Aviation Safety, Security and Emergency Planning

Aviation Safety, Security and Emergency Planning

Safety Regulatory Framework

Safety is a core issue key in Aviation. The industry’s foundation is safety. Aviation’s safety regulations come in three layers, namely the national, regional, and international regulatory frameworks. ICAO addresses global regulatory requirements (Alfhonce). ICAO came about in 1944 through an International Civil Aviation convention, and it is a United Nations agency. The organization formulates standards that address all aviation aspects, safety included.  It offers a foundation for all regulations on safety globally using its Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS). Additionally, ICAO oversees safety regulatory framework development by Member nations through the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) (Alfhonce). Recent years have seen ICAO requirements extending to include formal safety management implementation by aircraft operators and organizations that offer services in aviation.

The regional regulatory framework as a layer leaves the supra-national bodies to address National Regulatory functions. For instance, established in 2003, EASA, a European Union agency, carries the mandate of determining initial certification of aircrafts’ airworthiness and associated products. It also approves the organizations involved in designing, manufacturing, and maintaining aeronautical products. Besides, EASA certifies aircraft operating corporations and personnel (Alfhonce). The EU member states decide on EASA’s regulations. Lastly, relevant state authorities promulgate the National regulatory requirements in national legislation. Notably, the objectivity of the rules rests on the individual nation.

Security Regulatory Framework

Another critical aviation aspect is security. Security has a broad scope in aviation. It encompasses all operations in the air and on the ground aimed at ensuring aviation security. Aviation security in the US has been under the FAA in conjunction with significant involvement by the private sector. Notably, intense scrutiny fell on the country’s aviation security following the 9/11 attacks that saw terrorists hijack four airplanes (Alfhonce). The hijackers crashed two of these planes in New York at the World Trade Center and another in Washington near the Pentagon. The period after this attack saw the FAA adopting security regulations of multiple layers. In Canada, a federal agency, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), received the aviation security mandate. Approaching aviation security in a multi-layer perspective rests on the idea that the second security layer will hold firm should the first layer has a breach. The NTSB also oversees aviation security, but its mandate is more inclined towards the investigation of accident causes (Alfhonce). The CAA has the mandate of overseeing aviation security in the U.K. The CAA comes up with detailed guidance and regulatory requirements in support of the policies on aviation security.

Accident Investigation Regulatory Framework

The NTSB is another body that oversees aviation security. However, its mandate is in the investigation of accidents involving air crashes in the US. The accidents could either involve military or commercial airplanes. Congress established the NTSB body as an agency for independent investigations in 1967. Consequently, the body gets priority when investigating the causes of plane crashes (Alfhonce). The NTSB is the only body that has the mandate to determine an accident’s cause. However, this is not to say that the body has exclusive powers in establishing an accident’s causes. Other investigative agencies can participate in the process of investigation, and the NTSB has to ensure sufficient participation by these other agencies. Its mandate is to provide a timely exchange of the appropriate information that develops about the crash or accident.

Accident Causation Models

There have been three theories formed to explain what causes an aircraft to crash. These theories are the accident causation models, namely the simple linear model or sequential accident model, the complex linear model or the human information processing accident model, and the complex non-linear model or systemic accident model. In the simple linear model, the presumption is that accidents or plane crashes stem from an event sequence in a specific order (Katsakior et al. 1008), involving social factors, factors in the environment, and individual factors, as well as physical or mechanical hazards (Hudson 4-6). In the complex linear model, the assumption is that accidents arise from several unsafe conditions that pose a risk to the flight crew. Human behavior and actions describe the accident (Hudson 7-8; Katsakior et al. 1008). Lastly, the complex non-linear model carries the assumption that accidents involving airplanes can obe attributed to variables that mutually interact with each other in the real-time environment. Management and organizational factors describe the entire system’s performance (Katsakior et al. 1008). Consequently, it is possible to preempt accidents and avoid them if there is an understanding of how these factors interact with each other. The standard inference from the three models is that human beings stand at the core of all accidents involving airplanes. According to various studies, over 70% of all plane crash accidents across the globe have arisen from human error (Endsley 1). Consequently, it is evident that humans play an integral role in the operation of aircrafts. As such, the human factor is consists of various factors combined, inclusive of mental factors, the emotional state, the psychological state, and the environmental factors. These factors influence the flight crew’s decision-making capabilities during their interaction with the aircraft’s systems.

Human Factor Significance in Addressing Aviation Safety

One aviation incident that demonstrated the significance of the human factor in addressing aviation safety was when flight 006 of China airlines almost crashed in 1985, involving a Boeing 747. This flight was a routine flight to Los Angeles from Taipei. The fight had four crew members, including Captain Ho, who was the pilot flying or the pilot in charge of the plane (Alfhonce). Notably, Captain Ho ranked as an experienced pilot. On approaching the Californian coast, the flight had a light turbulence experience. The fourth engine started to give a weak thrust soon after the turbulence. There was an immediate response from the flight engineer who throttled this engine up. However, there was no response from the engine. The captain made an urgent call to the Oakland control center, requesting an assignment to a lower altitude so that he could re-attempt the procedure. On the captain’s attempt to restart the airplane, the aircraft started to tilt towards the left and began to fall from the sky. Just when only thirty minutes were remaining before the plane plunged into the Pacific Ocean, the captain saw the horizon and commenced leveling the aircraft, thereby getting it out of the impending nose dive that could have been fatal (Alfhonce). There was evident damage to the plane when it landed. The wings were damaged, and the landing gear’s door had torn off. The safe landing was a miracle. There is a consensus on the critical role that the human factor plays in safety in aviation, thereby prompting an increasing interest by researchers in the topic (Endsley 1). The NTSB took the data recorder for the flight to Washington for examination to establish what caused the near-crash. The ADI was the first item of investigation, and this is the part that levels the plane. Results showed that it was functional. According to the flight engineer’s statement, the engines were not working. However, the investigation revealed that three of the plane’s engines were in order (Alfhonce). Therefore, it can be true that human judgment could have caused the near-crash, but it also saved the plane from crashing.

Safety Management Systems

The safety management system (SMS) term builds on the system safety dogma. It extends the perspective field to human performance and human factors (HF) as core considerations in safety during the operating and designing of a system. SMS differs from system safety, owing to its proactive safety management approach (Batuwanga 2). It formulates anticipator procedures and indicators for safety risks, rather than just sticking to checklist-based inspections and prescriptive audits. Oversight in compliance and acceptance rests on prescription, but in targets and indicators of safety performance, it rests on performance (Yeun et al. 174). SMS sees different organizational structure levels being responsible for safe operations. This way, more people observe and report on safety issues to reduce the probability of missing a hazard.

The CAA purports that SMS does not have a typical definition, thereby necessitating best practice adaptations from different industries to offer guidelines to the aviation industry’s sections that have the task of implementing formal SMS. The CAA’s original SMS definition was an explicit corporate management responsibility element that sets out organizational safety policies and explains its safety management intentions as an integral section of its collective business (Yeun et al. 175). This definition has since changed to become an integrated and proactive safety and organizational management system approach. CASA defines SMS as a systematic safety management approach that includes relevant organizational procedures, structures, policies, and accountabilities (Yeun et al. 175). On the other hand, CAAS explains it as an explicit, proactive, and systematic safety management process that integrates technical systems and operations with human resource and financial management for the attainment of safe operations characterized by risk that is as low as practically reasonable. According to TC, SMS denotes a businesslike safety approach. It is a comprehensive, systematic, and explicit process for safety risk management (Yeun et al. 175). Similar to other management systems, SMS provides for planning, goal setting, and performance measurement. Below are SMS regulations for various aviation authorities.

Fig 1. ICAO SMS Model, Source: ICAO 2013b

Fig 2: CASA MS Model, Source: CASA 2009

Fig 3: CAA SMS model, Source: CAA 2010

Fig 4: CAA SMS Model, Source: CAA 2010

Fig 5: TC SMS Model, Source: TC 2008

Aviation Security Procedures, Devices Used, and Human Aspect Consequences

Presently, most airports have several security layer screenings. Travelers come to check-in locations where identification is a requirement, followed by answering some security questions at the check-in desk. Questions could include bag contents and if other persons have touched the bag. The traveler then leaves the baggage at the check-in locations and can take specific hand luggage weights, including liquids not exceeding 50ml. The passenger then passes through a checkpoint where some local airports in Europe, such as in Ireland and the UK, see a passenger photograph being taken before reaching the metal detection gate (Almazroui et al. 14). Several lanes have x-ray scanners and metal detection gates for viewing carry-on baggage. Airport security takes laptops and liquids from carry-on bags for separate screening by x-ray scanners for enhanced visualization. These scanners view two-dimensional images, and any suspicion prompts a manual check of the luggage by a different officer. After that, the traveler passes through the metal detector. An alarm prompts further a pat-down for further checking. Any suspicion of travelers carrying dangerous material sees them pass through another x-ray scanner for humans to ascertain the detected alarm’s location for further investigations. Otherwise, the travelers take their carry-on luggage (screened) to the duty-free, and finally to the plane.

Recent times have seen some airports in the UK implement millimeter-wave (MMW) gates such as the Gatwick airport. The gates’ location is at the back of the walk through metal detectors for external checks. The new MMW systems need an extra individual to check the system’s screen to check if the traveler is holding any illegal material, thereby bringing additional costs to the airport. Luggage left at check-in locations undergo control for weight allowance, then passes via Explosive Detection System (EDS) that employs computed axial tomography (CAT) (Almazroui et al. 14). The scanned luggage’s resultant image then undergoes a final review at a human screener before being loaded onto the airplane. Any suspicions on luggage content have a different officer searching the bag or handling it according to image analysis.

Security measures in aviation usually entail screening passengers and their luggage.

Baggage Screening

Most airports in the US and Europe screen passenger baggage using dual-energy systems of X-ray both at check-in points and when held by passengers. The x-ray systems help operators with image visualization by the use of pseudo color techniques for differentiating between various material colors. Some airports also have computed tomography (CT) machines to show passenger luggage in three-dimension and can allow a 360-degree baggage rotation. Hand luggage screening can utilize either a multi-view of dual-view x-ray systems. All CT and x-ray systems have useful state-of-the-art software incorporated in them. Such software includes Image Enhancement Function (IEFs), Threat Image Projection (TIP), and Image Storage, which the operators can turn on or off during screening (Almazroui et al. 14-15). EFs are for image recognition and more careful image analysis, which could be a color inversion, metal only, edge enhancement, and organic only, to mention a few. Image storage functions are for data storage and only come to use when necessary. All countries have specific national laws governing data storage. Consequently, different countries operate this software differently. TIP has emerged as the most useful function for selecting threatening luggage.  It relies on stored threat images for crosschecking luggage, cabin as well as hold bags. A computer decides on the Fictional Threat Images (FTIs) for immersion into the image of the cabin bag. In the case of hold bags, Combined Non-Threat Images (CNTIs) and Combined Threat Images (CTIs) are computer-selected for immersion into the actual hold bag images. Using TIP reduces the screeners’ miss rate. Considering signal detection expressions, an alteration measure rather than a sensitivity adjustment describes prevalence.

Systems with short-term times for retraining along with full evaluation and high prevalence enable the scanners to embrace the right measures in low prevalence periods, even without evaluation. For cabin bags, there are low prevalence limitations since screeners can rectify any previous mistakes and capture it. For hold bags, screeners cannot catch their errors. Arguably, vigilance denotes observance and physical preparedness readiness to react when conducting visual searches. This vigilance decreases with time.

Additionally, TIP displays efficiency messages concerning the screeners during the screening process. Notably, x-ray machines still have limitations when it comes to high-density machine penetration. Modernity has seen travelers carrying iPads, mobile phones, and mp3 players along with their chargers and cables on their journey, all of which produce complex images to operators (Almazroui et al. .15). According to studies, laptops in bags interfere with other items’ image clarity to security officers. Moreover, separate laptop screening provides the highest practice in screening to security officers. Such electronic devices with their batteries could have similarities to improvised explosive devices, prompting operators to open the language for manual inspection for surety. Presently, x-ray systems are for fastening the security check process. However, the processing speed is also dependent on the belt movement of the machines, and the time that security officers take on image analysis (Almazroui et al. 15). Consequently, the issue with resent x-ray machines rests on human interaction with the technology or other newly developed technology.

Passenger Screening and Human Aspect Consequences

Image scanners for human bodies come in two types, namely ionizing (active system) and non-ionizing (passive system) radiation, for instance, x-ray system and millimeter and terahertz waves, respectively. Active systems give radiation emissions from travelers for body visualization. Notably, these body scanners pose privacy and health concerns. Using the scanners is routine in the US. However, European law has restrictions on screening travelers with these scanners. Studies have proven low radiation dosage in ionizing scanners. The dosage is below 1% of the dosage a person gets from high altitude flights, therefore showing no radiation risks in using the scanners (Almazroui et al. 16). Nevertheless, scanning pregnant women and children requires extra care.

In effect, non-ionizing systems pose no radiation risks, as do millimeter waves. Employing ionization technology in screening humans, such as by using x-rays, is for viewing the screened individual’s image by screeners who can interpret it to establish if an individual is carrying an illegal material. Some privacy protection bodies, including the EU, thought of this as a revocation of privacy rights. Recent amendments to EU regulations allow airports in Europe to use non-ionizing body screeners. Millimeter-wave (MMW) scanners that utilize non-ionizing technologies address the privacy issue by creating Automated Target Recognition (ATR), for instance, millimeter waves. Dummy photos with target locations appear, if any, as opposed to the passenger’s body appearing (Almazroui et al. 16). The imaging screen of MMW shows OK without image if the traveler has not concealed any suspicious material in his body. In case of anything, the pictogram highlights it, prompting a pat-down search. However, privacy problems are not addressed by utilizing non-ionizing systems with just ATR, without some form of procedural policy implementation in operations and technology.

Evaluation

As shown, people have radiation and privacy concerns during screening. Non-ionizing systems are not risky, and ionizing x-ray systems are safe. The EU and the public have argued on privacy concerns since the x-ray system’s first generation. These systems showed a person’s full image for the screener’s interpretation. The scanned individual’s image that screeners view in detail to identify contraband material The EU ultimately rejected the image of a scanned person seen by the screener in detail to look for contraband material. Studies have been undertaken to strike a balance between privacy invasion and security, as air travelers want safe traveling without health risks and privacy violations. Religion should also be considered regarding privacy. Transport Security Administration (TSA) and other security officials should conduct educational campaigns for sensitizing travelers on health and privacy issues linked to new scanning systems.

Discussing and agreeing on balancing security with other issues could be dependent on circumstance and time for utilizing ionized screeners. MMW scanners have addressed privacy concerns, but scanned images are not stored. Generally, all scanners have advantages and disadvantages. Ionizing scanners have better resolution compared to non-ionizing scanners but pose privacy and health concerns. Additionally, security officers need comprehensive training for image interpretation. Non-ionizing scanners have no health or privacy concerns, with less training requirements for screening, but have a lower resolution that could miss illegal material implanted in human bodies. Lastly, security scanners substantially affect humans (both screeners and travelers), throughput, security, cost, and process (pat-down and policy).

Works Cited

Almazroui, Sltan, Wang, William, and Zhang, Guangfu. Imaging technologies in aviation security. Advances in Image and Video Processing, 3(4), 2015

Batuwangala, Eranga, Silva, Jos, and Wild, Graham. The regulatory framework for safety management systems in airworthiness organizations. Aerospace 5: 117, 2018

Endsley, Mica. R. Human factors and aviation safety. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 2019

Hudson, Patrick. Accident causation models, management, and the law. Journal of Risk Research, 2014

Katsakiori, Panagiota, Sakellaropoulos, George, and Manatakis, Emmanuel. Towards an evaluation of accident investigation methods in terms of their alignment with accident causation models. Safety Science 47: 1007-1015, 2009

Michael, Alfhonce. Aviation Safety: Regulatory framework, technology, contingency plan. Academic Paper, 2015. ISBN 9783668518513. Web. https://www.grin.com/document/373291

Yeun, Richard, Bates, Paul, and Murray, Patrick. Aviation safety management systems. World Review of Intermodal Transportation Research, 5(2), 2014