Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism

Palestinian Militant had successfully hostile the players of the Israeli Olympic team on September 5, 1972, in Munich. Terrorists were eight in numbers. They demanded the liberation of their 200 comrades, and they asked an airplane for safe evacuation. They brutally beat the hostages. Even they had broken their bones. They also demanded the release of their few leaders who were in German jails (Munich Massacre, 1972).

The German Government decided to launch a counterterrorist operation to rebuild their image in front of Nations. Israeli Government offered them to send their special task force, but Germans refused the offer. Before this attack, the Munich administration was spending less than 2 Million dollars on security purposes. Even before this, their local security system was not well-armed. They carried on negotiations as well they launched operation. Overconfidently Germans planned that action to be air live on television. There was a miscommunication between police officials. Police were less in numbers; they were not correctly located to shot the terrorists. Even they had no radio phone system to communicate with each other.

Furthermore, the police officials had no sniper; they had local riffles of low range. They provided a backup armed car to evacuate Israeli Olympic players that were stuck in traffic safely. The failure of operation became a significant level disaster for officials and the public too.  Police had no idea that any armed car is on the way for backup when an exchange of firing was continuing suddenly the vehicle reached the runway. In fast firing, the pilot and snipers were seriously wounded (Borden, 2015).

There was a miscommunication between Israel and German. Germans had the idea that Israel is not going to fulfill the demands of Arab Guerillas. After hours of negotiations, Germans have promised them to safe evacuation for them and fulfillment of their requirements. They tried to use the skills of Intelligence exploitations. The organizing committee declared the threat for the upcoming Olympic Games (Munich Massacre, 1972).

Germans had poor communication. Different parties were not correctly in contact with each other. German police snipers had no idea how many terrorists are there. The German state was only responsible for the problem that happened there.

Learnings from Operation

Unsuccessful rescue attack was the only cause to establish GSG 9 tactical police unit. The German police chief admitted that our Police were not fully prepared to deal with paramilitary trained terrorists. Our Police were instructed to look after daily basis local issues (D. (n.d), 1972)

Even after the massacre, the Police of Germany formed a special anti-terrorism task force to look after the safety of hostages. There was an increase in the security of officials because they wanted to avoid any critical situation.

They had planned a security system scientifically. Police took the help of a psychologist and had marked 26 places that were expected to be used by terrorists, and they allocated their security personals there. Also, they took assistance from international security agencies. Neither had they allowed the presence of media there. Unofficially presence of press was there, unlike the attack as mentioned above, where authorities left the electricity on, and terrorists had been watching the presence of Police in Olympic village from hostages’ apartment.

The weak factors were:

• Cancellation of operation
• Broadcasting every move of German Police
• Communication Gape
• Miscommunication with Israel.

GSG 9 Operation Fire Magic (1977 rescue of passengers in hijacked Lufthansa airplane in Somalia)

Capabilities, Intentions, Actions of the targeted terrorists

Palestinian red army was struggling for the release of their ten imprisoned commanders who had murdered 3 German officials.

On October 16, terrorists had murdered a captain and hostage 86 passengers by Hijacking Lufthansa flight on October 13, 1977.

Communication plan of the terrorists.

An hour and a half before a compromised slaughter cutoff time, a West German commando unit raged a commandeered Lufthansa carrier on an air terminal runway in Mogadishu, Somalia. It finished a five‐day, 6,000‐mile seizing scene by killing the four terrorists and liberating every one of the 86 prisoners safe.

Somali soldiers lit a diversionary fire in front of the airship, the crisis entryways over the flying machine wings were blown open, and individuals from the salvage party hurled in some “shock explosives.” The men of GSG 9, with two British SAS men loaned by the British Government, had arrived at the flying machine and climbed onto the wings undetected; the thieves (and the prisoners) were overwhelmed. The GSG 9 hurried into the airship, yelling to the prisoners to hold down on the floor and opened fire on the ruffians (Sof. E, 2012).

Meanwhile, the flying machine was used to move the travelers via crisis exits; three prisoners were  injured.

By intelligence exploitation skills, none let the terrorist know what is going on outside of them.

The lesson they learned:

The Governor has refused to accept their demands.

After the 1972 attack, the German Police organized themselves.

The operation lasted in five minutes.

There was strong coordination between Somalia and the German Government. Both states thanks to each other and said it was not possible without the help of each other.

ANALYSIS OF MASSACRE:

Weak points:

There was a lack of communication in handling the first massacre that happened in Munich.

In case you’re dealing with a group in operation, and the group head has not characterized the jobs, missed cutoff times, then the fault is the outcomes.

The arrangement?

Train all group heads to utilize a similar method of measurements for allocating components of a venture, setting up clear timetables — the same thing we witness in the operation of Munich.

Miscommunication between different officials:

Police officials were not clear about what they are going to do. How many people are there in their team, and which team is there for their backup?

Broadcasting the operation live was irrational.

Making any operation scenes live is a nonsensical idea. If the operation fails, what will be the reflection of the public seeing a service failed and watching their officials lying dead on the street? It can even harm the operation by making terrorists aware of the activities of counterterrorism forces. It might message the allies of terrorists hiding any corner of the city.

Communication gap with Israel and German:

Whatever situation happened to Israel, the terrorist was there to terrorize Israel for the recovery of their comrades. German Government should not have to refuse the help offer of Israel.

Ordinary Police against Trained Militants.

The use of the best sources in these kinds of operations needs time so that chances of failure decrease, but there was a situation completely different. Police other useful sources that are indispensable for operations against terrorists. If the option of the army was available, then there was no need for deploying ill-trained Police.

Lack of modern armory

West German Police were unarmed usually. In the mentioned operation, they had a low range of rifles.

Unplanned operation

The Munich operation was utterly unexpected. Assumptions are there that German was not in the mood of a succession of action.

In 1972, the Israeli Mossad started one of the most aggressive secretive counterterrorist battles ever. Golda Meir and the Israeli bureau’s top mystery ‘Advisory group X’ contrived an encounter in counter for the slaughter of eleven Israeli’s during the Munich Olympic Games. Meir requested that the panel devise a fitting reaction to the Munich slaughter. The board reasoned that the best result was to approve the death of any Black September fear-based oppressors associated with the Munich occurrence. The Mossad accepted accountability for executing the board’s order. To achieve the law, the Mossad built up a few death groups, each with explicit strategic and strategies for activity. The Mossad central station component created one group using staff tasks officials upheld by enrolled resources of territorial stations and oversaw through official Mossad home office’s techniques. A subsequent unit enlisted staff officials and exceptionally able authorities and set them outside the arm and control of the legislature. The hypothesis was to help this group monetarily through undercover instruments and let them work with complete secrecy outside the administration structure. The death group conveyed through ordinary channels neglected to finish their central goal and openly uncovered the whole activity. The second group, which worked with a full decentralized position and opportunity of development, made noteworthy progress in satisfying their operational targets and never undermined the movement.

Weak prior security plans

How eight terrorists are coming in the apartment of players and making them hostage, it seems like a fictional story. But it is not a fictional story. All this is true because they didn’t plan prior security arrangements. Terrorists were succeeded to capture Olympic players without any resistance. It’s an undeniable fact that the German specialists’ treatment of the slaughter of Israeli competitors during the 1972 Munich Olympics was described by blundering and smoke screens. In any case, new records seen by SPIEGEL uncover that authorities disguised significantly more – and more obtrusive – blunders than recently suspected. Without a doubt, there were even a few warnings preceding the Games that an assault was unavoidable.

Recently characterized reports from analytical authorities, international haven dispatches, and bureau conventions discharged to SPIEGEL by the Chancellery, Foreign Office, and state and government insight offices have uncovered the lengths to which authorities went to conceal their missteps.

Security organizations didn’t enroll warnings that showed up in the press. On September 2, three days in front of the dangerous prisoner taking, the Italian distribution Gente composed that psychological militants from Black September were arranging an “electrifying demonstration during the Olympic Games.” Only later – two days after the bloodbath in Munich – was the admonition put on record through a tip-off from the Hamburg criminal police

COMPARISION BETWEEN THESE TWO OPERATIONS

As we have covered flaws and weaknesses of the 1972 massacre above, here we have tried to highlight German, and Somalia cops do the successful operation. While inaction against terrorism in Somalia, everything was planned well. Officials made everything possible by using professional attitude. They used a new ar German anti-terrorist task force that was entirely ready to fulfill the operation successfully. The productive salvage activity was viewed here as a triumph for the Government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, which had would not acknowledge the requests of the thieves.

The West German commandos shot the entryways of the aircraft opens and afterward surged inside, the reports said — two of the fighters injured in the assault. A ham administrator in Israel met on West German radio said he had heard radio discussions from Mogadishu saying that one of the West German flight attendants on board had been harmed.

Strong communication

The communication they had, it’s the best example ever. Forces were in connection with each other.

Well placement of snipers

Snippers perfectly placed at best locations where they can easily hit the terrorists.

Cutting off every communicational source of terrorists

Before starting the operation, possible administration cuts down every helping line of terrorists to make them confuse and discourage.

Discouragement of terrorists

Directly Governor refused to fulfill any demand of terrorists and ordered to launch operation. Terrorists did not expect it. Their expectations were opposite to this. It breaks the heart of terrorists, which means they lost the war before starting of that.

The mutual understanding between German and Somalia Government during operation

Somalia’s Government played a vital role in that operation. They gave space to German soldiers and back them with their army. They did this operation with mutual understanding. While Somalia has collaborated with psychological militants before and is in the Soviet circle, political changes have occurred there as of late, and it has looked for participation from Western nations in its war with Ethiopia.

Reference:

ReDavid W. Barno (LTG, USA Ret.) and Andrew Exum, “Responsible Transition: Securing U.S. Interests in Afghanistan Beyond 2011,” in The Center for a New American Security. (December 2010)URL: www.cnas.org.

. Ltg Michael Flynn, et al., “Employing ISR SOF Best Practices,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter 2008, URL: www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i50/15.pdf.ference: