The nature of Consciousness

The nature of Consciousness

Discussions on the various kinds of Consciousness and how humans’ minds work often elicits a lot of debate with multiple theories brought up and specific examples to support the same. Australian professor David Chalmers share the curiosity to understand more about the nature of Consciousness. Being a philosopher of mind, he holds a position that Consciousness is not fully explained by physical theories Chalmers, D. J. et al. (1997) as in its nature, Consciousness is not physical but can only be felt. David Chalmers puts his position as Naturalistic dualism or, in other cases, referred to as physicalism. He frequently poses two questions Chalmers, D. J. et al. (1997),” what is the reality behind quantum mechanics?” And “what is the place of consciousness in nature?”

Explaining Consciousness is difficult as it is arguable into various situations and is ambiguous and refers to a lot of differing phenomena. Every phenomenon needs an expounding, although it is not an easy task as some are more complex than others. Chalmers categorized them in two. The hard problems Chalmers, D. J. et al. (1997) and Easy difficulties. The easy consciousness problems are those that can be explained by the typical methods of cognitive science Chalmers, D. J. et al. (1997) in that a phenomenon described concerning neural or computational mechanisms.

David Chalmers explains the easy problems of Consciousness as those describing some of the phenomena such as; the aptitude to categorize, choose and act upon environmental stimuli, the combination of information by a cognitive system, the clarity in attention, the ability to control behavior. Chalmers, D. J. et al. (1997, etc. The above problems easily identified and solved with a sense of clarity as the phenomena that are experienced may not be fully transparent in explanation, but at least an idea crops up of what we are facing. Cognitive science and neuroscience methods may not have achieved the resounding success, but steps are in progress and will work given the adequate time necessary.

On the other hand, the hard problem of Consciousness is our personal experiences. To be a conscious being is different Chalmers, D. J. (2010), and very diverse. Whatever we go through from our site, what we smell in the surroundings, what we perceive from our touch, and also the various bodily sensations. The sensations of contact, the pains we experience, the emotional attachment, and even the perception of love and belonging. What brings all of these states and integrates them is more profound and unique to each being. What all that means is conjoined experienced sensations we go through.

It is perplexing and amusing that when the cognitive systems process various information we have like our speech and sight, we tend to talk and see. Also, concerning emotions, it is agreed that it feels a sure way to have them. Although all feelings and mental states arise from physical experiences Chalmers, D. J. et al. (1997), it cannot be defined as to why physical processing affects our inner lives and enriches it.

Explanation of David Chalmers’s physicalism leads to the contradiction of the panpsychism opinion Chalmers, D. J. (2010) showing that Consciousness and mind emerged when all things that live on the earth started to record the experiences based on the things they go through. Understanding physicalism later helped them understand experiences that were alike.

Frank Jackson brings about the topic of epiphenomenal qualia Jackson, F. (1982), and contradicts the physicalism position in the nature of Consciousness. He argues that nothing physical is proved when you put in the sensational aspect of it. The brain contains multiple processes which go on and define what happens around us and the surroundings we are in. The mind is the organ that controls our choices; it controls our movements, what we learn, our perception, and our visual imagery and also our sensations. Emotions come about when we have feelings, the way they are processed all happen in the cognitive areas of the brain where the neural codes are transmitted and interpreted. Frank Jackson argues that a lot has been left out of the physicalism notion Jackson, F. (1998) that all information is physical.

Qualia came up with the knowledge argument Jackson, F. (1982), and use an example of the perception of different colors by people. The judgment of various colors varies, and many people differ in their ability to discriminate amongst them.

In an experiment to prove the various capabilities Jackson, F. (1982) differing for different people, he quotes choosing tomatoes. The test person is Fred, and he can do Exemplary discrimination. A batch of vegetables used, it is divided into two similar batches, he is blindfolded, and the tomatoes shuffled. When he is asked to choose one of the batches, he picks all the tomatoes perfectly. Fred explains, but each of the tomatoes looks different to him Jackson, F. (1998). He explains that although the colors red appears the same, they are mixed with varying shades of red. Fred’s supernatural like powers shows that Fred’s optical system can be able to differentiate two red spectrum wavelengths Jackson, F. (1982) very well the same as we can see green and blue.

Another argument put across by Frank Jackson is that no amount of physical resemblance can tell what it feels like to be something else Jackson, F. (1982). We may perceive and imagine the life of another creature but cannot conclusively understand what goes on with them and their feelings to judge their lives just by looking at them. Jackson reveals that if physical information was enough, we could be able to Judge Fred’s unique abilities to judge colors.

Physicalism and epiphenomenal qualia all have a basis for their arguments into the nature of our Consciousness. However, physicalism holds a better foundation to elaborate on prove that. The hard problem may in its own seem controversial but understanding it is a challenge. Chalmers argues that the issue of experience is always differentiated Chalmers, D. J. (2010), and will forever persist even after expounding on the performance of the various relevant functions. The nature of Consciousness will, however, continue to puzzle many and leave many unanswered questions, although a better understanding of our cognitive abilities and more research done will prove that Consciousness a non-material part of the universe. Physical theories may be present Chalmers, D. J. et al. (1997), but they do not exhaustively explain Consciousness. Experiences are agreed to be recorded information not current in material form and are reproduced in our conscious and unconscious states as forms of playbacks.

Neuroscience and better technologies will, however, help to provide conclusive evidence of which theory is real and how the nature of Consciousness works. It will also help to understand how other animals’ reasons and how it feels like to be in their state.

References

Searle, J. R., Dennett, D. C., & Chalmers, D. J. (1997). The mystery of Consciousness. New York Review of Books.

Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford university press.

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 32(127), 127-136.

Jackson, F. (1998). Epiphenomenal qualia. Consciousness and emotion in cognitive science, 197-206.