Case Study: What Constitutes the Crime of Stalking?

Case Overview

This paper centers on the issue of what constitutes the crime of stalking while citing the case of Nathan and Jennifer Clements. Nathan and Jennifer got married in September 1995 after courting for six years. However, in the summer of 1996, Jennifer alleged that Nathan became possessive and controlling. She says that Nathan, knowingly, purchased guns and left them under her pillow to intimidate her. Nathan did not stop there; he also accused her of having an affair and threatened to shoot her dead if he ever caught her. Things took the turn for the worst in December 1996 when Nathan gave her an ultimatum, either quit her job or move out of their apartment – Jennifer opted for the latter. Her action prompted a reaction from Nathan that was characterized by stalking, harassment, and threats.

Jennifer testified that Nathan would frequently call her place of employment and leave her messages. Between December 8^th, 1996 and January 1997, she testified that he left a total of 26 phone messages. During this period, she called him twice and asked him to stop calling and harassing her. Jennifer stated that the frequent calls caused her to live in fear of her safety. Despite this, Nathan continued harassing her, and in April 1997, an incident occurred that Jennifer testified to have placed her in fear of bodily injury or death. Nathan was eventually convicted of stalking in March 1999. However, Nathan challenges the guilty verdict rendered by the judge. He argues that the evidence tabled is legally insufficient to warrant a conviction under the “current stalking statute.”

Analysis

The case discusses the primary elements of the crime of stalking under the  statute. The components include offense happening in more than one occasion: conduct that causes a reasonable person to fear or the other person to live in fear of bodily harm or death: and knowingly engaging in behaviors that the other person my deem threatening. The above elements are the backbone of the “stalking statute” and provide the parameters through which legal practitioners and regular citizens can determine whether a stalking crime has been committed. So, were they met in the conviction of Nathan? I would say yes. The evidence presented showed that Nathan repeatedly engaged in the above conduct.

Firstly, the state provided sufficient evidence showing that Nathan committed the crime of stalking on different dates, and all of them after the current stalking statute came into effect. According to this evidence, the offense happened on Feb 18, 1997, Feb 25, 1997, March 29, 1997, and April 4, 1997. Also, the state provides sufficient evidence to prove that Nathan’s actions were enough to make a reasonable individual live in fear of bodily harm or death. His string of erratic behaviors such as showing up at places he knew Jennifer frequents and numerous phone calls would force a reasonable person to live in fear of death or bodily injuries.

Additionally, Nathan was aware that Jennifer regarded his actions as threatening. In his response to Jennifer’s application for a divorce filed on Jan 9, 1997, Nathan acknowledged that she was in fear. Moreover, Jennifer had asked Nathan to stop harassing her on many occasions. Similarly, the fact that Nathan was aware that Jennifer hired a police officer to escort her to collect her belongings from their apartment is enough proof that she considered him a threat.

Finally, most of the cases challenging the constitutionality of the stalking statute focus on its “vagueness” or whether they are “overbroad (Dynia).” A criminal statute is ruled vague in most situations if it is worded in a manner that it does not provide standards for the measurement of conduct, thus inviting arbitrary enforcement (Clarity in Criminal Statutes: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, n.d.). The current statute provides these standards in words such as “bodily injuries” and “death,” thus the stalker is aware of the prohibited behavior. For this reason, I agree with the court of appeals ruling that the stalking statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

References

Clarity in Criminal Statutes: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine. (n.d.). Retrieved February 24, 2020, from Legal Information Institute: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/clarity-in-criminal-statutes-the-void-for-vagueness-doctrine

Dynia, A. P. (n.d.). Vagueness. Retrieved from The First amendment Encyclopedia: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1027/vagueness