Critique: The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions

Description of the Work

The article, “The secret success of nonproliferation sanction”, Nicholas Miller focuses on addressing the rationalist approach on sanctions. In that regard, the chief argument presented in the article is the success of both the political and economic sanctions as tools in making nonproliferation policy (Miller, 2014). Besides, Miller also argues that the selection made in economic and political sanctions has affected the success of nonproliferation policy. More importantly, Miller also claims that sanctions have been subjected to different threats that make them ineffective in addressing global issues such as halting nuclear weapons programs. Nonetheless, Miller acknowledges that sanctions cannot be underrated in minimizing the use of nuclear weapons. Primarily, the article claims that sanctions have been used successfully in deterring countries that may be tempted to use nuclear weapons programs (Miller, 2014). In that regard, the primary purpose of this paper is to critique the article by assessing the methodology used by Miller to support his argument on the use of sanctions to minimize the nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the critique will analyze the material and sources used by Miller to support his arguments.

Methodology

Mainly, Miller wanted to demonstrate how nonproliferation sanctions are applied in the global context to prevent the use of nuclear weapons programs. Miller achieved his argument by presenting how rational leaders use nonproliferation sanctions to assess risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons. The author supported his argument using historical evidence. For example, Miller used the scenario of the United States in the 1970s when the country received different threats about sanctioning different states via legislation passed by Congress. Moreover, the author has used historical evidence by demonstrating how America implemented nonproliferation sanctions to prevent Iran from engaging in a nuclear weapons program. Based on the statistical evidence provided by Miller in the article, it is clear that many countries have attempted to participate in the nuclear weapons program from 1950 to 2000 (Miller, 2014). The author presents statistical data that indicate pre-sanction nuclear aspirants and post-sanctions nuclear aspirants. Thus, both historical and statistical evidence is sufficient in demonstrating how different countries have aspired to participate in nuclear weapons programs. Therefore, using nonproliferation sanctions in reducing involvement in nuclear weapons activities strengthen the central argument presented by Miller.

After evaluating the evidence provided by the article, one can conclude that the evidence was successful. For example, the number of countries involved in the nuclear weapons program in the pre-sanction era was higher, where France, China, Israel, Australia, Egypt, Taiwan, and South

Korea, among others, were the key participants. After the United States introduced the use of nonproliferation sanctions to minimize nuclear weapons programs, the number of nuclear aspirants in the post-sanction period reduced significantly where only Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Brazil, and Argentina expressed interest in nuclear weapons programs (Miller, 2014). This implies that the argument presented by Miller on how nonproliferation sanctions have been successful is fully supported by historical and statistical evidence. More significantly, the article presented the evidence in the logical sequence using tables that indicate statistical evidence. Overall, using tables, data sets, and graphs in the article indicate that Miller used a clear fashion to support his arguments.

Organization of Material and Sources

The organization of the material is easy to follow because the author has used different headings and subheadings to support his arguments. It is also easy to follow historical and statistical evidence that has been presented in tables and graphs (Miller, 2014). The material makes a compelling case because any reader can relate the data presented in the table and graphs to the central idea of the success of nonproliferation sanctions in minimizing involvement in nuclear weapons programs. More importantly, the author has provided a reference list at the end of the article to make it easy to retrieve evidence from these sources. These sources are legitimate in line with arguments presented by Miller in terms of historical and statistical evidence.

Personal Critical Evaluation

The historical and statistical evidence presented by Miller in the article indicate the material achieved his case. The analysis of how pre-sanction and post-sanction influence the viability of his argument in the success of nonproliferation sanction to curb the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the statistical evidence rules out all the hypotheses about the success of these sanctions. Thus, it is now supported by statistical evidence in the article is the main concept used by Miller in basing his claims. The strength of this article can be traced through the use of tables and graphs to support the arguments. Nonetheless, the use of sanctions by Americans has been implemented selectively, which is the main limitation of the article. Thus, if I am the one writing the article, I would ensure these sanctions are applied equally to minimize biases. Overall, the article has used a reference list that supports these arguments, thereby making is reliable and credible in conducting further study. To sum up, I believe this article is relevant in promoting international security by limiting countries from participating in nuclear weapons programs that can result in the creation of weapons of mass destruction.