Literature Review: SENIOR SEMINAR IN HOMELAND SECURITY LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature Review: SENIOR SEMINAR IN HOMELAND SECURITY LITERATURE REVIEW

Bergen et al. (2017) examines the United States’ declining jihadist threat. The authors argue that ISIS has gradually grown weaker and unable to stage attacks against the US. At the same time, the country had witnessed a declining number of terrorism-related cases since the year 2015, when it recorded a peak in such instances (Bergen et al., 2017). Amidst these declines, security departments must remain vigilant and cautious because the nature of threat does not appear to change significantly.  The role of homegrown extremism and thus, terrorism, seems to replace that of foreign attackers. In that manner, the US still faces an unchanging terror threat. However, this transformation cannot steal the credit owed to security departments and the entire governance for its unrelenting performance in combating terrorism. The substantial investments, awareness, and preparedness of the government reveal a nation with a deep determination for the safety of its citizens.

Bergen et al. (2017) maintain that fewer-than-forecasted Americans have died from jihadist-propagated attacks since the 9/11 incident. The authors argue that although a hundred and four deaths have resulted from such attacks since the infamous incident, none of those incidences was a national catastrophe. Also, none of the foreign jihadist organizations has succeeded in staging an attack in the United States since 9/11. The fatal instances that have happened in the US have involved US citizens, and none of the perpetrators has had training in a foreign country. That change sends a message to law enforcement and security organizations that the real threat comes not from foreigners but from domestic citizen-turned-terrorists who receive inspiration from the ISIS and other groups. The declining rate of these attacks, however, suggests that the government has adequately responded to the changing terrorism shape.

Although jihadist groups have managed to inspire a significant number of Americans to implement their terror plan, the rate of successful attacks has dramatically declined over the recent past. In the year 2015 (about one year after the caliphate’s declaration), the United States charged 80 people for participating in jihadist-inspired terror activities. Just before these charges, the country witnessed (in the year 2014) the highest terrorism-related casualty rate. Since 9/11, about half of all fatal incidences resulted from ISIS-driven extremism (Bergen et al., 2017). These statistics have changed dramatically recently. The United States’ success in halting ISIS’s recruitment initiative and its eventual loss of territories has gradually weakened ISIS. Lately, the group has neither managed to direct nor inspire attacks to the United States. The United States has numerous advantages over ISIS.

The level of public awareness strengthens the argument for the US’s emergence as the victor in this war. Numerous incidences have proved that the public has become more aware of terrorists’ activities. In the year 2001, for example, Richard Reid was about to finalize his bombing plan when other passengers raised the alarm. In the year 2009, Umar Farouk was about to accomplish his bombing mission when his fellow passengers noticed and stopped his plan. In the year 2010, a vendor averted what was about to be a disaster by spotting a suspicious sport Utility Vehicle in Times Square (Bergen et al., 2017). These incidents portray the increasing level of public awareness. Following such events, the public has triggered investigations into a significant number of terrorism-related projects. The level of investment in defence also exemplifies the US’s intent on defeating terrorism.

Bergen et al. (2017) says that between the years 2002 and 2017, the US has directed 2.8 trillion US dollars to counterterrorism projects. That enormous investment has accompanied numerous achievements that indicate the country’s progress into “a hard target.” For example, at the time of the 9/11 attacks, the US had listed only sixteen people in its No-Fly designation. By the year 2016, that number had increased to 81,000, indicating the seriousness with which the country deals with suspicious travellers. Similarly, the number of Joint Terrorism Task Force “fusion centres” has increased tremendously from the year 2001. Today, there are more than a hundred such centres compared to only thirty-five during the pre-9/11 era (Bergen et al., 2017). These statistics, the number of prosecutions, and the declining strength of the ISIS suggest that the US has the upper hand in fighting the terrorists. Various structural and management issues within the ISIS portray its inability to match the US in terms of military strength and organization.

According to Oosterveld et al. (2017), the opportunistic nature of ISIS is potentially one of the reasons that the Caliphate will fall. The group relies on wealth acquired illegally through insurgence and conflict-based rule. That includes kidnapping, smuggling, and the illegal sale of oil (Oosterveld et al., 2017). If another group emerges and promises the people more opportunities, or if a more influential group emerges, ISIS will inevitably fall. The establishment of the ISIS as a caliphate suffers from numerous weaknesses. First, the group has an ambitious plan for expansion which increases its chances of confronting its regular enemies. The distinctive insurgent method increases the chances of the group to lose its fighters (Oosterveld et al., 2017). Besides its determination to expand, the group also determines to maintain a long-term occupation and control over the Middle East. This conflicting nature brings confusion to the terrorists who have not yet established a solid rule. The lack of proper management and leadership places the terrorists in an unfair position regarding their confrontation with the US. Bearing the long-term military expertise of the US, it is compelling to conclude that the terrorists, with their disorganized strategy, lag behind the US in terms of military strength. There is a faint chance, therefore, that ISIS, can defeat the US in the terror battle.

Oosterveld et al., (2017) further points that by looking back at Al Qaeda, one may realize that an expansion strategy weakens rather than strengthen the ISIS. In other words, it is more costly to keep the affiliates than to let them alone. The strain caused by the members, plus the lack of proper governance, will eventually weaken the Caliphate. At the same time, the American influence in the countries and regions where the terrorists strive to control denies the terrorists a smooth expansion. In Iraq and Syria, for example, the US has managed to pose as a containing power instead of a fighter intending to destroy the ISIS (Oosterveld et al., 2017). As a result, the US continues to maintain its acceptance among Iranian and Syrian forces. That status diminishes the ISIS’s determination and, thus, impact on the region. By exposing the real motives of the terrorists, the US stands a better chance to help the countries currently under the control of the ISIS. That position gives the US an advantage over terrorists regarding its international situation. Generally, the US has the upper hand in both domestic and foreign affairs over terrorists. The declining control of the ISIS demonstrates this idea.

Although the United States generally faces a receding impact of jihadist groups, home-based terrorism inspired by those groups remains a significant threat. Kelvington (2017) analyzes the present and future security threat of the United States. He says that the risk has changed from one dominated by foreign attacks to one informed by homegrown violent extremism. That means that Americans, instead of foreigners, have participated in the planning and executing attacks against their fellow citizens in adherence to ISIS’s changed global terror messaging.

The author laments that since the year 2014 Islamic caliphate’s declaration, home-based attacks have increased. The internet has played a significant role in this transformation. The author introduces the concept of “virtual entrepreneurs,” whom he sees as radical terrorists aiming to recruit U.S. citizens, residents, and visitors to plan and execute home-based attacks. Between the years 2014 and 2017, the United States experienced fourteen terrorist cases promoted by “virtual entrepreneurs” (Kelvington, 2017). Alongside these foreign terrorists, there were nineteen U.S. residents involved in planning those attacks. At the same time, digital communication facilitated logistics planning that enabled some U.S. citizens to travel to the Middle East to join the Islamic State. The author warns that the future may feature a higher percentage of related cases and that warrants the US security apparatus an alarm. He also says that the global landscape of terrorism increasingly appears to involve domestic planners, which poses a threat to Homeland departments.

Although the intelligence system has significantly hindered the movement of fighters to join the Islamic State, attacks planned and executed by fellow Americans have kept the terror threat high (Kelvington, 2017). Through the internet, radical terrorists can instruct their recruits on how to perform attacks without them having to appear in the United States physically. The success behind the emergence of homegrown extremism results from the proliferation of the internet and the ability of the jihadists to instil “legitimizing ideologies” into U.S. citizens. Following this success, the US has endured attacks planned and executed by its citizens in various places. The Ohio State attacks (), the mass shootings in Orlando (2016), stabbing attacks in Virginia (2016), and the attempted bombings in New Jersey and New York (2016), are examples of home-based terrorist attacks.

Kelvington (2017) further examines the diversity and potential for growth of homegrown extremism and, thus, terrorism. He says that extremists express their “legitimate ideology” through various ideologies that ultimately call for or involve violence. One is intolerance, which may assume the form of religious or cultural prejudice. Otherism is also a way of expressing one’s ideology or beliefs in which an individual degrades others by perceiving them as inferior, unfit, etc. Obsolutism is also a common characteristic among jihadists where an individual sees his/her worldview as noble, thereby relegating others’ views. These ideologies, which radicals turn into grievances, tend to attract people into terrorism by instilling a sense of revenge against ideologically imposed injustices that terrorists want to avenge against the United States (Kelvington, 2017). Since many people across the globe readily embrace these ideologies, the threat of terrorism has a potential for growth and is diverse. That means that the US could suffer an even more significant risk in the future. As such, the country needs a rigorous and continuous effort towards safety.

References

Bergen, P., Sterman, D., Ford, A., & Sims, A. (2017). Jihadist terrorism 16 years after 9/11: A threat assessment. New America.

Kelvington, M. R. (2017). Threat to the United States Homeland: Internet Propaganda and Planners Inspiring Individual Jihad.

Oosterveld, W. T., Bloem, W., Farnham, N., Kayaoğlu, B., & Sweijs, T. (2017). The Rise and Fall of ISIS. Hague Center for Strategic Studies.