The Texas judiciary

  The Texas judiciary

The field of study of the American government is not only concerned with interrogating the country’s systems, but also its institutions, policies as well as the people’s values and views. Political science is the field of study that analyzes the practices of governments and how they operate both at the local and international levels, whereas Scholars of the American government concern themselves with the process of policy formulation in response to emerging issues and their implications to the American people.

The Texas judiciary is quite interesting as it has two supreme courts, which is unique (Judice, 1972). The court dealing with civil matters is the Supreme Court of Texas, while the criminal court is the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. All judges in Texas are elected officials serving six-year terms, including the eighteen judges who preside over the two supreme courts. As with all superior courts, the two courts have appellate jurisdiction (Judice, 1972). Below the Supreme Courts, are the Courts of Appeal. Judges in Texas participate in a partisan election, unlike other jurisdictions in America. Consequently, they align themselves with specific sides of the bar, depending on whether they are civil or criminal judges. Judice posits that this method of selecting judges disadvantages minorities and women who find it very difficult to win (1972).

The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause safeguards Freedom of Religion. It safeguards the establishment of religious practices by impeding the government’s ability to make policies that show the bias of one religious practice over another (Establishment Clause, 2019). However, some government intervention is allowed due to the regulation of religious bodies. In as much as the State has allowed for public funds to be set aside for private religious education programs, it disallows the conduct of religious practices in public places like at courthouses (Establishment Clause, 2019). The Establishment Clause causes great contention regarding religious monuments put up on public and, with some arguing for their destruction, while others posit that there can be no new monuments. In the case of Salazar v. Buono, the judges deliberated on the constitutionality of a sizeable Christian cross erected in the Mojave desert (Establishment Clause, 2019). The judges had dissenting opinions, with three of them arguing that the religious monuments need not be destroyed (Salazar v. Buono, 2010).

The protection of personal information from public scrutiny protected under the statutory law of Right to Privacy is intriguing. It interrogates what rights and freedoms the government has concerning the personal information they can access (Sharp, 2013). Privacy rights ensure personal autonomy,  safeguarded in the constitution. The First Amendment protects personal beliefs, while the Third Amendment safeguards personal homes from military use (Sharp, 2013). The Fourth Amendment protects the individual from arbitrary searches, and the Fifth Amendment protects the individual from self-incrimination and protects their personal information (Levy, 1986). However, these protections are limited as elucidated in the Griswold v. Connecticut case that established privacy zones, particularly marital privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965).

The partisan election of judges is a contentious issue which many look at as an avenue for disastrous results in the dispensation of justice. During campaigns, the money spent tends to influence the ruling made by judges, thereby defeating the ends of justice (Canes-Wrone, 2009). Apart from Texas, only five other states conduct partisan judicial elections. They are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia (Escovitz, 1975). States practicing partisan judicial elections are scandal-ridden. In 2004, a coal company spent millions in campaign contributions to a judge who subsequently voted to overturn a multi-million-dollar verdict in the company’s favor (Escovitz, 1975). The Texas Supreme Court also bowed to pressure from campaign contributors.

Partisan elections tend to be more expensive due to the ease of collecting campaign donations. They also favor special interests as campaign contributors are aware of a judge’s standpoint on various issues, making judges susceptible to coercion as they may be forced to compromise on their ideals, as discussed. Also, since judges owe political allegiances to their election, they are expected to meet the goals of their political orientation to secure funding. Consequently, the bench becomes divided according to Democratic and Republican ideals.

In some states not practicing partisan judicial elections, the availability of special interest money creates a partisanship system where there was none, like Michigan (Canes-Wrone, 2009). The partisan nominating process in Michigan greatly influences the judges’ views as they are expected to align with their parties.

Studies show that voters barely know why they elect judges because many do not understand the role judges play (Judice, 1972). Therefore, they are more likely to be influenced by political affiliation more than the judges’ ideals. Most people are only concerned with controversial social issues to determine how a judge will rule, yet campaign donors have little to no interest in these issues. Escovitz posits that liberal judges are favored by lawyers who are intent on protecting the personal right to sue when wronged, while corporations prefer conservative judges keen on limiting lawsuits against them (1975). Consequently, voters are unaware of the special interests arising as they lack access to such information before voting, relying instead on widely publicized criminal justice. In response to a lack of voter awareness, some states like North Carolina established a public financing program intended to end partisan elections (Escovitz, 1975).

In conclusion, partisan elections impede justice as their disadvantages far outweigh their benefits. It has led to the abolishment of campaign financing rules, further degrading the court system, which is dependent on campaign contributors who have special interests. They serve to split the bench along partisan lines, and since campaigns are expensive, they create dependency among jurists. Because of the influence exerted on them, judges make poor rulings so as not to offend their handlers. It is, therefore, necessary to abolish partisan judicial elections to safeguard the autonomy and independence of the judiciary.