JAPAN AND ITS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

JAPAN AND ITS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The establishment of a desired and positive national image of a country is not a cheap thing, especially for distant countries.  The cultivation of this positive national image requires concerted efforts from diplomats and may even extend to the proper utilization of social media platforms. Arguably, public diplomacy can be dated to ancient times and is not something that was initiated recently. Ideally, public diplomacy encompasses image cultivation, propaganda as well as activities which are aimed to solve differences relating to political and historical backgrounds between countries and reinstate a good relation between the involved countries (Bukh, 2014).  The ramification of this process is to understand and appreciate each country’s culture and establish a cordial relationship. Japan is not an exception to this process. The main goal of Japan’s public diplomacy has always been channeled to the history of recovering the militarism image and the misinterpretations and misperceptions accorded by the foreign countries which skew the reality of Japan as a democratic country.  This paper will seek to scrutinize the nature of public diplomacy embraced by Japan and examine the mobilizing elements in Japan’s diplomacy, which are the force to reckon in the country’s achievement of public diplomacy. The paper will also review Japan’s steps in promoting diplomacy just after the Cold War II and further investigate the Japan’s proactive initiatives in building public diplomacy-Building. While Japanese governments have remained inactive and passive over the past decades, the country is in the move to become more self-confident as its leaders are in the brawl to obtain a more assertive role in the international community by widening the scope of their interest from domestic affairs to the international level

The nature of Japan’s Diplomacy.

It has been argued that Japan has contained a reactive kind of diplomacy since the culmination of World War II. This argument has been held following the various reasons offered by the diplomats to support these claims. One of the reasons is attributable to the faceless nature of Japan’s diplomacy, which mainly lacks personality. Japan’s diplomacy is also characterized by being externally pressure-driven, whereby its course changes when it receives criticism from foreign countries; otherwise, it maintains its course (Lim, 2019). Moreover, diplomats claim that the country lacks independence, and blindly follows the United States.

Japan also yields foreign pressure at the last minute when it comes to matters relating to trade negations. According to diplomats, it is politically unrealistic for a country to renounce their vital economic interests for the mere purpose of wanting to seem faithful to the principles of free, an open market without external pressure (Kingston, 2015). This act is undoubtedly impossible on domestic grounds because international norms are not year entirely and clearly defined.  It is yet undeniable that external pressure is the driving force behind policy manipulation in any given country.

The diverse claims of diplomats reveal that Japan’s post-Cold War diplomacy has expanded its inactiveness (Kohno, 1999). Irrespective of the validity of the argument aforementioned in the introduction part, the dilemma of the nature of Japan’s diplomacy, either reactive or proactive, can be resolved by assessing the key components of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War period.

Mobilizing Elements in Japanese Diplomacy

Several elements principally drive Japan’s public diplomacy. These elements include the public opinion and the international political environment, the move adopted by the country just after the Cold War, and the style of leadership taken by the state, among other elements. The three factors, as mentioned earlier, are discussed in the three subsequent headings.

Public Opinion and the International Political Environment

It is alleged that Japan, as a nation, prefers the natural process of transition or evolution as contrasted to the artificial means, which is regarded as an initiative. Indeed, a group of pragmatic scholars researched in 1990, which revealed that the country is tenaciously rigid to change and takes no action unless pressurized by the United States (Melissen and Sohn, 2016). The nation is also thought to take haste moves into making unilateral decisions. However, this does not ramify that it will never change because the country has always desired to reform and conform to the policies adopted by other countries around the world.  The evident steps can attest to this that the nation has made in connection with the country’s public opinion on foreign relations after the Second World War, which depicts the approach to change assumed by the state.

Japan’s Diplomacy After the Cold War

At the beginning of the post-World War era, Japan experienced three key security issues. One of these issues was on how to create a new security order along the Asia-Pacific section (Morton, 2019). As soon as the Clinton Administration was inaugurated, America began to review its military posture known as “Nye Initiative”. This process resulted in the periodic issuance of East Asia strategic Report (EASR) (Soeya, 2015). While this happened, the US and Japan entered a consensus that was jointly instigated the restructuring of the US-Japan security framework. The process of redefining jointly led to the US-Japan Security Declaration in 1996 as well as the review and refinement of the Defense Guidelines in 1997 (Gurgu and Cociuban, 2016).  This bilateral endeavor assumed an analogous framework that allowed Japan to undertake an independent role in helping the establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was to encourage the insinuation of assurance in the Asia-Pacific region and foster regional, bilateral security plans (Midford, 2018).

The second core security issue that Japan faced was a legacy of the Cold War (Aoyama, 2017).  This issue was correlated with restoring a long-lasting peace in Cambodia. This step would serve as a prerequisite to the attainment of solidity in Southeast Asia, which included the objective of efficient fulfillment of the “Fukuda Doctrine”.

The third vital Japanese security issue was concerned with a remnant of the Second World War. Japan found it difficult to reconcile and normalize relations with North Korea among other Northern Territories regarding Russia.  Therefore, Japan pursued to address this issue in the 1990s (Ibid.). However, anticipations for the resolution appeared inaccessible by 1999 owing to North Korea’s apprehensive nuclear ambition and unilateral postponement of stabilization dialogs with Japan.

In the 1970s, foreign countries began to perceive Japan as an “economic superpower”. Since then onwards, Japan has been requested to be active in the international community.  However, these uncontained demands steadily began to relinquish with the Japanese.

The elapse of time, and commencement of the new era does not serve as the explanations for the advent of a more Japanese foreign policy (Melissen, 2011). Scrupulously did the Japanese public develop a cognizance that Japan ought to be involved in international affairs over a long time. Thus, it can be reasoned that the culmination of the Cold War just happened to coincide with the time of keen consciousness among the Japanese citizens about foreign affairs.

Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda discoursed his long-term vision of Japan-Southeast Asia relations. In retrospect, Japan executed its first attempt to present a proactive foreign policy, which was the “Fukuda Doctrine”. Despite that, this doctrine was a forthright friendship between the people of Southeast Asia and the Japanese, and it did go beyond to advocate any political role for Japan (Cheung., 2016). Thus, Japan had to circumvent juxtapositions with the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.  The Fukuda Doctrine then beckoned the parting from reactive diplomacy, which had reigned since the end of the Second World War.

A few years later, in 2012, Prime minster Shinzo Abe audaciously declared that japan is back from its “lost decades” of economic mayhem and political turmoil. Under the reign of Abe, Tokyo gained the determinations to undertake a more significant role in global leadership. This said policymakers hold that soft power will act as a breakthrough to achieving public diplomacy (Lam, 2007).

Style of Leadership in Japan and Diplomacy 

The government post of prime ministers plays a significant role in the attain attainment of public diplomacy in Japan. It is indisputable that the Japanese political leaders were dreadful, reactive, and passive during the Cold War as contrasted to other foreign governments. However, these leaders of Japan could not be given a chance to remain dreadful and reluctant just after the end of the Cold War.

Over the years, political leaders became more or less determined to assert the position of Japan in the international community. Until recently, the Japanese people have commenced channeling more significant efforts and attention to specific foreign policy issues since the end of the Cold War. Formerly, the foreign policy issues seemed insignificant to the Japanese people until the topics concerning foreign policy issues gained popularity among the people. The daily talk among these people has inclined towards the position of the country in the international community (Japan is using cultural diplomacy to reassert its place, 2020). The political leaders seem more obliged to bear accountability for public diplomacy and explain the policy outlook of Japan to the people, a move that is contrary to their previous responsibility.

The recent prime ministers of Japan have donned their impeccable yet exclusive leadership styles, which have acted a long way in eliminating the erroneous impression that Japanese diplomacy is passive in both practical and perception. Their calculated moves and dedication have helped them to redeem the country’s reputation in the global domain, which has significantly restructured Japan’s status in the international community.  The prime ministers have had more exposure to the public about the mobilization of public diplomacy, which has helped them to act more proactively (Japan is using cultural diplomacy to reassert its place, 2020). Subsequently, there has resulted in clear, closer, and frequent communication and consultation pathways between the prime ministers and the bureaucracies.

In an attempt to trace the foreign policies of the erstwhile prime ministers, it may be conceivable to recognize the foremost foreign policy task for each of the administrators. The Miyazawa administrator who reigned 1991-1993 succeeded in passing UNPKO legislation after lengthy negotiation in the Diet, which was then first applied to the PKO in Cambodia in 1992 (Asplund, 2018).  Having acquired skills from the Gulf War, Miyazawa presided the G7 Summit in Tokyo 1993, and his work was highly cherished by the leaders (Otmazgin, 2012). This case demonstrated a belated and proactive foreign policy actions.

Just after the inauguration of the Hosokawa administration (1993-1994), the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was wound up. This phase put Hosokawa in rough decision-making situations in the political arena, considering that this was the first coalition government ever since the conclusion of the 1955 system. However, Hosokawa made hasty decisions that lucking saved japan from the verge of becoming a victim of condemnation from other nations around the world. Hosokawa also fully utilized mass media to insistently preside over press conferences and broadcast policy announcements countrywide to depict change and evolution to the people.

Prime Minister Murayama (1994-1996) also entered into books oh history following his great foreign policy challenge that led to a deal between Japan and North Korea on nuclear ambitions. He adopted proactive leadership, which was warmly received by his party.

All said, the post of a prime minister had played a vital role in promoting diplomatic initiatives. Just after the end of the Cold War, the prime ministers have expressed their desire to help public diplomacy and pay more attention to foreign policy issues. There has been an increase in interactions between Japanese voters and political leaders, which has fostered the effective management of public diplomacy. Therefore, this role of a prime minister in japan can never be overlooked by the bureaucracy.

Japan’s Proactive Diplomacy-Building Initiatives

Even as Japan continues to exert the utmost efforts in promoting its national interests, the leadership of the country has failed hitherto. The present government is determined to contribute proactively to national development than it has been before.  Some of the interests of the government include promoting the stability and prosperity of the country in the international community. The country is also dedicated to securing peace by applying the principle of international cooperation. Based on the said principle, Japan intends to cooperate and work closely with its alliance partner, which is the US and other concerned nations, a move believed to promote proactive attainment of peace, stability, and economic prosperity in the international community. The government of Japan is reinforcing public diplomacy by promoting measures in the arena of international peace cooperation. Currently, it has dispatched more than 9300 diplomats on 13 United Nations (UN) peacemaking operations (PKOs) to ensure that negations for peace are developed (Japanese diplomacy: the role of leadership, 2015).

Despite the efforts of Japan to mend its relationship with the neighboring countries, Japan has not yet realized negotiations with the current administrators of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China. It has, however, portrayed significant concern to establish a stable three-way relationship between China and Japan, ROK (Lim, 2019).  The aim was to benefit these three nations and them in achieving stability, peace, and prosperity within the region and the international community.  Japan has already opened the door for dialogue, and for the sake of all the three countries, it is willing to initiate forthright summit meetings (Yue and Jin, 2018). Therefore, it is expected that Japan will continue to ask for dialogue with other nations so that it can establish good relationships with the countries and rebuild its international image and thereby promote its public diplomacy.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, Japan has a triple challenge of rebranding, rediscovery, and reassurance if at all, it needs to reminisce itself and succeed in the economy of Asia. The nation must leverage its resources and push for favorable public diplomacy to economically champion other nations in Asia. Cultural and political diplomacy will help the country to disillusion their misconceptions about other nations such as Tokyo while at the same time, detach the underlying intentions.  Japan has experienced a stifled mood over several years after its bubble burst in the 1990s, which has thwarted economic prosperity in the country. This has also ensured a prolonged recession in various industries in the country, which otherwise could have prospered had it been good cultural diplomacy is created with other nations in the world. Seemingly, projections can attest that proactive Japanese diplomacy, which was initiated in the 1990s, will continue to brand the image of Japan’s foreign policy for several decades to come.

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