Must We Be Just Plain Good?

Must We Be Just Plain Good?

Introduction

1. Nandi Theunissen sets an objective that works to do away with a regress argument that has for a long time been used so as to arrive at a conclusion saying that for anything to be of relational value then there must be human beings who are an end to themselves or have a non-relational value. The method he uses tries to survey a wide range of ways through which the argument for regress can be articulated. Additionally, this method creates a problem for the already formulated ways of regress argument and, in the end, realizing that as human beings we can buy the idea that we also entirely end in ourselves through realizing the existence of the relational value we possess (Theunissen, 2018). Nobody matters just because they are good people, but rather because they are good for another person, and it is for the other people in the surrounding. He continues to emphasize on the fact that someone is good for themselves since they also exist at the center of their lives and have the potential to sway it to be a good one.

The explanations of Theunissen start off with the formulation of an argument that argues that value has to have a first cause. With this, he further reformulated the reading to be that unless we put a value on ourselves, then we are unable to be agents for the good of it. As this turns out, it is seen as more of a transcendental move than a regress argument. Due to this, he explains that being just a good person for the benefit of it does not have any impact on a person (Theunissen, 2018). For example, the joy of having clean plates is a motivating factor for washing the dirty ones, and in addition, the clean plates can be used in serving another work that could not be achieved if they were dirty. This points out that seeking good would be of no value if there was not a different kind of value that would arise in return that is good in itself. Theunissen continues that apart from the relational value, properties humans have because of their well-being have a huge significance in their lives altogether.

In section three, that second version of the argument is defended by Joseph Raz, and it concerns the relation that obtains when one thing fits perfectly for the good of another thing (Peace, 2017).  An assumption is made that when X is good for Y, it does not necessarily mean that X is good or valuable because for it to be valuable, then Y has also to be of a higher value. There exist some chains of value dependence, which ends when something that has its value does not depend on being good for the other things aligned to it (Peace, 2017).  The meeting of this description by valuers would mean that they now exist at the final level of the chain of dependence.

Section four of the document surveys a wide variety of ways of casting doubt on the regress argument that has already been formulated. He argues that the chains of value that exist have a somewhat circular structure, and the value of dependence might have a reliance on the others. To explain further, he says that “relational goods are valuable because they can be good for valuers and valuers are valuable because they are good for other valuers.” As he refers to the structure of value, X has value because it is valuable to Y, and in turn, Y has value because it is valuable to X.

The circular structure mentioned above that exists is at odds with the “metaphysical principle,” explaining that something positive and non-relational must be contained in the world that is if they are supposed to have relational value (Peace, 2017).  The instrumental means are at a position off sourcing from making the world a better place, and the systems have to be maintained for that to be achieved. He changes this idea to a challenge by saying that humans are valuable to each other when they diminish the suffering that other people go through. Additionally, he says that in a world where people seem to be good for each other, then value attached would be all just relational, and there is no need to have just positive non-relational value for people to be of help to one another.

Onto the sixth part, he treads to the response directed to the Katian regress argument, which is the people with non-relational value. He concurs that the thought on the circular structure in section 5 can be expressed by saying, “I am because we are” and “a person is a person through other people.” What Theunissen goes further to explain is that we should not be lost in the wake of being there for other people that we forget being there for ourselves (Theunissen, 2018). And he explained this by saying that by benefiting from yourself, you are able to put an end to the regress that continues to be a threat. The explanation is that “we should relate to people always with a view to their being center of a life to which they bear a special relation.” Additionally, he says the philosophy of morality is not just fixed to the duties which are owed to other people. “In order to benefit another, we must truly have something to give. Who is a good person, the one who benefits? Who does she benefit, others of course but also and most importantly herself? She has something to offer another because she is a master of one – she has knowledge of how to be well in her own life”. The chain of dependence as explained can be ended when there is a relative fixation, and there should also be no non-relative value.

Arguments against him

What can be seen to wrong with a regress is that for example, if A has value only if B does and the value of B is determined by the value of C then this cycle continues without an end, and it does not explain that nothing has value (Peace, 2017). Theunissen states that “It is something of a reflex to find infinite regress intolerable, though what is amiss is not always entirely made out. The reply that comes thereafter is that “it seems implausible for the existence of value to depend on there being infinitely many things.” The people are at a position of accepting this as a condition that is around for the existence of value. The explanation that comes out clearly here is that if the value of the things people do was not of any value, then there would be no reason for doing them anyway because they would add nothing at all. All value in the world has to be instrumental (Peace, 2017).

Theunissen separates an issue which would be at the center stage of his fellow philosophers, wherein section 5 notes that the value of doing away with pain depends on the value of the specific individual who is undergoing the pain. Pain in any form is considered a bad thing, and there is always that perspective from the person that it occurs to, which turns out impartial. To quote Theunissen, he states that “To mind, each side should permit the other their basic foundational assumptions and the positions evaluated on their own terms.” The question that arises afterward is that it is possible to remain neutral. He has settled on the assumption which states that human well-being has a significance even if it might be at the expense of the well-being of animals being of less significance or none at all probably. The question that now goes unanswered is what gives the humans own well-being a special and important status above that of other creatures.

Conclusion

Theunissen argues from the point of defending the idea that one’s well-being occupies a central role in the human life cycle together with the moral philosophy and also adding to it the ordinary practical thought. The explanation that what matters for you should matter to you and the side of the existent of other important goals; for example, intellectual accomplishments that are not in line with a person’s specific interests are also not brought out precisely. However, the reasoning surrounding what is held of much value and what brings its value to it in that chain tends to create a picture of the things people hold dear and how they are of effect to them.

References

Theunissen, L. N. (2018). Must We Be Just Plain Good? On Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity. Ethics, 128(2), 346-372.

Peace, F. J. (2017). Who needs ‘just plain’goodness: a reply to Almotahari and Hosein. Philosophical Studies, 174(12), 2991-3004.