Moshe Dayan and Strategies of War

Moshe Dayan and Strategies of War

The legend of Moshe Dayan has spread across the world due to his contributions towards the establishment of a sovereign state of Israel. Dayan’s achievements are reflected in both military and political participation, and a share of controversies. The determination of Dayan both in war and peace agreements is what makes him a unique Israeli commander.

Biography

Moshe Dayan was born on the 25^th of March, 1915, in the community of Degania Alef, previously in Palestine, but currently in Israel. Degania Alef was Israel’s novel settlement of farmers where Dayan was raised (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). At an early age of 14 years, Dayan signed up for an informal crusade, the Hagana, whose main objective was to safeguard Jewish settlements from Arab attackers. He worked under the stewardship of Charles Orde Winget of British descent and head of the night patrol unit (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). Participation in the Haagana instilled significant skills in guerilla warfare. Dayan later gained experience in combat when he served in the special police force from 1936 to 1939 in Galilee and Jezreel Valley (Shamir, 2012). Dayan was imprisoned in 1939 following the criminalization of the Hagana by the British authorities (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). Upon his release, Dayan became part of the British army and later got involved participated in the liberation of Syria and Lebanon from France during the second world war (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). It is during the battle in Lebanon that Dayan lost his eye, leading to the adoption of an eye patch, his main identification feature.

The mark of Dayan’s military career was his involvement in the “war of independence” in 1948. In the battle, he served as the commander of Palestinian Jewish forces defending settlements in Jordan Valley. More leadership ventures were realized in the city of Lydda against the Egyptians.  Later in the same year, he was selected to lead the Jerusalem front, a position that saw him lead the 1949 armistice negotiations with Jordanian delegates (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). Deyan’s mastery of military affairs earned him a promotion to the General Headquarters as the chief of operations in 1952 (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). In 1953, he was appointed as the chief of staff to the military (Shamir, 2012). In his new position, Dayan recommended the use of offensive techniques agonists neighboring Arab powers, whom he perceived to be using extremist groups to disguise their military preparations for attack (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). Resultant Israeli attacks in Gaza and 1956’s Suez operations caused significant harm to Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian forces and a major accomplishment for the military under the leadership of Dayan.

In 1958, the commander left the military to venture into politics, joining Mapai, the labor party. He was, consequently, elected to the Knesset in the following year, where he also served as the minister of Agriculture up to 1964 (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). His tenure was haltered by resignation following a disagreement with the prime minister. This eventuality resulted in the formation of a new party, Rafi, in partnership with the former prime minister, Ben-Gurion. He was elected back to the Knesset under the new Rafi movement, which later merged with the labor party (Shamir, 2012). Dayan’s astuteness in politics and military operations earned him reputation and selection as the minister of defense. Notable achievements in this post include success in the 1967 “six-day war” and the initiation of peace talks with Syrian authorities (Shamir, 2012). However, he also faced criticism for the loss of the Yom Kippur war, which led to his resignation in 1974.

Dayan was later appointed into the ministry of foreign affairs in 1977. He spearheaded negotiations with neighboring states to achieve a lasting peace between Israelites and Arabs. The Camp David Accords of 1978 with Egypt were the result of such talks (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). He, however, resigned the following and was later diagnosed with colon cancer. Dayan passed away in 1981, October 16.

Strategies Employed by Dayan

One of the critical strategies employed by Dayan was the use of violence to initiate peace agreements. As the chief of staff to the armed forces, Dayan insisted on the need for Israel to sign a peace treaty with its neighbors to end the long cycle of violence. However, this, he argued, should be preceded by a military strike to demonstrate the might of Israel by gaining more territory and thwart any future Arab violence (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d). This was evidenced in his plan of a Franco-Israel attack on Egypt and Syria in 1955. Moreover, he championed the use of retaliatory attacks to reinstate Israel’s dominance over the region and force submission.

Another tactic utilized by Dayan was the neutralization of enemies before they attack. During his career, Dayan mostly championed an Israel-led attack on neighboring Arab countries whenever peace efforts stalled. Such a premature attack, before the escalation of disagreements, enabled Israel to deter opposition from preparing military assaults or exercising joint operations against Israel. An example is the “Six-day War” of 1967 when Israel destroyed the Airforce jets of all its warring neighbors, which would have been a significant threat in open combat.

The hybrid approach is the most commendable of Dayan. Despite his mastery of war and notable success in battle, Dayan always favored negotiations as a means of lasting solutions. His combination of violence and amity enhanced the prospects of ending the feud between the warring parties. Examples include the 1949 armistice negotiations and the talks he led in 1977 as minister of foreign affairs.

Comparing Dayana with Thutmose III

There are significant differences and similarities between the personification of Dayana and Thutmose III of ancient Egypt, as well as their approaches to war. Primarily, both men are considered to be “geniuses of battle” due to their outstanding strategizing skills. Markedly, both commanders preferred to launch attacks first before the enemy could organize. Such a technique led to the success of Israel against Arab countries and the 16 campaigns of Thutmose III in conquest (Mark, 2017). However, the two differed in that Dayana preferred dealing with the strengths of opponents, battling with the most significant rivals in the Arab union, Egypt and Syria, to demoralize weaker players. In contrast, Thutmose III’s campaigns entailed conquering the more vulnerable cities first to grow his territory through continued submission.

Assessing Deyan Based on the Clash of Megiddo

The encounter of Megiddo was a distinguished triumph of Thutmose III and one which demonstrates striking similarities between his approach to war and that of Moshe Dayan. The battle of Megiddo involved a united front of local Canaanites and Syrians, who were unhappy with the influence of Egypt in the region (Mark, 2017). Thutmose III marched his army towards Megiddo to attack the enemies, whom he chased to their sanctuary in the city. A seven-month siege led to the coalition’s surrender. Thutmose III extended a peace agreement to the enemies requiring them to respect Egypt and cease further rebellion (Mark, 2017). The liberal approach employed by the Egyptian commander is similar to Dayan’s “Open Bridges” initiative, allowing Palestinians under the newly acquired Gaza strip to continue with their normal lives rather than expelling or enslaving them (Shamir, 2012). The goal was to show amnesty in return for peace and respect for Israel. This is identical to the Megiddo battle and generosity of Thutmose III.

References

Jewish Virtual Library. (n.d.). Moshe Dayan (1915 – 1981). Retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/moshe-dayan

Mark, J. J. (2017, July 20). Thutmose III. Retrieved from https://www.ancient.eu/Thutmose_III/

Mark, J. J. (2017, April 3). Thutmose III at The Battle of Megiddo. Retrieved from https://www.ancient.eu/article/1101/thutmose-iii-at-the-battle-of-megiddo/

Shamir, E. (2012). From retaliation to Open Bridges: Moshe Dayan’s Evolving approach toward the population in counter-insurgency. Civil Wars, 14(1), 63–79. doi: 10.1080/13698249.2012.654682