Disaster Response Preparedness
Name
Institution
Date
Policies and Procedural Failures during Hurricane Katrina
The hurricane occurred three years after the formation of DHS (Department of Homeland security). DHS’s attention to Katrina was heightened and had even come up with a response plan. But despite the fact that DHS had a National Response Plan and that it anticipated the Katrina, response to the disaster was a total failure (Moynihan, 2009). Responders and even the government failed to convert the available information into an actionable response plan. Additionally, the response to the disaster was weakened by the dispersed nature of authority in the USA. Institutional capacities for managing similar disasters were inadequate at almost all government levels. For instance, the Bush administration had weakened the FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). The DHS had also not been tested, and it was not sure of how to deploy its resources and authority. Instead of perceiving Katrina as a matter of national significance, the DHS leadership responded to it like any other natural disaster (Moynihan, 2009).
New policies in DHS’s National Response Plan further complicated the government’s ability to establish a unified command. The policies prescribed the rules that responders to the disaster were to follow in their coordination, but most responders did not have knowledge of the rules; this leads to failures in coordination. The DHS had also come up with policies for responding to terrorist attacks following 9/11, and they hoped that the activation of the policies would limit the impact of subsequent attacks. Because of this mindset, they failed to treat Katrina with the seriousness that it deserved (Moynihan, 2009).
The US government’s intergovernmental nature of responding to crises assumes a gradual expansion of involvement by the federal government as local and state responders require help. However, this approach was ineffective during Katrina because local and state capacity to respond to the disaster was overwhelmed and damaged (Moynihan, 2009). In responding to Katrina, responders from the federal government took too long to respond to the disaster because they wasted time waiting for local and state governments to ask for help. The dispersed nature of responsibilities also made it difficult to create a central command, leading to further confusion. The three arms of government were in conflict as to who should have taken charge of certain responsibilities, such as the collection of dead bodies. For instance, the federal government wanted the responsibility of collecting dead bodies to be shouldered by the state government, but the capacity of state and local government was already strained (Moynihan, 2009).
Conclusion and Recommendations
Response to Katrina was a poor not just because of policy and procedural failures, but also because of the scope and size of the task. Because of coordination failures among responders, failure to treat the disaster with a greater sense of urgency and failure to consider risk factors in advance made it impossible to minimize the losses that Katrina caused. The Katrina happened after DHS had established disaster response policies following the 9/11 attacks, most of which failed. The disaster highlights how new structures and policies of responding to disasters can fail. New policies made the response to the Katrina ineffective, and they led to a lot of confusion about responsibilities and roles. the following are recommendations that can be followed by agencies and government response failure in future:
- The DHS and the federal government should partner in developing functional operational structures, revising existing disaster response plans, and establishing accountable and clear processes for national preparedness efforts. Executive branch agencies must also be trained, organized, and equipped to execute their roles (The White House, n.d.).
- Defense and DHS should work together in developing a plan that can be followed by DOD (Department of Defense) in supporting the federal government in responding to disasters such as Katrina. The two must also partner in prescribing the circumstances under which the DOD should take charge of response activities.
- DHS must review all plans, policies, strategies, and laws that affect communication during response activities. Once the review is done, the DHS must partner with the OSTP (Office of Science and Technology Policy) and the Security Council to develop a communications strategy that will support communications interoperability and operability (The White House, n.d.).
- The DHS must partner with the private sector, and the local and state governments to develop modern, transparent and flexible a logistics system that is based on existing commodity stockpiling contracts at the local level for provision of services and goods during emergencies. At the federal government level, capacities must be developed for conducting large scale logistical operations to supplement or, if necessary, replace logistical systems at local and state levels through resource leveraging within private and public sectors (The White House, n.d.).
- DHS should work in coordination with appropriate executive branch departments in developing mass evacuation plans when local and state government’s capacities are incapacitated or overwhelmed.
- DHS should initiate a review of all interagency procedures and policies so as to ensure that all federal searches are effective, and to ensure that assets are rescued when responding to similar disasters (The White House, n.d.).
- DHS should partner will DOJ (Department of Justice) in examining federal responsibilities for supporting justice and criminal law enforcement systems at local and state governments level during emergencies. The two should also collaborate in building policies, procedures , and operational plans to ensure effective response by the federal government.
- DHHS (Department of Health and Human Services) should partner with DHS and respective homeland security partners to strengthen the capability of the federal government to offer medical and health support during crises. Achieving this goal may require an improvement of control and command of all operational resources (The White House, n.d.).
- Human Services, DHS, Executive Branch Departments, State Governments, Local Governments, and NGOs should work together to develop comprehensive, robust, and integrated systems for delivering human services when a disaster occurs. Such plans will ensure that victims have access to assistance from states and federal governments in a smooth and simple manner.
- The Department of Housing should collaborate with other Executive Branch departments in developing bolstered capabilities and integrated plans for long-term and temporary housing of individuals affected by disasters.
- DHS should come up with a public communications plan for informing, guiding, and reassuring American populations before, during, and after disasters hit. This communications plan should be developed in such a way that it integrates the capability to deploy and coordinate response teams (The White House, n.d.).
- DHS must also come up with plans for rapid assessment of damages to critical infrastructure, and information obtained must be used to prioritize infrastructural restoration support decisions so as to ensure that impacts are minimized, and lives are saved.
- DHS should also partner with the agency for Environmental Protection during disasters to assess the safety of disaster environments for responders. Additionally, the DHS should also partner homeland security partners at local and state levels to develop plans for the coordination of debris removal at all stages when disasters occur (The White House, n.d.).
Comparing Response to Hurricane Katrina and Response to Super Storm Sandy
Unlike the poor response to the Katrina summarized above, a lot of improvement was observed in the way state, local and state governments responded to hurricane sandy. Learning from the mistakes made during the response to Katrina, assets and staff began to be placed in areas that were vulnerable to hurricane Sandy long before the storm happened (Ladislaw, 2013). Additionally, FEMA coordinated with other state departments to develop relief and emergency response plans. According to Ladislaw (2013), just a day before Sandy happened, “the then-president – Barack Obama – signed emergency declarations for New York, New Jersey, District of Columbia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland, paving the way for FEMA to directly transfer resources to tribal, local and state organizations”. This made it possible for them to make preparations before the storm.
Additional declarations were also signed by Obama in the following days for states such as West Virginia and Delaware. A national task force for power restoration was also formed by FEMA under the directions of Obama, and it was tasked with rapid restoration of power and fuel, minimizing red tape, and increasing coordination between the private sector and government agencies at all levels (Ladislaw, 2013). All these actions are a clear indication that the response by all authorities and agencies to the disaster improved a lot during Hurricane Sandy. FEMA was also very active in responding to Hurricane Sandy, thanks to congress approved legislation that authorized the restructuring of FEMA following the challenges that were encountered during the Katrina. New legislations also made it possible for FEMA to have resources from the federal government, and they also bolstered partnerships and communications between all levels of government – local, state, and federal (Ladislaw, 2013).
But despite the improvements that were observed when responding to hurricane sandy, a number of challenges were also observed, which offer opportunities for improvement. For example, power outages were witnessed at the peak of Hurricane Sandy, especially in New York. The Langone Medical Centre at New York was even forced to evacuate its patients (Better World Solutions, n.d.). A lesson from this is that strategies need to be put in place to prevent or respond to power outages. Improvements also need to be made in terms of evacuation procedures. When the hurricane hit, the city of New York did not call for evacuation immediately; they took about 8 hours. Strategies also need to be put in place to prevent communication break downs during impending disasters. Sandy was an eye-opener to the fact that communication breakdown can be catastrophic. For example, people in New Jersey and New York were ordered to evacuate, but about 70% did not because of communication breakdown. These are some of the few improvement lessons that can be derived from Hurricane Sandy (Better World Solutions, n.d.)..
Crisis Management from Hurricane Response Procedures
There are a number of crisis management lessons that can be learned from the successes and failures of the hurricane response procedures highlighted above. These lessons can be applied or used to respond to other types of disasters, such as virus outbreaks or terrorist attacks. In responding to virus outbreaks – such as the Zika virus – for example, local, state, and federal agencies must partner to offer medical and health care services to victims. Policies and procedures must also be put in place to ensure that victims of virus attacks are identified and isolated from other populations so as to minimize the spread of the virus. Communication procedures must also be effective so as to inform the masses about the virus and what they can do to avoid being infected. In fact, communication plays a central role when responding to any disaster.
Terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have the potential to cause damage not just to property but also human lives, just like the hurricanes discussed above. As such, the above response procedures can also be applied to terrorist attacks. For instance, Human Services, DHS, Executive Branch Departments, State governments, local governments, and NGOs can always come together to develop comprehensive, robust, and integrated systems for delivering human services when terrorist attacks occur. Such plans will ensure that victims of terrorist attacks have access to assistance from states and federal governments in a smooth and simple manner. Additionally, DHHS (Department of Health and Human Services) can partner with DHS and respective homeland security partners to strengthen the capability of the federal government to offer medical and health support when terrorist attacks occur. When it comes to managing immigration or refugee crises, the Department of Housing can collaborate with Executive Branch departments, private sector partners, and agencies at the local government and state government levels in developing bolstered capabilities and integrated plans for sheltering refugees. To achieve all these, a central system for deploying resources and managing communication between all agencies involved in necessary.
References
Better World Solutions (2015). Lessons Learned from Hurricane Sandy. Retrieved from https://www.betterworldsolutions.eu/lessons-learned-hurricane-sandy/
Ladislaw, S. (2013). Hurricane Sandy: Evaluating the Response One Year Later. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/hurricane-sandy-evaluating-response-one-year-later
Moynihan, D. P. (2009). The response to hurricane Katrina. International Risk Governance Council, 1-11.
The White House (n.d.). Hurricane Katrina Critical Challenges. Retrieved from https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html