Grenfell Tower

Grenfell Tower

The Grenfell Tower Incident highlighted shortcomings in the construction industry. The fire occurred in 2017 and is considered one of the worst catastrophes in London. Grenfell Tower was a 24-storey building that housed individuals from diverse economic and social backgrounds. The residents included immigrants and families that had relocated from other parts of London (Davies 2017). Unfortunately, Grenfell Tower’s undoing happened because of a fire. The fire, which started from the kitchen of Room 16, spread quickly and claimed at least 72 lives (“Volume one” 2019). An inquiry into the disaster also found building regulations were not followed, nor were safety concerns issues by the tenants. The materials used also contributed to the inferno. The review uses varied literature sources to explain the incident. Henceforth, the review is guided by the theoretical framework on how systems of control by firms and regulatory systems work together or fail to do so, as an effective management system. Evidently, the fire would have been prevented if the right measures were applied.

The Main Organizations Responsible for Refurbishment

Many companies were involved in the 2015-16 refurbishments. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Volume one (2019) identifies the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) as the owner of the project, although it outsourced the management to a different organization. Forthwith, Davies (2017) cites The Kensington and Chelsea Tenants Management Organization (KCTMO) was the company to whom RBKC conferred the management duties. Later, KCTMO hired Rydon as the main contractor for the project.  The Grenfell Tower Inquiry states that Rydon was selected in 2014 after a different company, Leadbitter Construction Limited, was dropped as the lead contractor (“Volume one” 2019).  Macleod (2018)’s research into the atrocity adds that KCTMO paid 10 million pounds to Studio E Architects and Rydon for the addition of nine flats, improvement of energy efficiency, and creation of community facilities as part of the refurbishment efforts.  Davies (2017) identifies that Artelia Projects UK Ltd. managed the financial aspect of the business. The Inquiry clarifies that Artelia was the quantity surveyor and RBKC’s agent (“Volume one” 2019). Forthwith, Rydon engaged a subcontractor, Harley Facades Ltd (Harley), for cladding services according to Volume one of the inquiry (2019). Other engineering specialists include Exova Warringtonfire, who specialized in fire engineering (“Volume One 2019). Davies (2017) and the Inquiry’s Volume One outline other companies, Max Fordham, Witt UK, Celotex, JS Wright and Sons, and Arconic. The Inquiry clarifies that Max Fordham, appointed by KCTMO, gave mechanical and electrical (M&E) services, while JS Wright & Co Ltd designed and installed the M&E works (“Volume one” 2019). Different firms, which were either contracted or subcontracted, did the refurbishment. According to Davies (2017), Witt UK created the ventilation system, Celotex availed RS5000 insulation for the cladding, and Arconic was responsible for designing the Reynobond PE that was utilized in the cladding.

Various Failures

Design, Procurement, and Execution 

The design of Grenfell made the building susceptible to fire. The first failure concerns cladding. The Inquiry Volume One notes that polyethylene was used in the spandrel locations windows (2018). Of note is, polyethylene is a highly flammable substance that melts faster than aluminum. Maguire and Woodcock (2018) further state that aluminum and polyethylene were a lethal combination for the cladding panels, especially since there was little space between the plastic foam and aluminum sheets.  Maguire and Woodcock cite the Celotex RS5000 as a significant cause. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry volume one (2019) also found that the windows were highly flammable. Cambridge (2019) explains that the fire spread from the window because the aluminum facing fell away during the fire and exposed the flammable polyethylene, which ignited faster than the intact panels. The fire then caught the nearby panels and spread throughout the building (Cambridge 2019). A discrepancy between the door design and installation was the primary factor that led to the fire, according to Booth et al. (2018). The hinges, fittings, and seals resulted in the easy spread of the flame. The doors also had additional problems, such as not being fire-resistant or self-closing, and being low standard in the case of stair doors, according to Fire Brigades Union (2018). The stairways, added Booth et al. (2018), had exposed gas and duct pipes that were not only noncompliant with the laws but aided the fast spread of the flame. The staircase was also very narrow and inhibited easy escape as it was merely 1.04 meters wide. Over-cladding also occurred when new insulation and rain-screen cladding were added to each storey. The designer also disregarded the compartmentation design, whereby fire-resisting barriers, such as walls or floors, prevent the spread of fire to other parts of a building, increasing safety. The building design used combustible materials that aided the fire.

The procurement practices were also heavy contributors to the fire. The process was driven by cost-saving. The Guardian article by Booth (2018) asserts that a proposal to install noncombustible panels was discarded due to pressure from the Conservative Council to reduce the costs. In fact, price sensitivity was the leading reason why KCTMO dropped Leadbitter in favor of Rydon, whose quotation was 1.3 million pounds cheaper. Kirkpatrick, Hakim, and Glanz (2017) concur that the Council did not support the purchase of fire-resistant materials because it would be costly. Kirkpatrick et al. (2017) mention that the KCTMO ignored issues on the safety of the building, a point that Macleod (2018) also acknowledges. The choice of cladding material was driven by cost, as Davies, Connolly, and Sample (2017) unearthed. The constructors had two options for the cladding material: Reynobond FR and Reynobond PE cladding (Davies et al. 2017). Eventually, Reynobond PE cladding was chosen because it was 2 pounds cheaper per square meter than the FR option. It is worth noting that the FR stands for fire-resistant. The procurement shortcuts led to the fire.

Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization (KCTMO)

KCTMO’s negligence to resident’s needs was a misstep that had catastrophic outcomes. According to a 2016 article by Grenfell Action Group, the KCTMO promoted dangerous living conditions and neglected safety and health for its tenants and leaseholders. KCTMO was also negligent in the 2013 fires at Grenfell Tower when the residents experienced frightening power surges resulting from faulty wiring. KCTMO did not learn from this experience to uphold the safety conditions in the building. Baxter (2017) further notes that the Grenfell Action Group warned that shutting down the car park for the block would inhibit the movement of emergency vehicle access one was needed. Indeed, when the fire broke out, fire engine responses struggled to get to the building. According to Baxter (2017), the Grenfell Action Group wrote many warnings that fell on deaf ears. Again, Lusher (2017) mentions that the residents of Grenfell complained in 2015 over the use of substandard materials and low-quality workmanship when constructing the building. Moreover, the tenants were irked by how the construction process took place as the materials were carelessly left on the corridors and were dangerously exposed. The residents added that the Council did nothing to address the concerns of the tenants. The Grenfell Action Group (2015) also released minutes of a 2015 meeting for the Grenfell residents held in 2015. The minutes noted KCTMO’s poor communication with regards to changes, dissatisfaction with building standards, concerns over hot pipes being left exposed, which was contrary to the building plans, and disrespect from the KCTMO. Shah (2018) exposed KCTMO as an organization, which threatened the residents. Shah (2018) explains that a lot of mistrust between KCTMO and the residents was evident, with the former even threatening to take legal actions to silence divergent views. The residents conducted endless meetings with local authorities and associations so that their voices would be heard, but to no avail. The KCTMO disregarded residents’ safety concerns, which culminated in the fire incident.

The nature of the occupants contributed to the negligence on KCTMO’s part. McKee (2017) notes that the residents did not attract the attention of the inhabitants because of their economic background. McKee compares the Grenfell Tower case to a 2005 fire in New Orleans, where the government was very detached from the citizens. Because they came from underprivileged communities, a majority of them immigrants, they had little say because of their low income. Jordan (2017) concurs that racism and classism was the reason for KCTMO’s indifference with the tenants. Jordan acknowledges that the most marginalized people in British society died in the inferno because they did not have a say in Parliament nor the local Council. Jordan (2017) argues that KCTMO was more concerned with impressing the potential white investors into the North Kensington by creating esthetically appeasing buildings, which were unsafe inside. Foster (2017) claims that had a white British community been living in Grenfell, then KCTMO would have been more responsive. That the Muslim and black population that lived in the Tower was of little concern. The KCTMO’s negligence was driven by classism and racism.

Regulatory Regime

KCTMO did not conduct thorough research into the companies hired, which showed much regulatory leniency. A 2020 BBC report cites the director of Studio E, Andrzej Kuszell, admitting that his company was inexperienced in constructing tall buildings. Kuszell also blamed the lax construction policies and lack of Council oversight for E’s role in the fire. Knapton and Dixon (2017) add that building regulations were at fault. The two cite the National Building’s law that scrapped off the requirement of materials used in external walls, not catching fire for at least an hour, allowing for escape. Instead, buildings only had adhered to Class O requirements, which permitted material that did not add to the heat of a fire. If anything, as stated in Volume Four of the Inquiry (2019), the materials actively enhanced the quick fire spread. Knapton and Dixon (2017) add that the team did not learn from the Lakanal House Fire that had happened. Similarly, Volume One of the Inquiry (2019) mentions the Lakanal incident from which little action or communication was done to prevent future fires. Baxter (2017) states that had the Council and local government acted on the recommendations of the Lakanal House inquest, the outcome would have been different. An inspection revealing the quality of materials used in construction would have found Grenfell unsafe, and necessary corrective measures would have been instituted.  Macleod (2018) cites Dame Hackitt, an independent advisory expert on the incident, saying that ignorance on the expert’s part is responsible for such fires. The relevant individuals do not read safety regulations nor their updates. Dame’s statement is actualized by the CEO of Studio E. He admitted not knowing the fire regulations and blamed other consultants for not educating the company or addressing fire safety concerns. The stakeholders did not uphold safety measures.

The existing safety regulations, furthermore, did little to prevent the fire. The deregulation of building safety and empowered private companies to be in charge of building control, as the Fire Brigades Union (2018) Notes. The Union illustrates this point by citing Part B of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 1985. Part B allowed for aluminum composite material (ACM) to be used in cladding panels for tall buildings, under Class O materials (“Grenfell tower fire” 2018). The Thatcher-led government did not invest in fire safety because of the unnecessary financial burden that the exercise would give the government. Giving private entities inspection and management of buildings also weakened the safety standards because of vested interests and likely corrupt practices in control activities, the Brigades Union (2018) writes. The government’s building control laws led to the Grenfell Tower destruction.

Politics of self-interest at a national level inadvertently caused the fire. Foster (2016) asserts that the Conservative Party’s regular decision to vote against the rights of tenants made the Tower’s residents powerless. Of note is, 72 of the Conservative members were landlords and did not want any policy that would contravene their ideas passed (Foster 2016). A case in point was a bill requiring landlords to make their premises fit for rehabilitation, which was pulled down. According to Baxter (2017), the same party was not very concerned about the fire safety and did not learn from an incident where 7,000 firefighters lost their lives, resulting in a 25% in fire prevention visits. The Conservative Party members deliberately ignored the need for better housing.

Duncan (2017) claims that the government’s failure was responsible for the fire. The first mistake is the national government relinquishing oversight and management of the buildings to the local level. In turn, the local government transfers the maintenance duties to the housing association, weakening the local council’s ability to perform its duties, and creating confusion for the tenants on which party is responsible for what role. Had the Council been keener on managing Grenfell Tower, Duncan (2017) admits that the fire would not have occurred. Duncan (2017) equally blames the weak regulations in the construction industry for the incident. He says that since the Lakanal fire eight years before, regulations were yet to be updated. In addition, reviewing the safety standards of cladding materials, according to the London Fire Brigade should have been heeded after the Lakanal fire, but that did not happen, leading to a tragic end.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

The management and companies involved in the refurbishment played a crucial role in the fire. Many proactive measures could have been taken, such as listening to the tenants, better procurement, and adherence to legal standards on safety. The Grenfell Tower incident would not have been catastrophic if value took precedence over costs as the articles reveal. The sources also demonstrate that legislation is a critical component in construction safety. Any lenience on the government has catastrophic impacts on an entire population and industry. However, the texts display some discrepancies, as neither mentions the extent to which each company was negligent. Moreover, the sources do not expose RBKC’s involvement in the issue, as the Council is the owner of the building. The reports on regulations also state do not mention which laws were broken and offer general discussions on the policies affecting construction. Furthermore, more information is needed in this sector. Most of the content comes from newspaper articles, including journal sources, raising credibility issues because of a biased approach. However, this can be explained by the incomplete inquiry given that Phase 2 of the report has not been released.

Recommendations

Strict adherence to the law would prevent such accidents. The parties involved in the construction process should be informed of the legal requirements in construction (Macleod 2018). All the participants should understand that not knowing the law does not exemplify one from blame; they should know they are solely responsible. In addition, the rules should be made public for easy access by the agencies and tenants. Furthermore, the laws should cover practices like procurement, design, monitoring, and artistry (Metacalfe & Elson 2017). At the same time, existing policies should be amended to require the use of high-quality materials. Adhering to legislation enhances the safety of the residents during and after construction. This is because the right standard of materials and construction techniques will be used. Breaking the law should carry a hefty punishment, such as fines and jail time for the parties involved, to motivate constructors to obey the rules. The introduction of policies can save lives.

Similarly, the materials used for construction should be exemplary. Aluminum and other combustible materials should not be used for exterior walls, windows, or doors. Fire-resistant materials should be used in tall buildings, even though they are expensive (“Volume four” 2019). Furthermore, before new materials are used, they should be tested to ascertain that they meet safety standards. The construction materials should also be appropriately concealed to diminish fire risks. Overall, construction materials should be safe.

Buildings should also have elaborate emergency exits. The Grenfell Tower only had one staircase, hindering easy escape from the building. According to OSHA (2018), a building should have at least two exit routes that are as far away from each other as possible in case a person is blocked by smoke or fire. In addition, the routes should directly lead to a street, walkway, or public space. The exit should also be fire-resistant. An excellent fire exit enables a quick and safe escape from the building. In Grenfell Tower’s case, many lives would have been saved had to escape been possible. Stopping the fire would have been easier because emergency responders could gain access to the building through the exits.

Finally, teamwork is essential. Cooperation and trust were clearly lacking in the Grenfell’s refurbishment. Henceforth, Bernard, Fletcher, and Steyn (2018) note that teamwork enhances trust, cooperation, commitment, and coordination of the projects. In this case, every stakeholder is involved in the decision-making process, and their input is valued. Further, each member knows their role and works towards a common goal. Communication is clear, and conflicts are managed swiftly. If there had been proper communication between the residents, local authorities, and the construction groups, the accident would have been avoided before it even took place. There would not be any blame game as each party knows their responsibility.

Reference List

Baxter, H. 2017. The Grenfell Tower residents saw this tragedy coming, but were repeatedly ignored. Was it because they were poor?. The Independent. [Online] Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/grenfell-tower-fire-kensington-london-residents-kctmo-council-contract-ignored-poor-a7789276.html>. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

BBC News. 2020. Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Architects behind refurbishment ‘really sorry’ for victims. [Online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51707499> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Bernard, T.J., Fletcher, L., and Steyn, H. 2018. “Linking trust and collaboration in project teams to project management success.” International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 11 (2). [Online] Available at: < https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324550915_Linking_trust_and_collaboration_in_project_teams_to_project_management_success> [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Booth, R. 2018. Grenfell Tower: fire-resistant cladding plan was dropped. The Guardian. [Online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/08/grenfell-tower-more-costly-fire-resistant-cladding-plan-was-dropped> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Cambridge, E. 2019.  Owner inferno: Grenfell Tower fire – what caused it and where did it start?. The Sun. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3805218/grenfell-tower-fire-cause-what-happened/>. >. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Davies, R. 2017. Complex chain of companies that worked on Grenfell Tower raises oversight concerns. The Guardian. [Online] Available at: < https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/15/long-builder-chain-for-grenfell-a-safety-and-accountability-issue> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Davies, R., Connolly, K., and Sample, I. 2017. Cladding for Grenfell Tower was cheaper, more flammable option. The Guardian. [Online] Available at: < https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/16/manufacturer-of-cladding-on-grenfell-tower-identified-as-omnis-exteriors>. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Duncan, B. 2017. Grenfell Fire: an indictment of government. University of Westminster. [Online] Available at: <https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/4609f288c5639fbbec4d32bc2d8bc9cb340b2c76fb1d3c739131485bb9cc5180/43118/Grenfell.pdf>. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Fire brigades union. 2018. The Grenfell Tower Fire: A Crime Caused By Profit and Deregulation.

Foster, D. 2016. The Tory landlord MPs who don’t care if rented homes aren’t fit to live in. The Guardian. [Online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2016/jan/15/tory-landlord-mps-housing-bill-private-rented>. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Foster, D. 2017. Would a white British community burned in Grenfell Tower. The New York Times. [Online] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/opinion/london-tower-grenfell-fire.html> [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Grenfell Action Group. 2015. Minutes from the Grenfell Tower emergency residents meeting. [Online] Available at: <https://grenfellactiongroup.wordpress.com/2015/03/27/minutes-from-the-grenfell-tower-emergency-residents-meeting-170315/> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Grenfell Action Group. 2016. KCTMO – Playing with fire!. [Online] Available at: <https://grenfellactiongroup.wordpress.com/2016/11/20/kctmo-playing-with-fire/> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Grenfell Tower inquiry: phase 1 report: volume four. 2019. Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

Grenfell Tower inquiry: phase 1 report: volume one. 2019. Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

Jordan, S. 2017. Racism and classism killed the residents of Grenfell Tower. The Huffington Post. [Online] Available at: <https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/skylar-bakerjordan/grenfell-fire_b_17104044.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAFgH-YGvajzIQfT4a1hQznsIdqBCGZpbjJDuHgpS5vdSr7ZJsk89SG1X-R5609iJqNq1icl3zw1Z-sScpbXxPoQT_xE5czNQqjTUoWn9ObzTZD5mr6FQQifDDDWJgJWrOdSszB2Si-bkDanCr6DwJ0xCVhE5DdimhOjC3gNlHDf5>. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Kirkpatrick, D., Hakim, D., Glanz, J. 2017. Why Grenfell Tower burned: regulators put cost before safety. The New York Times. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/world/europe/grenfell-tower-london-fire.html> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Knapotn, S., & Dixon, H. 2017. Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno. The Telegraph. [Online] Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/15/eight-failures-left-people-grenfell-tower-mercy-inferno/> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Lusher, A. 2017. Grenfell Tower residents complained two years ago of ‘cheap materials and corner cutting’ in block’s refurbishment. The Independent. [Online] Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/grenfell-tower-fire-residents-fears-warnings-ignored-kensington-chelsea-borough-council-tmo-a7794086.html> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Macleod, G. 2018. “The Grenfell Tower atrocity: Exposing urban worlds of inequality, injustice, and an impaired democracy.” City, 22(4), pp. 460-489. [Online] Available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327784074_The_Grenfell_Tower_atrocity_Exposing_urban_worlds_of_inequality_injustice_and_an_impaired_democracy> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

McKee, M. 2017. “Grenfell Tower fire: why we cannot ignore the political determinants of health.” The IBMJ, 357:j2966.

Metacalfe, K. and Elson, S. 2019. High-rise building safety reform: new duties during construction. Pinsent Masons. [Online] Available at: <https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/analysis/high-rise-building-safety-reform-new-duties-during-construction>. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

OSHA fact sheet. 2018. Emergency Exit Routes. [Online] Available at: < https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/emergency-exit-routes-factsheet.pdf>. [Accessed 17 Mar 2020].

Shah, T. 2018. ‘Their staff cannot be trusted’: residents speak out against Grenfell Tower management. Gal-Dem. [Online] Available at: <https://gal-dem.com/their-staff-cannot-be-trusted-residents-speak-out-against-grenfell-tower-management/> [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].

Woodcock, L. and Macguire, J. 2018. “Thermochemistry of Grenfell Tower fire disaster: catastrophic effects of water as an ‘extinguisher’ in aluminium conflagrations.” Entropy, 22 (1), pp.3–4. [Online] Available at: <www.researchgate.net/publication/326782413_Thermochemistry_of_Grenfell_Tower_Fire_Disaster_Catastrophic_Effects_of_Water_as_an_‘Extinguisher’_in_Aluminium_Conflagrations>. [Accessed 13 Mar 2020].