Political economy paradigm

Political economy paradigm

Chapter 8 puts the political economy paradigm of a realist in deducing expectations relating to financial, trade and monetary matters while focusing on Japan, the United States and China. The chapter considers the expectations of particular realist theories other than realism itself. Typically, realist theories in relation to the political economy where some may infer competing predictions, all derive their arguments from a common paradigm. The chapter reflects on the idea that trade relations fail as the most appropriate location of gauging behavioural expectations of realists. In the first part of the chapter,

the author establishes that framework is primarily an approach as opposed to a theory hence cannot be fake. Realism can be distinguished from the remaining schools of thought, particularly liberalism, in terms of its basic assumptions, the state and war. The latter also significantly shape the distinct interpretation of realists with regard to the implications of the assumptions concerning economic growth. In addition, realists can also be differentiated by their opinion on the state being a distinct actor possessing its individual interests.

The chapter underscores the inherent idea that trade matters have attracted an inconsistent scope of attention in discourses concerning realists analysis while ignoring more significant developments in financial and monetary segments. Chapter 8 highlights that the realist view appears to heavily disagree with the possibilities of international cooperation further emphasizing that the perspective is more real in the trade sector than any other sphere. However, realists agree to the existence of mutual economic benefits accruing from trade, although raise doubts concerning the sufficiency of the aforementioned benefits to ascertain their achievement. Even without concerns relating to dynamic comparative gains, realists still expect cooperation as the foundation of distributive benefits in a static environment.

Chapter 8 explains hegemonic stability ideology as the primary general theory, which has been put in place to exemplify the pattern relating to monetary relations. Although the above theory appears quite appealing, there exist numerous compelling problems to its interpretation. Therefore, power concentration does not emerge as the most appropriate explanation pertaining to monetary cooperation. However, liberalists have implemented and further emphasized the significance of philosophical consensus, as opposed to the provision of general goods, in an effort to explain the occurrence of such cooperation. Realists have not yet articulated a precise alternative to the above-mentioned case. However, the author explains that the problems regarding autonomy and externalities present monetary cooperation as an extreme challenge to sustain. As such, a baseline expectation regarding monetary relations ought to be monetary treaties will be achieved although will have the propensity of breaking down. The considerably free government reign over monetary matters should offer the necessary political space for overcoming complexity challenges in attaining monetary accords.

In the former quarter-century, among the defining features of the international economy has been its drastic expansion. The changes in terms of nature of finance, investment and international trade is a risk to state autonomy. As such, realists ought to expect nations to find the problems facing autonomy quite intolerable if not objectionable. Therefore, realists should anticipate these institutions to try to restrain these forces. Further on, states lack clear efforts to reassert authority over the majority of the flows hence will challenge significant realist conceptions. The above-mentioned concept also offers precise contrast between realist and liberal expectations, considering a liberalist view would be expecting irreversible changes or high likelihood of continuing.