Can we forgive the unforgivable?
According to Cosmopolitanism and forgiveness, genuine forgiveness is an internal logic and, therefore, is not limited to the impossibility of human nature. From this argument, it is clear that Jacques Derrida defined forgiveness as one’s ability to forgive unforgivable due to the extreme extent of evil committed against humanity. Derrida, in this book, argues that extreme evil to any human being without any form of justification, which at all should not be forgiven, needs to be forgiven. These mean that genuine forgiveness is the forgiveness that forgives all evil, which has been committed without any justification. The general perception created by Derrida is that forgiveness needs to allude to logic and not ethical consideration of humanity. Ethic questions the motive and repercussion of the evil deed, thus minimizing the chances of forgiveness. In such a context, this paper will explore the question of whether we can forgive the unforgivable.
The ability to forgive any imprescriptible crime that has no status or limitation requires unconditional willingness to forego the harm inflicted by the perpetrators of the crime. As Derrida maintains hospitality needs to be unconditional, true forgiveness needs to align with the forgiveness of unforgivable crimes like holocaust or apartheid in South Africa. As a result, true forgiveness is beyond any form of repentance, reconciliation, negotiation, or healing since the integration of these terms in forgiveness creates loopholes for impure or conditional forgiveness, which is not true forgiveness of unforgivable. Derrida argues that true forgiveness does not come from repentance or atoned since these actions clans one from the guilt of the crime they committed, and in such cases, they are unforgivable.
This concept seems to allude to psychological makeup, oh the human brain that once it develops a clear picture of the motive of the wrongdoing can easily be manipulated to forgive. This means that the development of a clear understanding of the crime perpetrators’ motive can act as an extenuating factor for the forgiveness of the unforgivable. This contravenes Lawrence and Karim (524), who alludes that “the heterogeneity of traumatic cause that results in the homogeneity of symptoms may equally produce heterogeneous body image and actions that can act as a homogeneous representation of trauma.” In this Lawlance and Karim alludes that the actionable forgiveness can be manifested in different from the traumatized person, and whichever course of self-gratification should not be interred. A fact which is dispelled by Derrida, who alludes that the act of forgiveness needs to come from deep beneath the heart of the offended without any catalyst to the forgiveness. Therefore, the argument by Lawlance and Karim to advocate for human body image or action as assign of gratification from traumatic experience dispels the act of true forgiveness and eludes the need for conditional forgiveness. Forgiveness should not at all cost be taken from the dictionary definition or what humanity alludes to when they say they have forgiven another person from wrongdoing. It should be an idealistic platonic relationship between the aggrieved and the perpetrator of the crime without any condition or expectations. Forgiving the unforgivable should not be attached to any conditions, just like loving other people from whom they are despite being unlovable. Inclusion of condition in forgiveness like a healing process, compensations, repentance, or any other form of condition dilutes the meaning of forgiveness, according to Derrida.
The conditions for forgiveness do not dispel or exemplify willingness for open generosity to forgive. In such, Derrida traces Abrahamic traditions as the unconditional traditional ideology of forgiveness to allude to the religious meaning of forgiveness. Despite this, he goes further to allude that forgiveness of unforgivable goes beyond the traditions of Christianity, Judaism, or Islamic that call for forgiveness after repentance. Therefore, the decision to forgive the unforgivable dwell in the heart and mind of the aggrieved and not any form of religious connotations, government action, or aggressor repentance. This is because the logic of forgiveness “continues to imply that forgiveness remains the correlate of judgment and the counterpart to a possible punishment, to a possible expiation, to the expiable” (Derrida, 36). This contravenes the argument presented in both Christianity and Islam, who assert that true forgiveness to unforgivable only comes from God or divine nature human being. This assertion alludes that there is a distinct separation between judgment or punishment advocated by traditional religious teaching and forgiveness from wrongdoing. Therefore true forgiveness is beyond any form of judicial processes or religious repentance but an ideology beyond human capability or possibility. This is supported by Osama Bin Laden’s letter to Muslim brothers across the world “The martyr has a guarantee from God; He forgives him from the first drop of his blood and shows him his seat I heave” Lawrence and Karim (543). In advocating for atrocities across the world, Osama alluded to Quran teaching, which meant that no human being could forgive one another from his or her crime apart from God. Therefore, God not only forgives wrongdoers but rewards them for committing crimes against oppressors. This is a kind of argument that Derrida dispels since, for one to be forgiven by God, there is attached condition; revenge against the perpetrators of the crime.
To answer the question of whether there is a possibility of true forgiveness from unforgivable crimes, Derrida alludes that true forgiveness can only be between two people (Derrida 42). Forgiveness of unforgivable needs to be a private matter since intervention from outside quarters acts as cohesion to forgiveness. Here he cited a South African woman who dispelled the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa by saying that she could not be forced to forgive the victim of apartheid if she was not ready to forgive the atrocity’s perpetrators. The idea hers is that such commission or governmental intervention forgiveness of atrocities committed should be left as a secret of the aggrieved. Therefore, religious teaching for repentance and government interventions for reconciliation ought to create space for those affected by crimes committed by other people to secretly decide whether to forgive or not.
The idea of forgiving the unforgivable should be lived as far as one life in this world and beyond, and the perpetrators of the crime should not be charged for such crime. Forgiveness perpetrated by corruption or materialistic calculation amount to impurity and aligned such forgiveness with forgiveness achieved after atonement. This limits the conditions for forgiving the unforgivable to the feeling of the aggrieved and their ultimate decision to forge their happiness and ill-feeling for a crime committed against them. Aligning to this argument, it is clear that only people can forgive for a crime committed against them, not others. Therefore, crime committed against the dead cannot be forgiven by the living a fact which brings in Derrida’s argument on divine power in forgiving the unforgivable.
Derrida’s ultimate decision on whether to forgive is based on taking responsibility for the wrongdoing and the decision of the aggrieved to forgive unconditionally. Although not everyone wishes to be forgiven from their wrongdoing, Derrida points out the arrogance of wrong of religion and government institutions taking responsibility for forgiveness to wrongdoers against the whole society. He points out that forgiveness has no sovereignty nor power, but the ultimate personal decision to do so without any government intervention. This means that governments, international organizations, or religious organization or grouping cannot forgive on our behalf nor should w be forced to forgive if the forgiveness does not inspire true forgiveness. He alludes that forgiveness by the government or religious institution is a form of comedy and add burden In the same line, Derrida argument seems to support biblical teaching that all crimes against humanity are forgivable “all is forgivable except the crime against the spirit, that is, against the reconciling power of forgiveness” (Derrida, 34).
From this argument, it is clear that we can forgive the unforgivable, but only without any form of condition or coerce by the religion or reconciliatory organization. Forgives is not a fundamental human right which can be protected granted in the court of law, and therefore it ought not to be demanded or expected to b granted—forgiving the unforgivable stem from initiating respect and consideration of others fundamental right, although this does not guarantee total forgiveness. Despite the initiative instituted through democracy and religion to foster forgiveness, wrongdoing to any group in the society decreases any possibility of true forgiveness. This means that to forgive the unforgivable, the perpetrators of human suffering must show genuine remorse to the crimes they committed and acknowledge the responsibility of their crimes. Despite this, this doe not dispel the aggrieved experience, and therefore, not one at any capacity should dictate when to reach the point of forgiveness. In the same line, no one should be judged for not forgiving the unforgivable.
In conclusion, as human beings, we can forgive the unforgivable provide it comes from the aggrieved, not cohesion by the government or religious institutions. This is because forgiveness is both an underlying moral and ethical issue that condemns any form of wrongdoing in society and the protection of fundamental human rights. From the question of whether we can forgive the unforgivable, forgiveness cannot be achieved without the repentance of the crime perpetrators and the decision of the offended to unconditionally forgive the offender. This means that in incidence, the offender object from repenting, he /she can be forgiven through the virtue of love to theta person and personal gratification of the crime perpetrated. Against Derrida’s argument, from all perspectives, forgiveness is conditional; repentance, remorse, and love are the most profound condition for forgiveness of unforgivable.
Work cited
Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and forgiveness. Eds. Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney. London: Routledge. 2001, 1-56. Print
Lawrence, Bruce B, and Aisha Karim. On Violence: A Reader. Open WorldCat, Durham [NC], Duke University Press, 2007, pp. 522–538 and 540-546