Data presentation on How the United States Convinced Ukraine to Denuclearize
Russia’s annexation and invasion of Ukraine poses an uncomfortable focus on the number of security guarantees pledged by the nuclear powers in exchange for its disarmament. The threat comes after Ukraine inherited the third world’s most massive atomic weapons before the fall of Russia in 1991 (Ford, 2007 389-409). Russia left behind most of the nuclear arsenals in Ukraine, which were not operational because the launch codes remained in Russia. Additionally, Ukraine lacked appropriate technology to operate its inherited rockets and other weapons. Therefore, nuclear warheads remained non-deployable.
Theoretically, Ukraine could have reprogrammed the nuclear control systems and acquire essential surplus technology to make its atomic weapons partly operative. According to United States Resources and Defense Council, at the point of attainment of independence in 1991, Ukraine had far more nuclear arsenal than France, China, and the U.K. combined (Kiernan, 2008 17-31. So, if Ukraine had reserved or made functional only a small fraction of the nuclear armaments, today it would be among the most feared atomic nations.
The liberal and realist lines of argument to the question of Ukraine’s geopolitical fate seemed conflicting. The view that no consilience was probably best explained using the liberal and realist concepts following specific patterns of political behavior. The realists tend to underrate the internal social dynamics as they portray Ukraine’s geopolitics ambiguity as a result of its cultural and political divide. Don't use plagiarised sources.Get your custom essay just from $11/page
On the other hand, liberals seem to disrespect the role of supremacy politics in the trans-state field. Both liberals and realists tend to deny the geopolitical prejudice of Ukraine. The realists consider the state as a victim of its geographic location and history. At the same time, the liberals view Ukraine as a lieutenant to Europe in the West’s stand-off with the Soviet Union (Ford, 2007 389-409). Surprisingly, the vision of Ukraine’s insignificant part in the transnational arena impacts its geographical politics self-esteem at home, hence deterring its freedom of action, self-identification.
Specifically, Ukraine’s geographical location, vast natural resources, and potential for agricultural, scientific, and industrial trade made the state strategic for the United States foreign policy (Ford, 2007 389-409). Though it took some time to adjust in United States foreign policy establishment to recognize Ukraine’s independent and unique geopolitical significance, U.S. decision-makers finally concluded that treating Ukraine as an equal companion in the international arena would benefit both Ukrainian and United States national interests.
Despite the advantages of vast natural resources and geopolitical position, Ukraine had two distinguishing vulnerabilities (Kiernan, 2008 17-31. Firstly, the state had a broad, open expanse of land and its population’s mixed ethnic composition. Secondly, the lack of geographical barriers made Ukraine vulnerable to the military threat from the West and East. Unsurprisingly, one of the strategic priority, was the full maintenance of the state’s political and territorial integrity as well as the sacredness of its borders. So, securing bilateral agreement to protect its independence and territorial integrity becomes one of the primary objectives for Ukrainian foreign policy after the collapse of Russia.
Generally, realists argue that countries should fight for their existence due to their concept that the world is a nation of anarchism (Mearsheimer 2006, 71-88). Throughout World War II, the U.S, Germany, Russia, and Japan all build nuclear weapon programs at various places. For instance, Russia housed nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The motive to make the atomic bombs would have been the capacity to win the warfare and survive.
The diplomatic pressure from Washington and Russia made Ukraine hand over all its atomic arms to Moscow after the ratification of the 1992 Lisbon Protocol (Kiernan, 2008 17-31). The protocol obligated that all the ex-soviet nations should surrender their guns. However, Ukraine did not submit immediately since, in Kyiv, there was feeling that the Northeastern neighborhood would one day take the opportunity of the defenselessness of Ukraine, the ‘Little Russia.’
Consequently, after delaying the protocol’s endorsement for a few days, Ukraine was guaranteed of its territorial integrity, political and national borders independence by the five permanent member state of the Security Council in 1994 (Kiernan, 2008 17-31). Three of the five countries, the U.S., Russia, and the U.K., guaranteed the security of Ukraine by signing a multilateral document with the state while China and France issued unilateral affirmations of their regimes. The five nations’ promises, as well as assurances of help against forthcoming foreign economic and political tension in the Budapest Memorandum, influenced Ukraine to surrender its remaining atomic armaments.
Had the Ukrainian still rebelled and established independent control over strategic nuclear weapons, it would have found them unusable as a deterrent if it was the Soviet Union that Ukraine wanted to prevent (Ford, 2007 389-409). The weapons had a range of up to ten thousand kilometers and were designed to hit targets in the U.S. The Ukrainians could have possibly retargeted on the Russian East.
Though all the nuclear forces were somewhat retargeted and enabled on Russia, they would have immediately become targets for Russian strategic weapons; thus, their credibility and survivability as prevention for Ukraine would have been severely hampered. This is because the guns were made to retaliate against a thousand of the Americans. Therefore, Ukraine could have achieved realism and state survival.
The question of who controls the nuclear weapons is somewhat complicated. Although Ukraine moved all the tactical weapons to Moscow by the middle of 1992, no Ukraine’s strategic weapons were transferred to Russia (Ford, 2007 389-409). Ukraine and the Soviet Union each claim administrative responsibility for the atomic weapons. For instance, Ukraine has a supervisory role in maintaining and protecting the warheads. Conversely, Ukraine had neither the capability nor the authority to launch the weapons it housed. On the other hand, Russian experts took part in weapon servicing.
The Commonwealth Independent States make decisions related to nuclear weapons. Thus, Ukraine has authority but no ability to veto a launch decision (Ford, 2007 389-409). Nonetheless, according to the Ukrainian head of state Leonid Kravchuk, the country can fire some of the weapons which were built in Ukraine (Kiernan, 2008 17-31). Similarly, Kyiv is building control and command systems, which could launch atomic arsenals without Russia’s permission. Surprisingly, if Ukraine were to abandon its commitment to denuclearize and instead keep the strategic nuclear weapons housed on its land, as seems increasingly likely, it would be the third world’s most significant nuclear power, behind the formidable United States and Russian forces.
While Carranza (2006, 502) claims that deploying atomic arsenals to protect a country can be an affirmative act, other nations are unlikely to be too forceful towards a nuclear weapon equipped state. The argument highlights the advantages of non-explosion and supports survival concepts. Additionally, the cause for less probable hostility from other nations is because of the fear that just a single atomic interchange between two or more countries can result in devastating impacts (Starr 2011). Conversely, a weakness to one country having nuclear warheads is that other nations may feel endangered and actively seek nuclear-powered arsenals themselves.
Previous attempts towards attaining nuclear disarmament and non-explosion of atomic arsenals have been achieved with limited success. Denuclearization occurred in Ukraine, with the country giving handing over nuclear warhead possessions. Kiernan (2008 19-20) believes that the primary motive for Ukraine to give up atomic arsenals was the financial incentive offered by the United States as well as the need for acceptance from the world in the after-Cold War period.
Realism is a defined condition of the transnational system comprising of foreign policy, which is primarily dedicated to ensuring state survival and pursuits of social wellbeing (Mearsheimer 2006, 71-88). Therefore, authenticity is concerned mainly with nations and their acts in the trans-states system as motivated by competitive selfishness. For instance, after the completion of the Cold War, the U.S. established a bilateral relationship with Ukraine. During the entire period, the U.S. was concerned with Ukraine’s denuclearization, an idea she framed from a Russian-centric perspective. Therefore, to achieve her foreign policy goal, the United States presented denuclearization alongside other issues that affected Ukraine, such as financial assistance, recognition of its independence as well as protection of its territorial integrity.
Therefore, one can suppose that realism, with its expectations and principles of aggressive condition, is tied to several important questions of what makes up humanity. The theory emphasizes the limits of human self-sacrifice, which is well-stated by Heinrich Treitschke (1916) in his saying that it is above all significant not to make higher demands than its defenselessness can fulfill. However, the U.S. actions of taking the financial and political weaknesses of Ukraine to act in their interest is a theory which is not far away from rational choices of first for survival. The idea is paralleled by part of Thomas Hobbes’s literature, which emphasizes on the invasion for gain, safety, and reputation (Hobbes: Leviathan, 1651).
Nonetheless, one of the most significant weaknesses attributed to realism’s proponents is its inability to account for or foresee the fall of Russia and the pervasive peace between liberal states. For example, the rapid pace of the dissolution of Russia took many in the United States foreign policy establishment by surprise. Consequently, many United States decision-makers did not do much reasoning about how to handle the post-Soviet countries before the actual collapse of Russia.
Though the Bush Administration recognized Ukraine as an independent nation, it was more concerned about the atomic warheads housed on Ukraine soil (Ford, 2007 389-409). As a result, the Bush Administration did not associate recognition of meaningful Ukraine independence to nuclear disarmament; instead, it expected Ukraine to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty once it had attained independence.
Therefore, the collapse of Russia and its willingness to help the post-soviet states to disarm can be best described as liberalism. The liberals believe in the measure of power through the national economy, cooperation, political independence, and peace. Francis Fukuyama (1992) found that development in humans can be measured by the abolition of international struggle and the assumption of the lawfulness values. He further perceived the degree to which liberal fairness have surpassed their vicious characters.
Following the overwhelming focus on Ukraine’s nuclear weapons inherited from Russia, the United States sought to stabilize the situation by moving all nuclear arsenals to Moscow (Ford, 2007 389-409). Russia played a crucial role in U.S. foreign policy in Ukraine and was frequently regarded as the leading party capable and willing to deal with post-Soviet problems. The relationship between Ukraine and the United States between 1992 and 1993 was carried out in an environment full of distrust and suspicion due to the Russian-centric nature of the U.S. policy.
The biggest issue that caused a confrontation between the two states was Ukraine acquiring non-nuclear status. Driven by strategic interests that were not necessarily identical, the U.S. and Russia applied additional tension to Ukraine to make it hand over its nuclear weapons. For instance, the United States refused to start a dialogue based on equality or develop economic cooperation until Ukraine would ratify and join the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Kristensen, 2012). Once Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol and entered the NPT in 1992, it began to receive financial and technical support from the U.S. in the dismantling of its atomic weapons.
In short, Ukraine had to withstand Russian and United States pressure to receive the best political advantage possible from nuclear weapon disarmament. In so doing, Ukraine was assured national security and United States economic compensation for acquiring non-nuclear status. Noteworthy, the Ukrainian-U.S relationship began to change in 1993 after the United States was disappointed with Russia’s economic and political performance (Kristensen, 2012). As a result, a Trilateral Agreement was signed to return and destroy Ukraine’s nuclear weapons in exchange for U.S. technical and financial support and the Soviet Union’s forgiveness of Ukrainian debt.
The vision for non-explosion and further the total denuclearization of all atomic weapon nations is claimed to be impossible. For example, nuclear-armed countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States ratified the Non-proliferation Treaty, yet they still possess atomic arsenals. Butcher (2010) argues that until such countries make a significant decrease in their nuclear weapons, any attempt of countering nations looking towards disarmament may be impossible.
While Russia and the United States ratified the New Start Treaty (2010) to work towards accumulating only 1500 operating atomic arms between them, different developments of nuclear weapons are evidenced. A primary example of this was the United States 2012 defense financial plan, which allowed financing for the innovation of their atomic arms (Kristensen, 2012). The act denotes the steady decrease that is being made as well as the extent of the struggle faced in achieving full nuclear arms reduction. Therefore, modifications of atomic weapons can be viewed as positive; however, current innovation could minimize expectations of total denuclearization and hinder efforts to stop more nations seeking nuclear-powered weaponry.
Ukraine has taken significant steps to realize liberalism after violation by the Soviet Union to uphold the statutes outlined in the Budapest Memorandum (Pifer, 2011). Russian terroristic activities demanded rapid and profound changes in the national armed forces, including a comprehensive revision of military education. To start with, Ukraine has been carrying out a difficult task to implement new military education programs, which include the Defense Education Enhancement Program. The program trains specialists in the military field. Ukraine has been establishing a system that embraces military education in training institutes and military units. The system requires a comprehensive and innovative approach and demands constant efforts from the state.
Therefore, being committed to elaborating and supporting United Nations education studies on non-proliferation and disarmament as well as understanding its undeniable significance in a long term perspective, Ukraine’s system is aimed at countering nuclear weaponry aggression of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Ukraine makes all possible efforts to enhance knowledge in the military sphere and even contributes to their advancement. For instance, in 2015 and 2016, representatives of relevant state institutions of Ukraine participated in a wide range of international training courses.
The projects undertaken by Ukraine in collaboration with other organizations such as NATO contribute to the implementation of the international duty of the state to in clearing the war remnants from the territory (Pifer, 2011). Moreover, the country partners with the United States in carrying out the humanitarian demining activities, especially in the regions liberated of Donetsk and Lugansk released from the Russian-terrorist forces territories. The relationship between Ukraine and the United States, in this case, indicates the true definition of liberalism.
I think liberalism provides the opportunity of peaceful existence even as countries accumulate power, based on the fact that political rule has now taken an effective form, from firearms to free trade. There is a need not to stress the weaknesses of human nature, even if international peace seems superior. There is a change in the meaning of power from armed perspective to economic dimension — the new shift demands for a more significant relationship, with emphasis on globalization and international support. Therefore, countries still accumulate power even under liberalism; however, the critical difference is that supremacy is more amassed if more help is achieved within international politics. The liberal system is no longer just a prediction of how policies should be; instead is now a modernized real-world concept of peace realized in the middle of the anarchical atmosphere. There continues a debate as to which thought remains significant and apt with regards to explanation of the trans-state relations. Many International Relations (I.R.) scholars will always argue that realism is politics as it is while others conclude that the liberal system is an illustration of idealized politics.
List of References
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