Application of the nine principles of war in the Gallipoli campaign.

Application of the nine principles of war in the Gallipoli campaign.

Evidently, in the 21^st century, many countries   have adopted different principles of war, which they are willing to use if they confronted by a war.  Most of this principles are mainly strategic both in the offence and in the defensive.  Most of the principles that are adopted by countries are based on wars that have been won or lost in the global history of war (Gürcan, & Johnson, 2016). The USA military applies the nine principles of war in the Gallipoli campaign in strategizing it wars. The objective of this paper is to explore the application of the nine principles of war in the Gallipoli campaign.

The first principle is objective. It is principle that incline the military in the development of clearly defined and attainable objectives. The application of this objective is mainly inclined to the issue of efficacy and economy in winning a war.  The best won war is the one which is won with little negative attribute to the military. This can only be achieved if clear goals are defined and a proper plan, which is customized based on all the variables of the war.

The second principle is offensive. This is labelled as the most effective principle as it helps in attaining clearly defined objectives and on the other hand maintain a freedom of action in achieving decisive decision. In application of the principle, the basic notion is gaining the initiative in such a manner that the opponent always reacts to your move but also denies him a chance to strategize on your move.  Offensive principle ensure that the best decision is used by reducing the random nature of war decisions.

The third principle is mass. It a principle that insists on the concentration of combat power and resources at the decisive place while still paying attention to time.  In application of the principle, the military needs to identify the decisive place of the war before using the principle. This identification help in reducing the time required to win a war by avoiding scattering of resources.

The fourth principle is economy of force.  This is a principle that is inclined to the efficient usage of the resources available in such a manner that minimal resources are used. The principle is best applied when it is put in line with mass principle since without identification of the decisive location and time of the war results in wastage of resources.

The fifth principle is manoeuvre. It is principle that focus on the position of the enemy and aims at placing the enemy in a position of disadvantage. In application, the principle is both tactical and strategic and tactical in nature. On the tactical approach, it is applied in flanking attack. Correspondingly, in a strategic approach, the point of focus is your line of March to which should be complex for the opponent.

The sixth principle is the unity of command.  Notably, when there is unity of command, there is also unity of effort. In application, the principle helps in unification of the objective which are central in winning wars as they are the frameworks of operation.

The seventh principle is security. This is a principle that helps in reducing the vulnerability of the military and in turn improves the freedom of action. In application, security might appear the same as objective, but the basic approach of this principle is gaining intelligence about the enemy and your environs. Intelligence which can be used in mitigation.

The eighth principle is surprise. Establishing surprise involves becoming completely invisible and unpredictable by your opponent. Therefore, in application, the principle calls for the flexibility of the military in the manner in which they use the available resources.

The last principle is simplicity. Plans and orders should be simple to understand for the military to ensure that they followed to the letter.  In application, due to the  complexity of wars and the amount of mental stress involved it is strategic to make plans that are easy to understand for your and difficult to understand for the opponent.

References

Gürcan, M., & Johnson, R. (2016). The Gallipoli Campaign: The Turkish Perspective.       Routledge.