of the well. A productive culture was lacking, and it was due to the inefficient strategies for safety used in the system (Fellague, & Bennafla, 2015). The deficient systems approach was observed in the numerous poor decisions which contributed to the blowout.
The industrial management assigned the responsibility to operate the Macondo well did not adequately plan to acknowledge the safety challenges evident from the Macondo well (Wassel, 2012). Usually, the designated operator is expected to comprehend system complexities and safety issues to integrate the aspects into clear and executable operations.
The operating companies for every project hold knowledge for all the geological conditions. Improved architecture depends on how the operator can observe the right procedures (Anthopoulos, Kostavara, & Pantouvakis, 2013). The operation team responsible for the construction of the damn violated particular requirements associated with acquired knowledge from their profession.
Untimely response to the loss of reasonable control
The loss of the control of the Macondo well was not realized until it was more than 50 minutes. The hydrocarbon from the formation had already started flowing. All the attempts to regain control through using the BOP were not fruitful. The BSR was not able to properly seal the well and sever the drill (Bea, 2011). Thus, the EDS failed to separate the Deepwater Horizon and the lower marine riser from the well.
The EDS ability to function was hindered by the loss of MUX communication during the explosion of the progressive fire. The burned for approximately 7 minutes on the rig floor before the activation of the EDS was tried (Bea, 2011). The Crew was not able to detect the flow of the well until the excitation of mud and ultimately expelled out of the riser by the flow.
The BSR was not designed to operate for the full range of conditions, which could be expected in an emergency(Anthopoulos, Kostavara, & Pantouvakis, 2013). The Crew responsible for drilling could not determine the location of a tool joint in the plane of the BSR. The tension was hence not efficiently maintained.
Alternative Solutions
| Issue | Solution |
| The integrity of the Cement Job – Good practice of cementing | The moment the casing is inside the well, circulation of a single annular or casing volume that is larger is required (Anthopoulos, Kostavara, & Pantouvakis, 2013). |
| The integrity of the Cement Job – Cement bond log | The discretion operator was supposed to run a cement bond log to prevent lost circulations during the cementing process. |
| Safety Approach – Education training and certification of the involved operators
| The operators should be trained so that they are equipped with relevant knowledge to execute integrity safety issues during offshore drilling (Anthopoulos, Kostavara, & Pantouvakis, 2013). |
| Safety Approach – Near-miss information | Acquiring and disseminating near-miss information pays a significant role in circumventing accidents. |
| Untimely response to the loss of well control – Early detection and control of flow from a reservoir
| Timely detection of flow from the reservoir by a BOB to avoid an impending blowout |
| Untimely response to the loss of well control – Manipulation of the joint position for the tool, compression, or tension.
| To work on the full range, the BSR should have been compressed, change its joint position, or create tension on the tool. |
Alternative Solution Pros and Cons
| Solution | Pros | Cons |
| 1. Good cementing practice 2. Cement Bond log | · Prevents lost circulations in the process of cementing · Inside casing reinforces the drilling environment (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2012). | · Costly to use the cement bond log · Increased participation of the personnel
|
| 1. Education training and certification of the involved operators 2. Near-miss information | · Enhances the acquisition of knowledge among the operators · Mitigate accidents | · Increased cost for training programs and facilities · Particular information does not match and results in confusion |
| 1. Early detection and control of flow from a reservoir 2. Manipulation of the joint position for the tool, compression, or tension.
| · Prevents an impending blowout · Enhances working on the full range
| · Sometimes early detection may interfere with the focus of the operators (Anthopoulos, Kostavara, & Pantouvakis, 2013) · Manipulation of the system is against the right operational practices |
Conclusion and Recommendations
Generally, accepted operational practices should be executed in the Macondo well construction. Such practice promotes the transfer of information from one operator to other operators for simulation and design purposes. Hence, to minimize the chances of future blowouts, efforts should be directed towards mitigating the effects of the loss of well control. Timely access to capabilities for containment should be demonstrated. Finally, The BOP system should be developed to provide a reliable separation and sealing potential for the drilling environment.
References
Abbasi, N., Wajid, I., Iqbal, Z., & Zafar, F. (2014). Project failure case studies and suggestion. International Journal of Computer Applications, 86(6).
Anthopoulos, L. G., Kostavara, E., & Pantouvakis, J. P. (2013). An effective disaster recovery model for construction projects. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 74(0), 21-30.
Bea, R. (2011). Understanding the Macondo well failures. Deepwater Horizon Study Group Working Paper, January.
Fellague, M. & Bennafla, K. (2015). Organizational culture and the implementation of total quality management in Sonatrach (Medgaz project as case study). Indian Journal of Management Science, 5(1), pp.1-11.
Ingersoll, C., Locke, R. M., & Reavis, C. (2012). BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010. MIT Sloan School of Management, Case Study.
Wassel, R. (2012). Lessons from the Macondo well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico. Bridge, 42(3), 46-53.