Domestic Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism

Domestic Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism

Abstract

The act of radicalizing and recruiting a group of believers to jihadist is more than a military challenge but a pure missionary contest. The Jihadist terrorist operations intend to measure the skills, attract attention, and also harm the jihadist enemies. Besides, the other high intention which has existed over a year amongst the Jihadists is galvanization of the Muslim community. Recruitment to Jihadist terrorism not only aims at filling the operations of terrorism but also creating a new outlook. Therefore, the article seeks to discuss the process, challenges, and means of discouraging domestic radicalization.

Introduction

Jihadist means the struggle or act of fighting against Islam enemies. Jihadists use different means of recruitment, unlike Al Quedas, who use the dispatch method (Cillufo et al., 2016). They are commonly known for recruiting like-minded extremists who agitate in place of jihad found within the loose networks. Recruitment is always informal and localized in a significant way. However, amongst the Jihadists, radicalization became the regular norm. Those who were lured to the Jihadi training camps were highly radicalized. Through the process of radicalization, the recruits bonded in terms of hardships and also shared beliefs. They gained combat experience, underwent thorough training that proved their skills in terrorism. It became easier for the selection of specific Jihad terrorist operations.

Therefore radicalization and recruitment distinctively vary. Radicalization comprises of a set of beliefs internalized in the mindset of the recruits or the existing recruits. The militants embrace a supreme test of violence in the Jihad operations, which then proves as a way of conviction. While recruitment is a pure transformation of others to a weapon of jihad, and they ensure the bonding of the extremists who have a similar mindset to form an autonomous terrorist group. It goes beyond just recruitment but also operating in finding ways and means of preparing for an actual operation act, which is the ultimate task in jihad.

How Domestic Radicalization and Recruitment Vary

Radicalization and recruitment vary from area to area. Areas of Islam religion become potential targets as the recruits are already members of the dominant culture. They may be involved in the already existing conflicts which aim at seeking independence or nationwide devotion to the fundamentalist understanding of Islam. It is drawn from historical cases of resistance and local tradition at large. Therefore, the local population becomes sensitive to such causes, although their actions may not support it.

For example, in Arab dominated countries, Jihads share beliefs of the subcultures and cultures. They confront hostility and oppression from the authorities and thus the reason for taking operations underground or abroad.

Domestic Radicalization

Radicalization in Western countries proves to be difficult because of the vast population of Muslim immigrants.  Unlike the United States of America, where the tradition of assimilation of the immigrants is common. In Western countries, the potential jihadist recruits comprise of the marginalized immigrant subculture or those from separated from the families and friends in the same community. However, those who are considered vulnerable are those who are still seeking an identity, validation, or approval. They need their actions to be culturally and religiously justified, which then provides them with a clear call for action.

Jihad terrorism agenda is action-oriented and also claims to be religiously justified. First, radicalization involves seeking out the Jihadist websites of an individual in the beginning. The individuals seek help and further support from the like-minded fanatics or the domestic jihadist mentors. After the radicalization, the group is then considered dangerous and most lethal in other countries, especially, West.

Joining the Jihadist terrorism is not a one-time process. The process is gradual, and it involves multistep that take several months or even years in case of the need. Although in the current millennial, the process has accelerated, and a considerable population has joined the cause. Some journey of radicalization begins at the mosque setups where a radical Imam preaches. Other ways happen in informal congregation and prayer groups where spiritual guides become their most significant source or the manual.  The unofficial congregations or the prayer groups are sometimes from schools or prisons, and on the internet.

For instance, in Italy and other countries in the West, radicalization has remained to be a critical issue as far as prisons are concerned. In Italy, prisons have sometimes been considered or turned as recruitment hubs by different extremists but especially the Jihad terrorists. A single group of radicalized detainees can easily brainwash other detainees as it is well known. In Italian prisons, Jihad radicalization has posed to be the most significant source of threat. And according to evidence of the latest available data, this has become an already existing problem. In late 2107, over 70 detainees were converted to Jihad terrorism and were already waiting for trial or sentencing for the same “International Islamic Terrorism.”

The group of 70 detainees in the Italian prison was separated from other detainees to other highly guarded sections of high-security surveillance systems. The cause of radicalization increased further within the Italian prisons up to unsustainable populations. Furthermore, in the process of attempting to counter the extremism and radicalization, the Italian authorities initiated the deportation of a good number of immigrants. Such a cause enhanced the act of improving the cases of national security at large. Therefore, for this matter, the Italian government has strengthened its effort and commitment to weed out the threat of terrorist operations in the country.

On many occasions, several terrorist attacks are carried out by people with extensive backgrounds in criminal records. It is believed that individuals are radicalized while in prison. The former Sicilian detainee was identified to have engaged in the 2016 terrorist attack that happened in Anis Amri. The attacker was reportedly from Sicilian prison, and he had undergone rigorous radicalization by the jihadist for the most prolonged period. During the time he was in prison, and he later became a dangerous terrorist with a violent outcome.

Still, on the process of jihad terrorism domestic radicalization and recruitment, it involves incitement. Hafez & Mullins (2015) argues that the message of incitement comprises of legitimacy and commands the violent jihad. It also has the selection criteria and persuasion content for the jihad recruiters. The volunteers who are willing to become part of the Jihad journey are introduced to several destinations of beliefs but not a single one. The adhering groups may be gathered to an independent lockup as it happened to the original group, Hamburg group, which once carried out a successful paramount attack. The devotees may also become part of the existing local groups.  For the cause of radicalization to become operational, the groups may be addressed by the jihadist to act on their own or be relocated to different training camps.

Proofs for Radicalization and Recruitment

To be recruited to jihad fully, one must show various tests of commitment. A series of invitations take place with the agenda of accepting what comes on board. Some responsibilities come with traveling abroad for training. The next step is ultimately to act accordingly. Action is always an individual’s decision. The volunteers are in a position to move on by self-selection. There are no cases of coercion in case of peer pressure.  Jihad makes a submission to the course voluntary, and not all recruits complete the transformation journey. The recruited individuals are required to stay committed, and their commitment can sometimes be adjusted or readjusted depending on the need. The jihadists ensure that whenever there are situations of dropouts along the way, a powerful and safe counter recruiting strategy is developed.

Recruitment to jihadist terrorism strictly emphasizes on five major themes. The themes include duty versus humiliation, guilt, shame, dignity, and honor. In jihad, fighting is comprehended as God’s obligation, religious role. Meaning, they believe that whoever joins jihad is guaranteed paradise. Thus, to prove jihadist terrorism, one is offered the courage and powers to show prowess at war. Such opportunities do not ensure explicit violence during the recruitment process, but rather, they consider jihad as a license for violence.

However, commitment to Jihad recruitment involves in-depth discussions of terrorist plans, surveillance of potential targets, and full participation in war through martial arts. For one to become a complete jihadist, different options are considered. Some of the areas that jihadists concentrate on are the abilities to internalize the idea of becoming a jihadist. Also, if the individual can easily create a brotherly bond with the already recruited Jihadists and signing contract becomes another significant part of jihadist recruitment.

Why People Get Recruited or Radicalized

Personal Problems

Personal problems sometimes play a role in radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism. Some of the own standard challenges may include distress from an identity crisis, uncertain futures, feeling estrangements, and government disruptions, thus reasons for relocation. According to Jenkins (2007), the identified problems sometimes appear amongst a particular age group, while some come because of immigration issues. The second-generation immigrants in Western countries are always recruited to jihadist terrorism. Others show the zeal of commitment to becoming new typical converts. But in Jihadists, some several converts seem to come from rich families, and they are believed to have a well-defined future with promising careers and individuals who can easily get readjusted.

Although not many could be radicalized to jihadist terrorism, the massage of jihadists is extensive and highly disseminated. The message creates an actual connection with jihadist initiative, Asian and Middle East madrassas, radical mosques, and spotting interested parties with recruiters. It proves that the population joining Jihadist terrorism is not only enhanced by the jihadist narrative but also by the number of retail outlets where recruiters converge for meetings with potential believers of jihadist terrorism.

The entire recruitment thus shows a few numbers of challenges making it less efficient with low outcomes. The operations are sometimes successful as the few radicalized individuals show commitment. They carry out jihad terrorism in different avenues with proper targets, after all. Thus, the cause suggests that lowering the number of recruitment venues would automatically obstruct jihadist recruiting.

Focus on Recruiting Venues

Jihad considers recruiting its troops both inside and outside radical mosques. They consider mosques as known as religious spaces with fewer obstructions. The venues are known as retail outlets, and they can be easily identified and monitored. However, the imagined and areas with high-security surveillance can never be recruitment spaces as authorities get informed quickly. Immediately the recruitment venues are plotted with the authorities, and it becomes easy to cause an obstruction and then to discourage recruitment.

For example, The Herald Square Case in NYC was identified as a good example required for comprehending and identifying jihad recruitment operations that could have easily resulted in a terrorist attack. The Counter-Terrorism Department in New York has developed a way of understanding the radicalization processes and venues (Neumann, 2012). Through various strategies, they have managed to address the case. For instance, prisons are some of the identified places where radicalization has become rampant. Prisons are venues that can be easily be controlled from time to time.

Steps to Discourage Potential Recruits

The community is considered as a potential alternative of discouraging the recruitment and radicalization operation. A society can offer lucrative ways of engaging targeted youths, primarily through sports, technical training, education, and national and community services. Furthermore, rehabilitation centers have been established to counter jihadist terrorism. Imprisoned recruits became rehabilitated to at least discourage the jihadist terrorism they lately engaged in. In Italy, the already convicted terrorists were offered reduced sentences in return for repudiations of violence and corporation with the system. The effort to discourage potential jihadist recruits is evident in two Asian countries, including Yemen and Singapore. The two countries prove a better experience of introducing efficient programs to rehabilitate the imprisoned jihadist.

By implementing relevant anti-terrorism education programs, potential jihadist terrorism can be wholly discouraged. Countries like Singapore are one of the identified countries that have successful experience of introducing anti-terrorism education programs. The outcome is evident in the area with mosques and major community centers (Ranstorp, 2010). Education programs for anti-terrorism have created awareness on the impacts of terrorism and also exposing the nature of jihadist ideology.

In the United States of America, heightened levels of security have led to almost the absence of jihad recruitment. The level of intelligence in America has proved that America’s Muslim population may be less lured to jihad than the European Muslim population.  However, other than security being heightened, there are other countervailing voices within the American community.

Spread on anti-terrorism message has become another method of reducing jihad terrorist recruitment. Anti-jihadist messages can be facilitated through documentaries and widespread journals across the internet. As much as the sources are maintaining relevance to anti-terrorism attacks, they should not carry any form of propaganda. Currently, laws encourage messages against drugs, domestic abuse, and unwanted gangs in communities. Such has become a point of reference to many anti-terrorism agencies making the spread of the message for jihad terrorism easy.

Conclusion

Currently, radicalization and recruitment of jihadist terrorism have elevated from time to time. Many youths and even adults have successfully been involved in the attack leading to an outcome of several attacks. As noted in the previous points, jihadist terrorism has become common in the Middle East and Asian countries since they are the center for Muslim religions. However, apart from recruitment in mosques, prisons are also identified as areas of the target for the operation. The recruitment process is easy, and no, there are no chances of coercion whenever an individual does not interest. A lot of remedies have been undertaken to control the levels of radicalization, and they include creating awareness through documentaries, journals, and education programs. Additionally, through rehabilitation, the former convicts were introduced to recovery and transformed into a new system. Therefore, radicalization and recruitment of jihadist terrorism have become violent and a source of harm worldwide.

References

Cilluffo, F. J., Cardash, S. L., & Whitehead, A. J. (2006). Radicalization: Behind bars and beyond borders. Brown J. World Aff., 13, 113.

Hafez, M., & Mullins, C. (2015). The radicalization puzzle: A theoretical synthesis of empirical approaches to homegrown extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(11), 958-975.

Jenkins, B. M. (2007). Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization Recruitment (No. RAND-CT-278-1). RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA.

Neumann, P. R. (2012). Joining al-Qaeda: jihadist recruitment in Europe. Routledge.

Ranstorp, M. (2010). Understanding violent radicalization: terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Routledge.