The Mind-Body Problem

The Mind-Body Problem

People comprise of both mental properties and physical properties. Humans have some features associated with physical science. The physical properties may include some elements like motion, size, shape, time and space, etc. People also have mental properties, which generally do not associate with physical components. The psychological features are associated with consciousness, which includes things like emotional and perceptual experience. There are also intentionality elements like desires and beliefs. They are all possessed by a self or a subject. Physical properties are mostly public, which means they are equally upheld or observed by any individual. Other physical properties are not entirely observable, but, on the contrary, they are available to all, with scientific techniques and equipment. These properties include an electron. The case is different when it comes to rental properties. One can feel pain directly, but his/her behavior can also show the pain they are experiencing. Conscious mental properties are generally private to the self, who is privileged to access them in a way that no one else can to the physical.

The mind-body problem involves the inter-relationship between the two aspects of properties. This problem breaks down into various components. The ontological questions include; what defines the mental states? What is the explanation of physical rules? Is it right to say that one is a class of the other? Does it mean that mental properties are material or the other way around? Or are the two states entirely different? The casual questions: is there any influence that one state has on the other? Do mental states influence physical states? If that is the case, then how? Various aspects of this problem come from various psychological issues, like intentionality, consciousness, the self. The consciousness problem: what defines the term consciousness? How does knowledge relate to the body and the brain? The self-problem: What explains the self? What is the relationship between the person and the entity and the mind? The other problem arises from physical aspects.

An example is the embodiment problem: How is it that the body houses the brain? Does the body belong to a specified subject? The intractable nature of mind-body issues has led to many varying philosophical views.

From a material point of view, mental states are considered to be just another version of the physical state. Computational theory, functionalism, behaviorism, and mind-brain theory are ways of how materialists try to explain the cumulative nature of these two aspects. The common factor in these theories is seen in the attempt to analyze the nature of consciousness and mind in regard to their capability to indirectly or directly develop behavior. On the contrary, there are also varying materialism versions that attempt to tie the mental states to the physical states. Without expounding on the mental states as far as the behavior-developing role is concerned. Mostly, the latter are placed together under the category of ‘non-reductive physicalism.’ Although this category is rendered elusive due to the controversial nature available in the term ‘reduction.’ From the idealist point of view, the physical states are considered to be mental. Their argument is based on the claim that the physical dimension is an empirical universe and, so, it is considered to be the intersubjective output of human experience. Dualists claim that both physical states and mental states are entirely real, and neither of them can be, in any way, integrated to the other. In summary, it is true if we say that the mind-body problem exists due to the fact that both thought and consciousness, widely interpreted, appear very distinct. They vary from physical aspects, and there is merely no convincing theologies on how to create a satisfactory unified element of both the body and the mind.

There are various opposing philosophical positions in elaborating the understanding of the mind. In the philosophy of the brain, Ryle is widely known for establishing a crucial connection between mental states and behavior. Under the traditional view, the processes that are said to be bodily are entirely external. And they can be seen by other people, although they are private, according to metaphorical description. In this view, the subject associated with the mental state is incorrigible. Other individuals know them just indirectly from the response of the body. Ryle’s opposition to the doctrine starts by questioning the absurdity in its outcomes or consequences. Ryle is mostly given much credit for explaining many challenges in Cartesian dualism. The thrust of his major polemic is that theologies is that the alleged concepts of the mind that we employ in our daily commonsense practices. They are unable to take any action without trying to steal the theories associated with their subject matter. The practice of using these concepts of the mind would turn to be a complete mystery. Considering the view that obtains the “truth-makers” of individual’s statements that are mental not just the aspects within an occult flow of consciousness, but also considering the aspects within an occult of stream of neurological events or computations. Both view the truth-makers of people’s arguments about other mental states as hidden and so in practice as inaccessible.

Ryle’s argument-strategy is opposing the idea that analytical capabilities or intelligence can be generally explained. Considering logical operations is to show how the idea causes a logically vicious regress. Logical abilities or knowledge are hard to tell by assuming that speculative activities are unavailable since these operations can be either non-intelligent or intelligent. The idea that intellectual skills always need earlier speculative activities creates a brutal regress. So, it must be considered that various rational abilities are not as a result of logical operations. The function of standards, norms, or rules that are the basis of people’s practices cannot be underestimated or exaggerated. According to Ryle, regulations or standards are the distillations or codifications of various normative practices.

Ryle’s view on behaviorism is that mental terms found in various statements can be frequently translated. The interpretations come without losing the original meaning into modality about what the person will do in different situations. On this account, Ryle is known to have offered an analysis of statements of the mind into behavioral reports. The challenge associated with behaviorism is that it relies on its argument. The microscopic view of what is depicted as behavior and also what is depicted as observable. The biggest problem associated with Cartesianism, according to Ryle, is that it tries to make up from the differences in mental statements by creating the existence of hidden causes. Ryle focuses more on the apparent reasons but also opposing what is not on the viewpoint of other people.

Ryle rejects the idea that thinking is considered a symbol of manipulation. He denies the view that phrases, sentences, or words are symbols, if these symbols are, in any way, to be interpreted as representations or proxies for anything else. Thinking is not saved for the hardship of attempting to make a decision. Also, thinking is not reserved for any inner processes. An engineer can think about his plan while reconstructing prototypes. Additional efforts might be significant to all the ideas into phrases. Generally, according to Ryle, mental statements should not be entirely equated in any way with using language. The typical methods of explaining our musings and ponderings appear to be graphic rather than literal. They should not be chronicles but histories. And so the mental statements should be explained entirely in abstraction from a particular consciousness reports of any detail that we may remember. In only a few scenarios of thinking, the finishing of a project involves the individual’s being provided to declare his theory or scheme. Although there can be situations where there can be thinking without talking, when thinking results in sayings, the outcome may not be a string of phrases linked together to form a grammatically correct sentence. So, this may lead us to the view that language bits are only significant, just like the thinkable objective meanings to any readers or hearers of different nationalities. According to Ryle, thinking can be described as saying anything to oneself with the aim of opening one’s eyes or even consolidating one’s grasp.

Another opposing philosophy of metaphysical realism was from Hillary Putnam. He claimed that the materialistic mind theories make no sense. The direct realism will bring justice to the people’s intuition, according to Putnam, and the claims on knowledge are responsible for a free reality. Putnam claims that the fantasy of metaphysics has taken different forms. The first of the assumptions is the belief in the ”fixed totality’ of various properties and objects. They are claiming that all the meanings of words relates to at least one of the features. And also that the view of all knowledge is entirely fixed. Putnam disregards these assumptions by saying that they have brutal consequences on philosophy. Because when we categorize mental statements as “interface” between the universe and cognizers, it turns out to be impossible to explain how the people’s cognitive powers can be applied to reach out to the “outside” world.

I do not believe that anyone can contest Nagel’s argument that there is entirely no satisfactory solution to the common metaphysical dead-end. The dead-end is caused by combining mental and materialistic concepts in a unified system. Although this mind-body problem was initially instilled as dualism, it has sustained many ways of handling the incompatibility of mental states and physical states. Nagel’s approach is to analyze the different versions of psychological and physical aspects. The strategy makes sense. Basing my argument on his claim that people do not have the conceptual equipment needed to analyze how physical and subjective features could essential aspects of the same process or entity. How can an element or an element of a person’s view or idea be described physiologically as an event in his brain? The mind is imagined to be transplanted in the bodies. The relationship between the brain and the body is mostly taken for granted. The mind and body tend to be incommensurable even though the brains are essential parts of the body. There are moral criteria for identifying a person’s condition. People usually are protected while the mind is not. The fact that when a brain is attached to a person is named, as somebody’s brain, does not make it essential in its real identity.

A step to the solution of the mind-body problem should be to start thinking about the brain as only available partially. This approach brings the variations of real and nominal aspects into specifications for a more realistic response to the problem. It also makes perfect sense in chemistry; an element can be categorized by its reactions, atomic structures, and its number in the periodic table, among others. I also think that Nagel’s challenge is radical.