POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Some characteristics of Ottoman society

In the world history, the Ottoman Empire was among the longest lasting, and mightiest dynasties. The superpower was run by the Islamic culture and it governed a big region in the Eastern Europe, Middle East, and North Africa for over 600 years. The Ottoman was a formal government that was established by the Ottoman Turks. Also, they expanded the empire under the control of Orhan, Osman I, Bayezid I, and Murad I. Sultan was the chief leader of this community who had absolute political and religious power over his people. The Sultan lived in a special place in Istanbul called the Topkapi palace (Özdalga,2013). However, the sultans faced the threat of assassination, and had to relocate every night to take precaution.The western Europeans viewed the Ottoman society as a threat. However, historians argue that the kingdom was a great source of regional security and stability. Also, it established important attainments in science, culture, arts, and religion. It was able to accomplish this by being open and diverse to other religions and cultures other than Islamic. The ottoman society had a strong political philosophy (Özdalga,2013). Moreover, the Slavs, Turks, and Armenians were mostly engaged in political and governmental events. The ottoman was referred to as one of the most liberal territories since most people in that society were not Muslims and they were allowed to practice their religious activities. For instance, the Jews and Christians were allowed to go to the synagogues and churches respectively to satisfy their religious needs. The society’s aim was to enlarge its territory and power by taking Islam to non-Islamic states.

Role played by Arabic language, literature and culture in the development of Arab nationalism and rejection of Ottoman rule

Arabism started to develop in the nineteenth century as a critique of the government of the Ottoman Empire. The Arabic speakers had been fully prepared to accept their role in the empire for about 400 years. Most of the Arabic speaking individuals acknowledged Islam just like the ottomans. The nationalism developed as a partnership in Islam, taking up all the Muslim individuals under the rule of sultan of the ottoman society regardless of the language they spoke (Cleveland, 2015). The Arabic speaking Muslims reserved a pride in their language, and celebrated the initial Arab conquests that passed Islam from Oxus to Pyrenees. Also, they took pride in their origins that connected them to Arabia in face of Islam. However, the loyalty to Islam bound them to Muslims who prided themselves on other origins, and spoke different languages. Also, these people brought different energy in the expansion and defense of Muslim. The ottoman had been precisely showing this vigor since the fifteenth century. It had been bound to the Islamic enthusiasm that had taken Islam to the gates of Vienna (Cleveland, 2015). In the ottoman house, all the Muslims viewed themselves as the beneficiaries and participants in the joint Islamic enterprise. They did not distinguish between Turk and Arab. However, the basics of this symbiosis started to deteriorate with the relative weakening of the power of the Ottoman. The Christians who were not content and the great powers of Europe were rolling up both ends of the Ottoman carpet. They took a nationalist form in their struggle for independence. As the Ottoman Empire declined, the remaining subjects’ confidence also diminished. Other discontent were even seen in the Arab speaking regions in the empire, the Fertile Crescent, and in Arabia.

Tanzimat Meaning, aims, and accomplishments

Tanzimat was a sequence of administrative reforms that occurred between 1939 and 1876, during the reign of Abdülmecid I and Abdülaziz the sons of Mahmud. The Hatt-ı Hümayun and Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane are examples of such reforms. The reforms were meant to capture additional tax revenues for the Ottoman Empire’s military defense, and to rationalize and centralize the Ottoman rule. The ultimate goal of the Tanzimat was to promote equity. The Tanzimat diplomats desired to preserve the nation that facilitated the mobilization of wealth for modernization (Davison, 2015). The central focus of the reforms were in the administration, in the army, in the society, and both in the provinces and at the center through adjustments in law, and education. The reforms were meant to facilitate the development of other institutions that would assure security of property, and life. Moreover, the institutions would guarantee honor to all citizens irrespective of their race or religion. The Tanzimat diplomats developed a different secular school system, and established assemblies for provincial representation. Also, they reorganized the army according to the Prussian conscript system (Davison, 2015). Through the Tanzimat reforms different codes of criminal and commercial law that were similar to those in France were introduced. New courts that were independent of the Islamic religious council, the ʿulamā, were established to administer these laws. In Tanzimat’s effort to acquire a centralized administration, all legal authorities were centralized in the hands of the ottomans chief leader. Furthermore, the Tanzimat reforms were successful in laying the basis for the steady modernization of the Ottoman government.

Three reasons that many MENA states are weak today

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a region that is economically diverse. It includes nations with shared heritage at the different stages of economic growth and with natural resource endowment that vary greatly. Economic reforms have been taken in many of these countries, crises have been avoided, and macroeconomic stability has been achieved. However, the economic performance in these areas has been below potential for the last 30 years (Altenburg et al., 2015). The three main reasons for this weakening of the economic performance are; the persistent high rate of unemployment, weak integration into the global economy and the lack of an entrepreneurial culture. The high levels of unemployment have been contributed by the high population growth rate, and increased growth of the labor force. At some time, employment in these regions grew faster than in other third world countries. However, the faster population growth provided surplus labor that flooded in the labor market, and the capacity of the economy would not absorb it 9 Altenburg et al., 2015). Also, the weak integration into the global economy can be connected to the unemployment and high population growth in these states. MENA regions have adopted the inward looking strategies for growth instead of embracing globalization and openness to enhance economic performance. Therefore, the areas have deprived off other nations full benefits of globalization. Furthermore, the low rates of enterprise formation in these regions has contributed to the poor economic performance. The entrepreneurial performance in every MENA economy is extremely low compared to that of the emerging economies and large developed countries.

The manner in which the oil boom of the 1970s affected the political economy of oil-rich states

The 1970’s oil boom gave rise to the most fundamental wealth transfers in the current history. The policy makers had extremely high expectations, that ‘black gold’ would be the force that would bring transformation in the countries that produce oil. The oil producing states are distributed across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America (Ross, 2013). The decision makers expected that the economies of those countries would be advanced. However, they were disappointed since these oil-producing countries ended up in a state of political failure and economic decline. The prices of imports in the oil-rich countries increased leading to deficits in the balance of payments, increased borrowing, and underdevelopment (Ross, 2013). The prices of oil increased drastically followed by an economic destruction. The economic damage is evident in the incomplete development projects, the severe corrosion of mass, and the shattered development plans. Moreover, the boom lead to increases prices of oil, which in turn caused high inflation, low economic growth and high levels of unemployment. Demand for other goods and services reduced since the high prices of oil reduced the available wealth and increased the doubt about the future. Also, the supply of other goods in such countries reduced since the total cost of production rose. The per capita income in many of these countries fell drastically (Ross, 2013). In other countries like Nigeria, Iraq, and Sudan there has been increased panic of civil war. All these economic and political conditions constitute what is referred to as the resource curse.

The main issues pertaining to religion & politics and the political economy in Tunisia

In Tunisia, current revolution have contradicted the political economies that assume that democratization is guided by the economic liberalization. Also, the revolution works towards a political economy that concentrates on the class alliances to comprehend what is meant by replication of the system ( Hamdi, 2018). The classic political economy has been revived by political science as opposed to economics. The issue of social class being center of political economy depends on both a satisfactory philosophical context and analytical relevance. The social classes are required to understand the dynamic forces of the past two centuries. Considering social class as a foundation of the call to go back to a political economy does not really imply the promotion of the Marxist technique. Based on the Tunisian revolution, going back to social classes is vital since a direct causal relationship cannot exist between political and economic factors (Hamdi, 2018). The need to first go through the social side is unavoidable since it is capable of giving political significance and meaning to economic conditions. Therefore, the Tunisian revolution is probably the chance for economists to re-evaluate their analytical framework, and their interpretations. However, they should consider the institutional variations in particular. The Tunisian citizens are generally disappointed with the present state of their country. Most of them are not satisfied with the nations’ economy and direction its taking. Also, there is a division over if things are better now with Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali out of governance. However, some citizens are optimistic about the future economy of the country. Their priority is to acquire a democratic government with laid down features of democracy (Hamdi, 2018). For instance, free speech, fair judiciary, and honest elections should be the most important features. Concerning the role of religion in leadership, Tunisians seem to take Turkey as their role model as opposed to Saudi Arabia.

The main issues pertaining to religion & politics and the political economy in Libya

Libya does not have a stable, inclusive, and unified state. Qadhafi used repression and oil funded investment to weaken any social counterweight to his authority and the state. The major political and social dynamic is fragmentation centered on loyalties, identities and multiple interests. They include tribes, regions, cities, religious orientation, and political factors. Local dynamics and actors rule over politics with a strong link between tribes and cities (Obeidi, 2013). While other peripheries have power, the center is weak. The long-term history of Libya referred to as regionalism and localism cites this. Regular, tensions are felt around the balancing of power amid provinces and between power levels. The new political leaders have made up their mind to support political stability by giving government appointments, and by using resources from gas and oil. The political leaders are composed of the Muslim brotherhood, and revolutionaries. However, in most cases the government does not respond the aspirations and grievances from the revolutionaries. Tension between the conservative actors and the pro revolution are important measures of economic and political opposition. The state security forces have little reach and legitimacy, hence security is ad hoc and poor. A collection of various armed groups has occupied the place. Strategic leaders have delegated conflict resolution and securities to local notables and and armed groups (Obeidi, 2013). The defining feature of the economy of Libya is still oil and its legacy of rentier state. The economy’s structure is baldly imbalanced, economic governance is inadequate, and there is scarce state working for support in Libya.

References

Altenburg, T., & Lütkenhorst, W. (2015). Industrial policy in developing countries: Failing markets, weak states. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Cleveland, W. L. (2015). The making of an Arab nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the life and thought of Sati’Al-Husri. Princeton University Press.

Davison, R. H. (2015). Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876. Princeton University Press.

Hamdi, M. E. (2018). The politicisation of Islam: a case study of Tunisia. Routledge.

Obeidi, A. S., & Obeidi, A. (2013). Political culture in Libya. Routledge.

Özdalga, E. (2013). Late Ottoman society: The intellectual legacy. Routledge.

Ross, M. L. (2013). The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton University Press.