American state of readiness for bioterrorism

American state of readiness for bioterrorism

Bibliographies

Chalk, P. (2004). Hitting America’s soft underbelly: The potential threat of deliberate biological attacks against the US agricultural and food industry. Rand Corporation.

The study aimed at expanding the debate on assessing the susceptibility of the agricultural sector and to determine the impact of bioterrorism on the economy.

Funk, C. (2018). America’s State of Readiness against Bioterrorism. Pepperdine Policy Review, 10(1), 5.

This study aimed at assessing the general readiness of American state in its fight against bioterrorism.

Kalupa, N. H. (2016). Black Biology: Genetic Engineering, the Future of Bioterrorism, and the Need for Greater International and Community Regulation of Synthetic Biology. Wis. Int’l LJ, 34, 952..

This study aimed at determining the effects of synthetic biology and its regulation on future bioterrorism.

Larsen, J. C., & Disbrow, G. L. (2017). Project BioShield and the biomedical advanced research development authority: a 10-year progress report on meeting US preparedness objectives for threat agents. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 64(10), 1430-1434.

This study establishes that the advanced R&D authority has played a substantial role in creating partnership with industries and developing food and drug approvals for use in the public health emergency.

Outterson, K., Gopinathan, U., Clift, C., So, A. D., Morel, C. M., & Røttingen, J. A. (2016). Delinking investment in antibiotic research and development from sales revenues: the challenges of transforming a promising idea into reality. PLoS medicine, 13(6).

This study built on the Chatman house report that was focused on how policymakers could design delinked mechanisms that separate return on investment in R&D from antibiotic sales.

Projan, S. J., & Shlaes, D. M. (2004). Antibacterial drug discovery: is it all downhill from here? Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 10, 18-22.

This paper aimed at determining the use of antibacterial drug in terrorism and how it can be managed.

Sarasin, P. (2006). Anthrax: bioterror as fact and fantasy. Harvard University Press.

This paper addressed bioterrorism in the context of the global market.

Vargo, M. E. (2017). The Weaponizing of Biology: Bioterrorism, Biocrime and Biohacking. McFarland.

This study explain various means through which bioterrorism can be masterminded to the public.

Yount, L. (2004). Fighting bioterrorism. Greenhaven Press.

This paper addressed measures that the government can use to combat terrorism effectively.

Introduction

Merely seven days after the 2001 terrorist attack in the United States of America, media companies and government offices across the country received envelopes filled with Anthrax spores (Funk, 2018). It was established that this attack could kill five people and infect seventeen others. Investigations that were conducted after the attack did not confirm whether they were part of the previous conspiracy. Either way, it was a warning to the American people that the worse was about to happen. Adversaries of the country were not sated by the alteration of the globes trading epicentre.

However, the States has been privileged not to experience any bioterrorism attack after the 2001 terror attacks Funk, 2018). Bioterror possesses severe consequences and should ultimately be fought. However, the cases are not mostly apprehended. The case for the anthrax attack, for instance, was not completed. The Federal Bureau of Investigations principal suspect, Bruce Ivins, killed himself in 2008, and the proceeding litigation was relinquished Funk, 2018). Up to today, it is not clear whether the government seized the actual terrorists.

While the attacks did not cause panic among both the people and the government, they forced the government to utilize measures against bioterrorism on an advanced level. Nevertheless, it is quite not clear whether the federal government has been top in its efforts to fright bioterrorism (Funk, 2018). Plans to combat the terror have contributed to panics in pharmaceutical companies, opaque and confused government policies concerning the threats of weaponized bacterial agents, and the lack of surveillance over biological attacks.

Inadequately documented bioterrorism events in the US causes laxity in national emergency readiness. There exist several current diseases occurrences that can precisely be traced to the focused attacks on the Americans. Furthermore, like the Anthrax attack scare evidenced, bioterrorism remains a real hazard in the global market experiencing increased globalization, shipping activities and travels (Sarasin, 2006). In this regard, the United States government remains vigilant to stay put for both imaginable and unimaginable attacks. To this end, it is essential to assess America’s level of preparedness against bioterrorism.

The significant characteristics of bioterrorism and the threats

The documented case of biologically weaponized materials can be traced back to the 67 BC. During this period, king Mithridates injected honeycombs with a substance called grayanotoxin that caused blurred visions, impaired perception, among other symptoms (Kalupa, 2016). Since that period, biological weapons have been used in warfare. It was not until the United States of America prohibited the usage of such weapons in warfare that the conversation about the ethics of biological warfare commenced. Being the first internationally recognized policy to regulate biological war, The Hague convention of 1899 tried to extend the discussion on the global arena. However, the utilization of biologically weaponized material and agents were seen even in the World War 1. Other international conventions such as the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and Geneva Protocol of 1925 attempted to address the use of chemical and biological weapons but failed.

By its nature, biological warfare mainly targets combats and non-combats comprehensively. Besides the horror of biological attacks, the lack of a clear distinction between battles and non-combats, which is a critical principle of the jus and hello theory, is the main reason for the attempted intentional conventions as mentioned above. Though national laws have not considered the biological tools and weapons of terror, contemporary international laws do.

The use of biological weapons has grown to be off-limits in the international arena such that the use of weaponized infections is regarded as terrorism, whether utilized by terrorists or states, for bad or a right course. It has accredited the definition of biological attacks by US Department of Homeland Security and National Academics extensively as an intentional release of an infection causative agent or a toxic substance produced by other living organisms against plants, animals and humans. Plants and animals are encompassed in this definition because of the overwhelming consequences that the attack may have on the countries food supply. It is more often referred to as agroterrorism. The incidences start with a point of introduction because infested plants or animals substances could subsequently affect other crops and animals. A biological attack on American food production could affect the entire population by threating various economic activities. In the US, one out of eight people work in sectors or industries that are directly supported by effects in food production. The amount of agricultural produce exported by the country is much more than the US industry consumption, making it a great contributor to the balance of trade (Chalk, 2004).  The State already losses Millions of dollars each year to disease, and attack on crops and livestock would seriously escalate the problem. In this regard, the economy of America would significantly suffer an agroterrorism attack.

Moreover, an agro-terrorism could poison the citizens through the infected food products. While many foreign national animal infections cannot pass the animal-human barriers, other diseases can. For instance, in 2004, Netherlands pig farmers accidentally have begun to showcase signs of Staphylococcus aureus, which is a common bacteria in the pigs. The strain was an evolution of a drug-resistant bacteria called superbug. Its resistance is due to the multiplication of genes taking several natures. For instance, pseudomonas is composed of an additional cellular membrane that aids in antibiotics resist (Funk, 2018). Besides, the bacteria can remove some genomic materials to live. An English French team researcher proclaimed that some strains of germs had secured themselves from isoniazid by just deleting a single gene.

While superbug infection would be deadly to American agriculture, the terrorist could use this bacteria directly against the citizens. The anthrax scare of 2001 reveals the damage that a bioterrorism attack could have on the people beyond illnesses and deaths. Not only did others stimulate the scare by fake anthrax letters, but the investigators and emergency services were also bombarded with calls from the people over suspicion on their mails (Freed, 2010).

Bioterror attack can contribute to panic and closure of essential government services- given the attack is well uncastrated. The Department of Homeland Security has documented six different means through which weaponized biological attacks can be masterminded. These include consuming contaminated food and water, human-to-human infection, aerosol sprays, contact with infested insects, contact with contaminated animals and physical distribution (Vargo, 2017). A superbug could be triggered to the US through one, some, or all of these means. Apart from using superbug, bioterrorist could develop a designer virus through the use of genetic engineering to stimulate the virulence of pathogens (Funk, 2018). It could formerly cerate signs of common cold, and later secondary infections after exposure to a particular DNA sequencing. This process is an exact replication of the current study by scientists on the modification of DNA sequencing to cure contagious disease like cancer.

To create a designer virus, two components are required. Experts should understand genetic codes and have access to genetic materials. A terrorist who does not have access to the State materials would therefore spend years of training in an institution with the access of genetic material to successfully design a virus (Funk, 2018). While there is advanced regulatory measure to ensure that the US government is capable of tracking viral DNA stands, there are some alternatives that are available for those who require access to DNA material unnoticed. Oligos are an example of DNA structure blocks that comprises between fifty to hundred base pairs (Funk, 2018). They can be separated when shopped commercially and interlinked to create a gene sequencing. Therefore, it is not without a doubt that the superbug or designer virus could successfully be produced using the oligos, and distributed all over the economy of America.

Prevention capability

The US government needs to institute measures to curb bioterrorism. While some prevention measure is stationed, they are not sufficient for the prevention of possible biologically weaponized attack. Notably, the efficacy of a terror attack depends on the susceptibility of the population to an infection. The sensitivity spurred Charles to position that every US citizen should be vaccinated to prevent smallpox, a disease that has been extensively eliminated across the world. The extermination of smallpox formed a strange contradiction. It is to say that without exposure to a particular illness, the population cannot have an immunity. Therefore, the entire community is susceptible to an infection that was eradicated years ago (Yount, 2004).  Some signs of smallpox still exist in countries such as Russia and the United States, with the argument that the nations should destroy them. Without a justification that smallpox could be used for bioterrorism, it could not be wise for the countries not to have a sample for subsequent vaccine creation.

Not all experts agree with the Charles views. For instance, anti-vaccination movement in the US widely believes that the vaccination is a cause of autism among the children and votes for the use of all-inclusive medication to fight the contagions. Anti-vaccination movements erupt from failed government bodies and pharmaceutical firms and reflect a more in-depth divide between the government and its citizens (Funk, 2018).  It is broad defining on autism makes it challenging to study. Autism can be recognized in children before they turn three years old. Some of the recent studies argue that autism is an outcome of ecological conditions.

The capability of the government to vaccinate its citizens against the bacterially weaponized agents depends on vaccines that are already in existenceand the private organizations have fundamentally done the research and development of these vaccines. Unfortunately, the federal laws regarding standards and regulations for the endorsement of medication are both opaque and demanding. As an outcome of this, the private medical companies have put aside the most critical research and the developments needed to recognize and combat the infections.

Stringent government regulations make drug innovations dangerous due to the high cost of bringing a newly developed drug to use. In 2004, a survey that was conducted by the Tufts centre discovered that the cost of drug introduction into the market goes beyond $800 million (Funk, 2018). For firms to deal with this expenditure, there have to be profit expectations. Therefore, it follows that the pharmaceutical organizations will manufacture medication that will assure sales upon announcement rather than those that target a particular niche, hence less commercial (Projan & Shlaes, 2004). To stay ahead of bioterrorism, the US government should prepare for both the known and the indefinite. Unfortunately, the pharmaceutical firms will not use resources to research on drugs for the unpromising market just because of patriotism and safety.

Several guidelines have endeavoured to correct the susceptibility. The first and foremost suggestion was to establish the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) agreement policies. The Trump administration, for instance, is contemplating the impacts of restructuring these standards to emphasize on a new drug safety and efficacy. Then he later was defined as favourably impact on a biomarker of diseases (Funk, 2018). Presently, FDA approvals are both dependent on the medicine for positive results and questions whether the drug mitigate the infection. In this case, it is not sufficient for a dug to have an overwhelming effect on the health of a patient, such as a lowered cholesterol. Instead, pharmaceutical companies must ensure that the drugs have an influence on the origin of high cholesterol level. While the standards are good intentioned, they are capable of halting the supply of necessary medicine to the citizens.

The second reform that was proposed is the separation of the development of new medicine to the private sector. A perception called dilinkage. It is an abstract method where the government offers incentives to the pharmaceutical companies for research on drug regardless of the results. Theoretically, this concept will guarantee that the risk of drug endorsement is not an issue to the production firms (Outterson et al. 2016). The dilinkage arguments rely on government funding as a useful tool to control pharmaceutical companies’ productions. However, the government has been unsuccessful to uphold the role successfully. The challenges are apparent in policies concerning response to outbreaks

Outbreaks readiness

In the year 2004, the US federal government formed a scheme referred to as BioShield, a project that endeavoured to encourage and streamline the establishment of chemical, biological, radiological; and nuclear (CBRN) measures. Gushy Disbrow and Joseph Larsen clarified that BioShield offered $5.6 billion for about ten years for the development, purchasing and stockpiling medical measures to be used in the public health emergencies, for instance, the CBRN terrorism events (Larsen & Disbrow 2017).

Also, the legislature created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in 2006. It was the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the assistant secretary for preparedness and response. The department serves as the pivotal point for research and development of purchasing medication for CBRN terrorizations, emerging contagious diseases and epidemic influenza.

In the BioShield project, BARDA has achieved the stockpiling objective of prescribed drugs for emergency conditions, although not sufficient to counter the terrorism threats. In 2017, BARDA’s ten-year report established that, while it has over eighty medical countermeasures, merely twenty one have been stockpiled in response to bioterror incidences. Among these, only six are approved by the US FDA for CBRN-based indications. Though it was established to streamline the synthesis of the drug, the vetting process regarding project BioShield exasperates most of the medicine companies (Funk, 2018).  BARDA notes that the drug makers are protected from the lawsuit by project BioShield. However, safety is limited to some companies that are fortunate to push the products through BARDAs opaque certification process.

In 2007, the hearing on project BioShield revealed the frustrations. For example, the CEO for Hollins-Eden pharmaceutical complained about HHS for lack of being transparent, poor communications, inexperienced agencies and missed timelines (Funk, 2018). Notably, it was not the sole organization that experienced challenges with this project. The representative from Missouri also noted that VaxGen was not allowed to testify after their license for the development of next-generation anthrax vaccine was cancelled by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Amid these challenges, BioShield continues to be the Americans proffered project for emergency drug capacities.

While this project covers drugs that are at present cleared by FDA approvals, the FDA does not offer any emergency exemption. In this case, the agency may authorize the use of unapproved pharmaceutical without prior submission to the investigation of new drug rule. Nevertheless, this rule is only a simplification of paperwork if the government require to use the medicine outside FDA approval rules (Funk, 2018). It is important to note that IND does not stimulate research of a new drug, nor does it issue prescriptions from trial to instant distribution. Besides, with the available challenges, the federal government has not provided a well clear proposal for the delivery of life-saving medicine to counter bioterror. It may be because of extreme optimism on the capability of the forces when an emergency strikes, the primary reason for BioShield failure in early 2007.

Due to the increasing concentration of patients during an emergency and the possibility of closer interactions, hospitals are a breeding ground for infections. Therefore. Procedures for managing CBRN casualties, especially from biologically weaponized attacks should be cautious of majorly depending on hospital facilities for medications. Besides, HHS has laid many response strategies and containment for the responder. Other channels have also reinforced the government’s commitment to the treatment operations. For instance, an approach exists in which the local government only administer medication to communities that quarantine (Funk, 2018). Over a long period, ring containment has been successful and cost effective as it targets the most vulnerable. The strategy works perfectly if the people within the circle do not join other healthy individuals. However, imposing quarantine measures on time would be impossible in the developed nations that are densely populated with constant intentional travels.

Glass and Schoch-Spana established that while many scenarios facing the government are looting, rioting and vigilantism, American citizens who are faced with emergencies have in most occasions proven the capability to engage in the conditions in an orderly and calm manner (Funk, 2018).  They recommended that the federal government should transform its existing response measures to include the citizens as a partner rather than a burden through the emergencies. Offering the public sincere and valuable information throughout bioterrorism is significant in easing the fear that a looming attack may produce. While the local authorities would want to send personalized messages during such times, the government cannot avoid speculations within the words. Conjecture and misinformation that attempts to fill the knowledge gap can cause more harm than good. Therefore, government agencies should foster channels and communicate with the media to direct information more efficiently during terror attacks.

Since early 2003, the national academy of engineers in Washington contended that improper relationship between the government and its people could harm the propagation of critical information to the public. During the crisis, the capability of the nation to curb public fear would depend on the capacity of the public to take part in their endurance (Funk, 2018). The academy recommended that the government should liaise with the mass media and develop mock scenarios of bioterrorism. It will adequately prepare the reporters who are always the first to arrive in an emergency scene.  Bio attack may take some time before it is considered a national disaster, making the reporter be vulnerable to more exposure. Exposure to biochemical during this time may stimulate outbreaks because of human-to-human interactions. Therefore, the press should be accorded priority in future disaster management plans.

Conclusion

American citizens have been lucky not to have experienced high instances of bioterror. Apart from the Anthrax attack, the other incident of bioterror occurred in 1984. Even with the few strikes, the federal government should take the necessary steps to prevent future CBRN attacks. Such preparedness should include reforming approval process of FDA pharmaceutical. However, there is more than the government can do. The primary step is to change the government view of the public as a hindrance to the public. The 2001 critics showed that the government should encourage open and transparent communication with the public. The attack was a hindrance to the overall economic operations. Therefore, the government must continuously update the emergency plan to encompass the public. Active and transparent communication is essential for bioterror preparedness in America. If the federal government hope that they will be heard during emergencies, it should repair communication lines between the pharmaceutical companies, the people and the press.

References

Chalk, P. (2004). Hitting America’s soft underbelly: The potential threat of deliberate biological attacks against the US agricultural and food industry. Rand Corporation.

Funk, C. (2018). America’s State of Readiness against Bioterrorism. Pepperdine Policy Review, 10(1), 5.

Kalupa, N. H. (2016). Black Biology: Genetic Engineering, the Future of Bioterrorism, and the Need for Greater International and Community Regulation of Synthetic Biology. Wis. Int’l LJ, 34, 952.

Larsen, J. C., & Disbrow, G. L. (2017). Project BioShield and the biomedical advanced research development authority: a 10-year progress report on meeting US preparedness objectives for threat agents. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 64(10), 1430-1434.

Outterson, K., Gopinathan, U., Clift, C., So, A. D., Morel, C. M., & Røttingen, J. A. (2016). Delinking investment in antibiotic research and development from sales revenues: the challenges of transforming a promising idea into reality. PLoS medicine, 13(6).

Projan, S. J., & Shlaes, D. M. (2004). Antibacterial drug discovery: is it all downhill from here? Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 10, 18-22.

Sarasin, P. (2006). Anthrax: bioterror as fact and fantasy. Harvard University Press.

Vargo, M. E. (2017). The Weaponizing of Biology: Bioterrorism, Biocrime and Biohacking. McFarland.

Yount, L. (2004). Fighting bioterrorism. Greenhaven Press.