The Trolley Problem

The Trolley Problem

            Several years ago, Philippa Foot, an English philosopher, drew acknowledgment of a particular problem. The issue regarded the driver of a trolley. Suppose as this driver, while you continue your work, you come into the view of five laborers busy repairing the track. The sides of the track are steep, and the track is somewhat of a valley. The only way, therefore, is to dodge the fatality is to stop. You step on the brakes, but to your shock, they don’t work. There exists a spur of the track to your right, which you could use to evade the disaster, but Mrs. Foot has a worker on that track who can’t get off it too. A quagmire subsequently faces you, do you go on to hit the five men, killing them instantly, or do you divert to the spur of track and kill the one worker? The dilemma here is known as the trolley problem, and I will focus my discussion on it.

Most people would permit the sacrifice of the one worker for the ‘greater good’ of the five workers, but is this morally right? Well, several individuals argue that it would be permissible to turn the trolley, while others feel that it would be wrong to even think of some form of a sacrificial lamb. Another additional problem presents itself. Suppose you were taking a walk next to the said track. You witness the driver fainting in the shock of brake failure. The track switch is right next to you, and you have the option to turn it either to the spur of the track or let the trolley proceed on to the five laborers. What do you do? Do you turn the switch and kill that one guy to save the five men? This predicament is called the Bystander in the switch problem (Thomson, 1985).

Several arguments have arisen since Philippe’s presentation of the trolley problem. Some feel that the driver acts on behalf of the trolley company; thus he faces liability for any harm he may cause either to people he may be carrying, or external individuals such as the five men. The Bystander is just an innocent person going about their business and requires no responsibility imposed upon him to choose between life and death. Others feel that the driver would drive the trolley right into the five men if he fails to decide to turn the trolley, and the Bystander would face no liability or responsibility for failing to turn the trolley. However, if I were a bystander, I would instead not get involved in the turning of the switch. By doing so, I would choose the driver who maybe, had a different opinion. I would also be responsible for the fatal murder of a man, and such would never leave my conscience.

Some people may be conflicted by my choice, but I would ask. What gives one the right to decide who lives and who dies? Additionally, the driver may be an experienced lad, and I expect him to conduct his work as he was trained. His drivers’ course probably included such a scenario, I suppose, thus I hope him to make the best decision. If I fail to turn that switch, I hurt no one, which is quite okay with me. All that I have done is fail to save the five men, and that too, would linger in my conscience, but it would be something I witnessed happen and not something for which I was solely responsible.

Thomson stated that people tend to regard killing as the physical ending of life, but another form of murder is letting an individual pass away. At the same time, you had the option to intervene (Bernecker, 2020). While I may agree with him to some degree, his statement may not apply to all cases. For instance, if I were in a building full of people such as a shopping mall, and I spotted a bomb with a 10- minute timer left, would I save myself or inform the relevant authorities at the bank to conduct a quick evacuation? I would unquestionably do the latter. Here I am not faced with a dilemma on who to save or kill; I made the right choice to save everyone from the bomb; thus, Thomson’s theory stands. However, in a case such as a Bystander in a switch, I am expected to sacrifice one person for the betterment of five, which I would not be okay with; thus, I would instead not get involved for it would be morally impermissible.

I will take another instance related to the trolley problem. Suppose there existed a particular surgeon with five patients suffering from organ failure. They all require transplants for them to survive. A young lad subsequently enters the room, and I discover that he is a perfect match. I ask him to donate his organs to my patients, but he politely declines. Am I morally permitted to go against his will and cut him up to save my patients? Of course not! To even consider doing so would be a colossal tragedy, and I would be susceptible to a murder charge. Philippa Foot stated that there is a vast difference between doing and allowing, and it is morally wrong to intentionally hurt someone to merely end them than it is to make the decision such as the Bystander in a switch; foreseeing future unintended harm to save someone (Bernecker, 2020). If the surgeon operated on the young man to dig up his organs against his will, it was a doing, but if I turned the switch and killed the one worker, it would be an allowing. While I agree with Philippa, why exactly should I be allowed to execute the worker? It is morally acceptable, but not forgivable.

Suppose I turned the switch and killed the man, consequently saving the five. A week later, I realize that the man had five children who depend on him, while the five men had no families. It would be a mental catastrophe for me. I would have left five children fatherless for the rest of their lives because I made an intuitive approach to save the five men. The Doctrine of Double Effect states that if doing something that is morally upright has a negative side effect, then it is ethically okay to undertake the action since the negative turnout was unintended (Bernecker, 2020). I utterly disagree with this statement. I believe that such kind of thinking leads people to make decisions without considering what would happen to the other person.

Suppose I was on a journey with my friends on an expressway. As we have deep conversations in the car, I get distracted and miss a red light; thus, I spot an oncoming vehicle on the street on my left side. I have the option to divert to the pedestrian walkway and evade the oncoming vehicle, but it will end up in the death or fatal injury of over 20 people. I have three passengers in my car. Should I divert and run over these thirty people, or should I go ahead and get rammed, killing 2 of my friends on the spot? Such a situation creates a mind-boggling decision to make. Is it morally permissible to run over these individuals and claim that I was protecting my friends? I would rather not survive with over 30 deaths in my conscience, and instead, accept to be rammed by the oncoming vehicle. It may seem outrageous not to save my friends, but it is the right thing to do. The Doctrine of Double Effect’s argument that an intention to do good with adverse consequences is acceptable therefore doesn’t apply in such a case.

The moral belief of the Bystander in the Bystander at the switch scenario determines their decision to turn the switch or not. They may not be okay with choosing to kill the one man due to their moral upbringing, and besides, they are not responsible for the killing of the five men. In an instance where the one man was not on the different track, it would be a quick decision to turn the switch, and failing to do so would be accusable regardless of it still not being wrong. The choice to kill a man lies not with the Bystander, as he is not involved in the activities conducted on the track.

Modern governments use concepts such as the distributive exemption to make critical decisions in their day- day. Sometimes such arrangements are necessary for the greater good, but in my opinion, appropriate measures have to undergo before committing the action. The distributive exemption principle states that it is better to engage in an act that harms fewer rather than more if it were to harm anyway. Not all distributive exemptions are permissible, however. In a case such as the car-crash dilemma mentioned before, it was right to save the 30 pedestrians from harm than it would have to save my three friends. The principle would, therefore, apply in my case.

Choosing to kill the worker on the divergent track in the Bystander at the switch problem presents itself as an infringement of his rights. Assume a situation where the trolley passed over a bridge heading to the five men. Two tracks comprise the bridge, and there stands a fat man on one of them, blocking the divergent track the trolley driver would use to evade killing the five workers. I decide to push the fat man over the bridge so the trolley can use the track. Wouldn’t such an action be an infringement of his rights? Regardless of the great decision, I made to save the five men, and if the fat man survived, he would possess every right to sue me. I had possible solutions to get him off the track, such as shouting at him or warning him of the impending disaster. Taking the matter into my own hands was wrong; thus, he would not be wrong in bringing me to court. Some people may argue that he was a necessary sacrifice, but no one wants to be a necessary sacrifice. If the agent must infringe the right of one to divert something that threatens the five that threatens the one, they may not proceed (Thomson, 1985). We all possess equal rights, and five men do not hold more rights than the man on the track. Therefore, everyone’s right to live should be respected regardless of how dispensable they may seem in the time of dire need. I, therefore, declare my stand regarding the Bystander in the switch scenario; I would not turn the switch since turning the switch would mean killing a man, and killing is inherently wrong.

References

Bernecker, S(2020). The Trolley Problem. Irvine, California: University of California.

Bernecker, S (2020). Solutions to the Trolley Problem. Irvine, California: University of California

Thomson, J. (1985). The Trolley Problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395-1415. doi:10.2307/796133