RESEARCH METHODS IN IR

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Civil war is human-made disasters that cause death and destruction of property. After the cold war, major wars became less, but regional and domestic conflicts between nations were still existent, leading to intervention from external institutions (Nye, 2017). Somalia is one of the countries experiencing intrusion by outside states. The African Union Mission in Somalia was tasked to deal with the situation in Somalia to enhance peace and stability in the country. The importance of this study is how AMISOM response has managed to deal with the issue at hand in addition to what challenges they have experienced as a result.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Since 2006, the al-Shabaab group invested in the weakness of Somalia’s central government despite the government strengthening in current years to control territories that had remained unprotected. The terrorist group heightened in 2011 as it controlled parts of Mogadishu, the capital city and Kismayo, which is an essential port for the country. In 1991, the military dictator, Mohammed Siad, was overthrown as Somalia existed as an anarchy state. The country has never been stable since a lack of a valid government has failed to present itself. Since 1991, Somalian’s in their hundreds of thousands have died because of violence and starvation while around one million forced to leave their country.

The United Nations tried to enhance peace in the country with no results. In 2004, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed that consisted of Somalia’s most significant clans representatives. Ethiopia protected the TFG into moving into the South Central of the country in a town known as Baidoa in early 2006 as it was unable to exercise any level of authority and endure clan politics. In Mogadishu, there was a different turn of events as heavy fighting occurred, changing the landscape of the country. Lawlessness was at it is the peak with robbery, murder, kidnapping and rape occurring daily. The Sharia court was used to settle disputes since the nation was and heavily Islam in religion..

In 2004, the Islam Courts Union (ICU) was formed because of a merger of eleven courts. In 2006, the warlords we are crushed by the ICU, thus seizing Mogadishu. One of the factions under the ICU was the al-Shabaab as they were a remnant of a former Somali Islamist Organization, al Hihaad Islamiya (AIAI), who were prominent in the 1980s who wanted to replace the government of Mohammed Said Barre. The al-Shabaab launched attacks against the Ethiopian military in Somalia. In 2008 and 2009, they used improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings and assassinations as their attack methods. They wanted Ethiopians out of the country and form an Islamic state of Somalia. The group got support from the Southerners, thus becoming a military movement that had control over a broad region of the country inclusive of the port of Kismayo.

The Ethiopian army was able to push al-Shabaab to the south but did not end the group. In 2009, the Ethiopian forces left this replaced by Uganda and Burundi peacekeepers under the African Union Mission to Somalia under the African Union. AMISOM was sent into Somalia to keep peace and diminish the al-Shabaab group that was causing chaos and oscillation in the nation. AMISOM has concentrated on Mogadishu especially patrolling and watching over the presidential palace, airport, seaport and other areas to revive the Transitional Federal Government. In 2009 and 2010, al-Shabaab carried out bloody attacks all over the city, resulting in a deadlock. AMISOM, not al-Shabaab could not defeat the other; this al-Shabaab carried out two suicide bombings in Kampala to weaken the Ugandan forces, which had joined the mission. Uganda deployed more troops in the response of the attack instead of withdrawing. Al-Shabaab retaliated by launching a significant attack against AMISOM and TFG in 2010, but they were repelled as they saw the troops were not willing to back down.

AMISOM was formed by the African Union in 2007 but ratified by the UN Security Council. It is the role of peacekeeping, safeguarding government personnel and institutions. Their mandate in Somalia was to help train, guide and advise the Somali Police Force and help civil-military operations as well as humanitarian relief. The number of AMISOM troops increased as they also got aid from Kenyan forces whom al-Shabaab had launched several attacks in the Kenyan territory, and Ethiopian soldiers came back. AMISOM engaged in months of fighting across Mogadishu to expand its areas of control, thus resulting in the withdrawal of al-Shabaab main fighters from the center of the city.

The Federal government faced challenges in enhancing legitimacy and effective policies with the locals beyond Mogadishu and producing endurable income streams. AMISOM, with the help of neighbouring countries, managed to weaken the al-Shabaab as they have been removed from their strongholds, notably Kismayo. AMISOM has achieved positive results during 2014 as it acted as a mission as opposed to individual troop contributing countries. Kenya and Ethiopia interests have immensely contributed towards their success. Since 2010, particularly 2014, AMISOM together with the Somali National Army achieved several successes by taking back areas that had originally been captured by the al-Shabaab terror group.

The African Union AMISOM mission to Somalia has faced a few challenges since their operations but their still a long road to support actual peace in Somalia, as the troops have been lacking in finances, to continue supporting peace in the country. This is still a question of contention as the future is bleak and not resolute.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Al-Shabaab group having started as a faction of the Islam Courts Union in Somalia that was used to settle disputes in the country after failing a state since instability characterized the nation since 1991. The group targeted strategic points of the nation by claiming control over them that we are vital in enhancing the political and economic stance of the nation. The group merged alliances with former enemies in the country by wanting to support it as an Islamic nation that adhered to strict rules without foreign interference. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peace keeping force under the African Union authorized by the UN Security Council remains unable to resolve Somalia’s crucial problem as the country’s crisis of governance remains prevalent due to al-Shabaab terror group, interrelated armed conflicts and opposition to the government. The three main dimensions of conflict dynamics have formed this, not only revolving around al-Shabaab but involving power efforts the political economy of logical violence and identity politics.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What different approaches have the African Union Mission in Somalia undertaken in response to the al-Shabaab?
2. What challenges have the African Union Mission in Somalia faced?
3. What ways can these challenges faced be addressed?

1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1. To examine the different African Union Mission in Somalia approaches to the response to al-Shabaab in Somalia.
2. To find out the challenges of African Union Mission in Somalia.
3. To assess the ways in which these challenges can be addressed.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is significant to both the government of Somalia and AMISOM troops in Somalia. AMISOM being a peace keeping mission with the aim to derail the al-Shabaab group in Somali being first deployed in 2007 to the country. AMISOM’s task was to push out al-Shabaab out of the country’s capital city whereby the Transitional Federal Government could work. The method they employed was quite traditional as they only reacted when attacked. As the al-Shabaab continued intensely, AMISOM changed their tactics and removing the whole group was enhanced. Earlier the United Nations in 1993 had tried to intervene in Somalia to alleviate humanitarian disaster and restore peace in the country. Another intervention occurred in 2006 with Ethiopian forces with the backing of the United States of America entered Somalia to offer support to the Transitional Federal Government against the powerful Islamic Courts Union.

There was no success but the aftermath was impeccable. Also, in 2007 another intervention was carried out by African Union which is still ongoing known as AMISOM. Somalia’s instability is affecting its neighboring countries this becoming an international issue hence the intervention of AMISOM. Its intervention is quite different from others that have been tried in Somalia this the mission has managed in helping the government in getting back the major strategic regions of the country that were once controlled by the al-Shabaab. The approaches taken by AMISOM are different as opposed to previous ones thus the success of the mission though still ongoing as it tried to entail normalcy in the country that has been riddled with civil strife since 1991 as stability has been managed in some areas and the ability of government to function is of great strides.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter gives an overview of various books, articles and reports that present the African Union response to al-Shabaab terror group in Somalia. This looks to supply the basis of the research the problem through the critical analysis that the study pursues to fill.

1.6.1 Brief Introduction

Al-Shabaab is an Al Qaeda-affiliated organization that has risen rapidly to prominence amid Somalia’s decades-long anarchy. In 2006, the organization was radicalized and brought prominence as a popular Islamist guerilla movement by Ethiopia’s invasion. Somalia is the paradigm of a failed state as well as the site of many external interventions since 1991 (Francis, 2013). However, critical interventions were directed by international actors, more recent peace operations led by regional states. The current African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been presented as the solution by its supporters and financiers (Boulden, 2013).

Regional elites use AMISOM to impose statehood on Somalia based on their domestic political experiences as it has not only entailed the rejection of central manifestations of Somali political authority but also regional construction of the nation as a failed state. AMISOM is a peace support operation that has evolved and countries to chart its own path military and politically. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991, Somalia has been the site of both failed interventions and policies of neglect (Mueller, 2018).

In 2007, the entry of AMISOM in Somalia promised to reduce threats by al-Shabaab and create an enabling environment in which to merge state institutions and promote dialogue and reconciliation. AMISOM operates in a political landscape marked by an absence of a stable political agreement amongst the main parties to the conflict (Albrecht & Haenlein, 2016). AMISOM has had to become party to the conflict in order for Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI’s) in a high threat environment, counter terrorism operations and mission conducts active counterinsurgency. Its mandate is to examine the plans of the African Union Commission (AUC) to deal with the limitations of the existing logistic structures in Somalia (Jeng, 2012).

The African Union has grown over ten years into the regional organization’s largest peace support operation. Its partnerships have seen it being hailed as a successful model of collaboration between regional and international structures. Deployed to Mogadishu, Somalia in 2017, AMISOM became the unions longest running largest costliest and deadly operation. Only six countries contributed troops out of the fifty-four AU members namely: Djibouti, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Joining AMISOM helped alleviate some regional security concerns but the decision also brought benefits to the Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) governments and their militaries (Elfversson, Bromley, & Williams, 2019).

It was in 2013, that AMISOM adopted a mission Protection of Civilians (POC). The AU was hardly an ideal actor in implementing a civilian protection agenda because of its limited earlier experience. The most often important motives for joining AMISOM were institutional related to enhancing domestic security forces. Political rationales aimed at enhancing national reputation and key relationships, and economic rationales for supporting domestic security forces and individual soldiers (Bamidele, 2017).

1.6.2 African Union approaches

According to Williams (2017), influential Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui outlined six basic functions of the state in an article on ‘the failed state’ in Africa, to argue that ‘many African states are in trouble. It is nonetheless important to recognize the significance of the Global War on Terror for understanding how state integrity have gained salience in East Africa. Many of the region’s key aid donors, notably the US, UK and European Union (EU), have regulated their relationships with East African states around countering Islamic extremism and denying safety to Islamist terrorists, especially since 9/11.

This has compelled the region’s politico-military networks, many of whose operations depend on Western financial and military support, to engage with fundamental donor policy assumptions around state failure and the place of political Islam within regional politics. This has not been a unidirectional process by any means but nonetheless has supplied a grave regional meeting place for debates on, and articulations of, state instability and acceptable political authority. This has had important implications for regional approaches to state-building in Somalia (Williams D. , 2015).

The AU has proven peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Sudan, Darfur, Somalia, Central Africa, Mali and Central African Republic since 2003 while regional bodies formerly with little involvement in security affairs have created standby forces and brigades to respond to regional crises. Most of these missions are led by neighbors of the state being intervened in and most have been justified by the dominant states and Western aid donors in terms of providing solutions to African problems, a concept developed by US officials as a means to justify withdrawal of American troops from regional conflict but since adopted and instrumental by African political elites as a rallying for African unity, agency and self-help.

The emergence of AMISOM, which is funded by the US, EU, UK and UN, should be seen within this regional and international context as the two most important players particularly the US and European Union.  Regional involvement in Somalia since the mid-1990s has followed two paths: military intervention and diplomatic mediation. Though Ethiopia and Uganda have been more prominent in pursuing mediation approach with Kenya and Djibouti the latter, there has been some blurring of the lines in recent years and a movement towards wholesale military intervention and peacekeeping (Williams P. D., 2019). Ethiopia led early mediation efforts between warring Somali factions during the 1990s but already had concerns about the emergence of fundamentalist Islamist groups in Somalia with ties to Ethiopian Ogadeni rebels. This prompted in 1996 the first of many ad hoc Ethiopian military interventions designed to destroy Islamist militant bases and bolster Somali warlords who opposed them.

According to Williams (2013), the most ambitious and sustained Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia came in December 2006, when Ethiopia dispatched up to 30,000 troops into Somalia to seize control of Mogadishu. After a fleeting period of tension, Ethiopian forces entered Somalia and retook Mogadishu in the name of Somalia’s weak forces. Working with Uganda and with strong US and UK support, they helped show a regional-led intervention force in early 2007.  AMISOM, which also worked in compliance with Ethiopian troops until the latter’s union into the operation in 2014, has worked with considerable success in urban areas. For Djibouti and Kenya, the facilitation of peace conferences had been the preferred vehicle for dealing with the Somali crisis until the later 2000’s (Williams P. , 2017).

The deployment of an AU mission provided the UN with an opportunity to renew its engagement in Somalia, where the global body had been criticized for abandoning its responsibilities in the preceding decade. It was a particularly enticing opportunity because, while it was clear that a peace enforcement mission was needed to be seized as the situation on the ground in Somalia was far too contested for a consent-based peacekeeping mission thus the UN as an institution had no will to support such a troop-intensive, high-impact mission itself. It was also a chance for the AU to fulfill one of its core missions by declaring ownership over an African conflict and a chance for the UN to gratefully avoid having to do so (Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017).

The Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) one of the institutions whose success is most critical to AMISOM’s goal of achieving a stable Somalia makes up the Somali National Army (SNA), the Somalia Police Force (SPF) and the Somalia National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). The first form of interaction between AMISOM and the SNSF was a joint planning and operations in the fight against al-Shabaab (Albrecht & Haenlein, 2016). The provision of training and mentoring, as well as the integration of trained security personnel into the SNA, was another form of interaction between AMISOM and the SNSF. AMISOM trains the SPF based on its mandate for police training. This training was initially conducted in Djibouti and later in Mogadishu. AMISOM is also tasked with mentoring and integrating Somali forces trained by different training providers (Dash, 2017).

The third form of interaction related to the logistical support provided to the SNA by various TCCs. This support sometimes takes the form of provision of arms, ammunition or other military equipment, arranged bilaterally. Such support is necessary because the SNA does not have the firepower to fight al-Shabaab (Dash, 2017).

1.6.3 Challenges of African Union AMISOM in Somalia

Unfortunately, the SNSF’s dependence on specific TCCs and other external actors for military equipment and ammunition support through bilateral agreements has negatively affected its independence. Beyond this, the salaries of the SNSF are paid through financial support by external actors such as Japan through the UN Development Programme, the UK, the UAE and the US, which seriously damages the government’s ownership and control of its troops (Fisher, 2018). In addition, different actors are training Somali security forces based on their own military cultures and practices, with little harmonization and coordination. For instance, the EU, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan have each trained Somali security forces (Mueller, 2018).

The lack of regard to centralized authority seen in the SNSF unfortunately also reflected in AMISOM, where TCCs (Troop Contributing Countries) have been persistently reluctant to fully follow orders and directives from AMISOM headquarters from their respective governments. While the challenge of command and control is not unique to AU (African Union) missions, it has been noted as being more prominent in the case of AMISOM. AMISOM’s inability to hold territories cleared of al-Shabaab and its minimal interaction with local populations (Mueller, 2018).

The other challenge AMISOM faces is in organization and supplies. The United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) is only authorized to transport non-lethal help and troops to chosen points known as battalion hubs. The transportation of war supplies and the forward transfer of troops from the battalion hubs to the field is the responsibility of the troop-contributing country (Elfversson, Bromley, & Williams, 2019). Attempts to improve AMISOM’s supply system have also been hampered by the inconsistency of doctrine. UNSOS supply capabilities are civilian, not military. As such, they are structured to supply planning in a traditional peacekeeping mission and not for a combat environment. Strict restrictions on where UNSOS air assets can land, for instance, have made the evacuation of our troops extremely difficult (Williams P. D., 2019).

AMISOM operates in a challenging environment where everything from troop deployment to equipment is controlled by the troop-contributing country and not the mission. As a result, force commanders do not have complete scope to direct their own forces, which can delay or even hamper operations.

AMISOM lacks force enablers and force multipliers. A force enabler is an ability such as transportation or communications that contributes to the success of a mission. A force multiplier, on the other hand, is a combination of capabilities that increase military effectiveness, such as combat planes, infantry fighting vehicles and heavy artillery (Williams D. , 2015). AMISOM still lacks the requisite force enablers and multipliers to effectively deliver on its mandate. This hinders its ability to hold liberated areas. Another challenge is that al Shabaab has an intelligence arm that it uses to collect information from the population under its control. It relies on this, as well as its knowledge of the local culture and language, to sustain itself (Williams D. , 2015).

Force generation is particularly difficult for organizations in this case the AU that do not have a developed body of policies and guidance for managing relationships with contributing countries. This can lead to deficits in transparency and accountability that might discourage some states from contributing and some organizations from supplying certain types of support.

AMISOM’s experience suggests that multilateral peace enforcement operations deployed to active war zones are likely to rely on a smaller group of potential troop-contributing countries than more traditional peacekeeping operations (Bamidele, 2017). This group is likely to consist large lofts willing to endure higher levels of casualties than those sustained by more traditional peacekeeping operations, as well as countries from the region and immediate neighborhood. As a Consequently generation in challenging the group will require other incentives, such as security force help packages.

According to Francis (2013), almost all UN peacekeeping operations, AMISOM was not given an explicit protection of civilian’s mandate, though it was tasked with protecting certain Somali and international important people. In recent years, however, various statements from the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council have urged AMISOM to do what it can to track and reduce civilian harm, including from its own activities.

Peace operations are not well equipped to stop elite corruption, but ignoring corruption has negative consequences. Somali elites have been perceived as the world’s most corrupt for over a decade. This corruption has undermined attempts to build effective local security forces (Williams P. D., 2019). AMISOM’s dilemma is that it must try to combat corruption while supporting Somali politicians and security officials. This has been a particularly acute problem in the dark political economy of Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab operator’s-style protection racket with local businesses.

1.6.4 Addressing Solutions to Africa Union’s AMISOM challenges

Looking back at the largely reactive mandating process and its underlying considerations, the AMISOM experience offers one vital lesson for politically legitimating peace missions in Africa: the recognition of the need for mission mandating that thoroughly reflects the context and is rooted within a well-thought-through process. Such a mandating process should also consider the means of achieving the mission’s goals mandates be crafted in a more specific manner, in terms of the scope of the mission’s tasks, time frames, and area of operations. All these needs must be matched with the available resources (Williams P. D., 2019).

On a more strategic level, the limitations of the existing logistical arrangements clearly prove that the AU needs to develop its own logistical concept and support institutions to match the demands of its evolving peace enforcement missions. A growing trend to have more such peace-enforcement missions in Africa amplifies the urgency of this need. The UN as well as other strategic partners should support the AU both financially and technically to build its own capabilities for mission support in the longer term. Among other things, this requires building workable and accountable institutional arrangements at distinct levels of the support structures.

The AU and the TCC’s need to streamline and centralize the mission’s command structure to ensure the joint planning and conduct of operations between AMISOM and SNSF. Need for AMISOM to exercise efficient command and control over its own forces. TCC’s often wait for orders from their capitals to engage in offensive military operations instead of heeding AMISOM headquarters’ orders (Elfversson, Bromley, & Williams, 2019). The 2015 AU–UN joint benchmarking exercise tried to address these issues by recommending the streamlining of AMISOM’s command and control under the overall direction of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of Mission. A high-level consultation between the AUC and the chiefs of staff of the various TCC’s also highlighted the need for greater compliance with AMISOM’s command and control (Dash, 2017).

The continental approach to addressing conflicts coupled with the willingness of African countries to put their professional and dependable troops in harm’s way should be quickly supported by the UN. This is because in situations like Somalia the AU is carrying the burden of the UN Security Council, which is the custodian of international peace and security (Fisher, 2018). The lack of predictable financing has compelled the AU to endure the consequences of partners whose interests and priorities may not always be in compatible with those of the region.

The current withdrawal of AMISOM force levels has been criticized by troop contributing countries as counterproductive given the increased threat level in a huge operational area. There is a fear that the planned annual reduction that started in December 2017 may compromise the gains made so far and even lead to the mission’s defeat. For the current evolution strategy to succeed AMISOM needs to partner with credible, professional, and skilled Somali security forces that are loyal to a democratic, accountable, and legitimate government. Some progress has been made in these areas, but there is still a long way to go (Fisher, 2018).

AMISOM must find a way to manage international and local expectations. For its entire existence, AMISOM has been under-resourced, running with large gaps between the force authorized by Security Council resolutions and the force deployed on the ground. missions that rely heavily on troops from neighboring states should weigh the benefits and challenges of these contributions and be prepared to mitigate potential negative consequences (Albrecht & Haenlein, 2016). In 2005, the UN Security Council and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had thought it risky for neighboring, frontline states to deploy to Somalia as peacekeepers. However, the UN Security Council later dropped this concern, and all three of Somalia’s neighbors Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia joined AMISOM (Williams P. , 2013).

AMISOM lacked an explicit mandate to protect civilians as it did not stop many Somali civilians from expecting AU peacekeepers to protect them, to avoid harming them. Enforcement operations like AMISOM even when they lack an explicit protection of civilian’s mandate must always work hard to minimize civilian harm in their area of operations (Elfversson, Bromley, & Williams, 2019).

A genuine agreement and reconciliation between the federal government and the regional administrations on how to implement the new national security design. It will also require stamping out corruption in Somali security forces, taking the fight to al-Shabaab and negotiating a peace settlement with them to end the war (Williams P. D., 2019).

1.7 HYPOTHESIS

There is a brewing conflict in Somalia that has attracted the attention of the international community with different external states and institutions taking part in military intervention as a means of entailing stabilization of the country. The country is going through AMISOM intervention as the study argues that this will be significant to create peace and stability in the country.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This part presents the method used in carrying out the study. It begins with a minimal description of the research design, then the data collection techniques, data types, the strategies and analysis.

1.8.1 Research Design

According to Ragin and Amoroso (2010), A research design is a plan for collecting and analyzing evidence that will allow the researcher to answer questions he or she has proposed. The main aspects carried out in this design is descriptive by studying the tow variable and how they are connected. The two variables are the African Union Mission to Somalia and al-Shabaab in Somalia. The study will describe by explaining through explanatory research design how the African Union Mission to Somalia response where the al-Shabaab have been a threat to the nation and what tactics have been used as well as the challenges faced as a result and how to mitigate them.

1.8.2 Types of Data

There are two types of data used in research which are primary which is collected by a researcher for a particular project for the first time and secondary data which is work collected by other researchers for other reasons which could be further research or additional information by other researchers added upon (Stevenson, Wrenn, Sherwood and Ruddick, 2006). For this research primary data cannot be employed as it is not possible to reach the AMISOM mission in Somalia as the country is still not fully peaceful.

Secondary data used in this study such as books articles, newspaper articles from the library sources and E-resources are used as supporting documents. The documents used in gathering and findings are academic journal articles written on African Union’s AMISOM mission to Somalia, as well as getting a brief history of the country and what led to the point that the country together with the point that external interference was required, the challenges faced can be solved through various solutions as suggested by various authors.

1.8.3 Research Procedure

The study will have a literature review that is detailed as it will be systematic. The systematic review will categorize literature into themes. It will engage scholars in the field of peace and conflict by giving a brief introduction of the al-Shabaab group in Somalia how it arose to currently. The approaches taken by African Union through AMISOM then followed by challenges as it is systematically flowing by looking at how the Somali government have also been included and finally the solutions to be addressed as a result of the challenges and  how the Somali government can enable these challenges to be mitigated. The literature review will aid in data collected about the study.

1.8.4 Data Analysis Methods

This is where data gathered is analyzed by deducing theories, phenomenon’s and separating the differences among the different authors. Data techniques used the combine from the secondary data used and interpreted into social themes. This study will be analyzed based on an attempt addressed by different authors with the African Union AMISOM in Somalia with their duties and challenges faced by the organization and troops while in Somalia.

1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

According to Bryman and Bell (2007), ethical considerations are one of the most vital parts of research. It is rooted in the ancient Greek philosophical inquiry of moral life. Refers to a system of principles which can change former considerations about actions and choices. Ethical considerations should be considered when doing research especially humans taking part in the research project. A range of factors are considered such as the participant being protected against any harm, as they should be accorded respect when it comes to their dignity. Participants involved in the study should be allowed full consent before carrying out the study. Privacy should be seen as one may not want other participant to know their identity their information should be kept private once their details or information about the study is collected. Confidentiality is another ethical consideration by ensuring the details of the participant is not shared publicly but supported just for the purposes of the research.

Voluntary participation as the participant should not be forced to undertake part in any research but on their own willingness. Communication should be transparent and honest as the research should be clear and outright without hiding information to the participant. The goals and aim of the research should not be exaggerated as it needs to be straight forward and not deceptive. In this research project the ethical issues for consideration are acknowledging the work of the authors since it is secondary data being employed hence it is work and writings by others to avoid plagiarism. It should be done by referencing using the APA format for in text citations as it shows that it is another person’s work by giving credit where it is due.

Maintaining a prominent level of objectivity in analysis and discussion in the research. By being fair when analyzing the information that has been gathered. Ensuring the research is not biased such as cultural biases or cognitive bias but comparing facts from both sides instead of just concentrating in one side as opposed to including others that may be related to that subject or topic of research.

1.10 LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY

Refers to the characteristics of a design or method influenced the interpretations of findings from the research. Also, refers to the shortcomings due to unavailability of resources are unlimited in number set in the research. In this research there are a number of limitations presented with this research. Secondary data has been employed to gather information since it is impossible to use primary data due to the location basing on the topic. One limitation is the location as it is quite impossible to insert yourself collect data in an area whereby terrorism still looms and instability of a nation. The location actually limits the research method basing on the research topic.

Another limitation is lack of authenticity as the source used such as articles and books may have some parts missing especially if using online sources as they tend to skip out some pages and leave some as with the current situation of the COVID-19, the research is limited to online sources. the information or data may be in inaccurate as if you are unable to compare a particular subject with other authors it may be false especially with this research with the way al-Shabaab, it is quite tricky on which is the accurate one and which one is not. The data as presented by use of secondary data may be outdated. It is not believable or sure with the data being used in the research particularly when researching on the history of the topic as the sources used may be conflicting with timelines and events.

Another limitation is the research is limited to the use of secondary data as some of the information required in this research may require first-hand information in line with the second objective which is in knowing the challenges faced by the African Union AMISOM in Somalia, as it would have been adequate to collect first-hand information from the soldiers themselves in order to deduce what challenges they face to be able to classify the major issues faced under AMISOM from their responses. Lastly, the topic may limit the research especially if it’s of recent events or happening as not much information may be available from the various sources to be used in the research. The topic chosen should be carefully thought out.

1.11 CHAPER OUTLINE

The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one gives a general introduction of the research topic, the background information is then provided, followed by the research problem of the which highlights the problem of the research in a single statement. The literature is reviewed with a gap identified with the topic. The research questions are identified through literature review, the objectives are given with the methodology of the study as well as a hypothesis. Ethical considerations and limitations are also stated.

Chapter two outlines the first objective whereby the different African Union AMISOM approaches have been employed to the response of the al-Shabaab such as first using the traditional method whereby only retaliated if attacked but since changed its tactics by flushing out al-Shabaab from the capital city of Mogadishu.

Chapter three, is the second objective of the study which shows the challenges African Union AMIOSOM in Somalia face such as financing as they are unable to get proper equipment for their missions and also the government not cooperating in order for peace to be ensured.

Chapter four focuses on the third objective as the various solutions suggested by various authors are given towards curbing the challenges and also suggestions by members of the mission to the African Union and what measures could be taken.

Chapter five gives the summary of the findings together with a conclusion and finally recommendations.

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