Economic inequality of the badli workers of Bangladesh: Contested entitlements and a ‘perpetually temporary’ life-world     

Economic inequality of the badli workers of Bangladesh: Contested entitlements and a ‘perpetually temporary’ life-world

Introduction

Our lives are like floating rafts on the flowing water, we move from one corner to another corner. (Rani, female badli workers’ leader in Badli Workers Committee)

In this article, we present an empirical account of management and organizational prac-tices that constitute and perpetuate a state of economic inequality for the badli workers of the state-owned jute mills (SOJMs) of the postcolonial state of Bangladesh and how this leads to their social marginalization. We do this through direct engagement with the badli workers’ own accounts and interpretations of their life-world and conditions that they perceive as inequitable, both unjust in themselves and unequal in relation to other members of the mill community of apparently similar economic value to management and the organization.

Processes of industrialization, with their related organizational structures and wage employment relations, were first established in Bangladesh during the British colo-nial era. Historical accounts of the British Indian Empire tell that the jute industry constituted one of the largest formal, export-oriented sectors under the emergent com-petitive industrial capitalist system (Chakrabarty, 1989; Sen S, 1999). During this time, people who had previously worked in pre-industrial conditions, as artisans and cotton weavers, were evicted from the land and were employed in mills established near the city of Kolkata. Here, they constituted a new working-class semi-urbanized community (Bagchi, 2007; Chakrabarty, 1989) that was clearly distinguished and identified as ‘jute mill workers’ (according to Bangla language Chatkal Shrramik). Following the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, new jute mills that embod-ied these same features were established in the 1950s in the province of East Pakistan, later to become the nation state of Bangladesh (Sobhan and Ahamd, 1980). During this period, East Pakistan had to absorb an influx of Muslim refugees from the Indian State of Bihar and West Bengal. These refugees, along with indigenous Bangalis, provided the workforce for the newly established mills (see Chakrabarty, 1989; Chowdhury, 2007; Lévi-Strauss, 1952; Maron, 1954). Whilst hailing jute as the ‘golden fiber’, Lévi-Strauss (1952) considered the sheer number of unskilled workers involved as a challenge for the early flourishing of this industry. However, these workers were later to take part in the Bangladesh liberation war movement in 1971 and, subsequently, to become involved with union culture and to learn a collective approach to presenting their agenda when the mills were nationalized after Bangladesh’s independence (see Chowdhury, 2007). The narratives that we collected from the community suggest that, over the 60-year history of the SOJMs, the workers have constructed their generational loop such that their relationship to the mills deter-mines, shapes and constitutes the essence of livelihood, not just for the current work-force but also for their children and future generations (see Chowdhury, 2007). As such, the structures of organization and management of the mills both shape and reflect the life of the community (see Perrow, 1991).

Since 1991, as one of the major industrial sectors, the jute industry has been subject to a ‘structural adjustment program’, the Jute Sector Adjustment Credit program (JSAC). Based on external pressures for efficiency gains, implementation of JSAC has directly impacted

the working class community, leading to mass retrenchment and casualization of employ-ment under the badli system (see Bhaskar and Khan, 1995; Bhaskar et al., 2006). Formally recognized within current legal doctrines – Labour Law of Bangladesh, 2006 (LLB 2006)

– and informally within long-standing working practices, badli workers are supposed to be appointed during the temporary absence of permanent workers. However, over the two dec-ades since the early 1990s, employment of badli workers has become unrelated to any tem-porary absence of equivalent permanent workers. Now, badli workers in the SOJMs of Bangladesh form a large pool of both skilled, retrenched workers from these same mills, and unskilled labour working under loose terms of employment that define their status as neither formal nor informal, and neither short- nor long-term. This quasi-legal, casual employment status, together with related, ill-defined employment conditions, is now formalized and codified within organizational structures and management practices in such a way as to hinder the badli workers’ access to broader social and political entitlements. Hence, of them-selves, badli workers say, ‘We are a different category of workers’. This leads us to consider how these conditions produce and reproduce economic inequality in the broad sense at the societal level, and how the rationalization and cost-minimization goals of management have led to the formation and maintenance of the badli workers as yet another ‘different category of workers’ – one that we term ‘perpetually temporary’.

With the organization – the SOJMs – as the context of our study, we discuss the badli workers’ own perceptions of economic inequality relative to other groups. We draw on the work of Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (1980), who defines such inequality in terms of ‘capability’ and the question, ‘equality of what?’ Following Sen, we address capability from the perspective of access, or lack thereof, to basic entitlements in society. Hence, we explore the specifics of the badli workers’ situation not only in terms of the equality or otherwise of their basic entitlements relative to other groups performing similar work in this same setting, but also of the equity, or social justice, of their allocation and distri-bution by management. In this context, where access is intrinsically linked to the organi-zation, we consider how the badli workers’ status is codified and reproduced through organizational inertia (Stainback et al., 2010). Such inertia can be grounded in cognitive bias, as illustrated here in the badli workers’ own accounts of their situation. Further, drawing upon works from the field of subaltern studies, both broadly (see Chakrabarty, 1989; Sen S, 1999) and from relevant contextual literature (Chowdhury, 2007; Maron, 1954), we identify sub-categories of gender, ethnicity (e.g. Bengali or Bihari) and reli-gion (e.g. Hindu or Muslim) that may provide further grounds for bias and, hence, organ-izational inertia and embedded inequality.

Our text is structured as follows. First, we expand our theoretical position, as dis-cussed above. Second, we introduce Sonali Jute Mills (a fictional name that encapsulates several SOJMs within which the study was based) as our case example for exploring involved actors’ perceptions in relation to the (re)production and dynamics of economic inequality within the practices of management and norms of organization. Third, we discuss these involved actors’ accounts of and reflections on their situation, their percep-tions of inequality, their reasons for believing this to be the case, and the circumstances that might enable them to be given voice to participate in overcoming these conditions. Finally, we reflect upon the implications of our study both for the community and in the field of management and organization studies.

1134                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

Conceptualizing economic inequality

Sen (1997a, 1997b, 1997c) conceptualizes economic inequality, not simply as income inequality but in terms of a person’s social, political, civil and ethical status. He argues (Sen, 1997b: 157) that ‘identification of economic inequality with income inequality impoverishes the understanding and study of economic inequality’. Sen (1980) states that in considering inequality we have to think first about equality, and equality of what? Here, he considers ‘equality of what’ from the perspective of achieving equality of capability. Sen (2002) defines the basic elements of capability as including income entitlements, facility for dwelling, access to health care, provision of education for the person, whether s/he wishes to pursue education, and provision of education for his/her children. For Sen and others (Dèrzè and Sen, 2002; Sen, 2002) these entitlements constitute both the basic capability of the community and the realization mechanism of that capability. In aggrega-tion, a person’s possession of capability implies that she/he has a properly functioning life and enjoys community life and freedom (Sen, 2002). Here, an individual’s un-freedom, un-well-being and lack of capability for playing a full and active part in the functioning of the community are symbols of inequalities that are economic in nature (Dasgupta, 1990; Sen, 1997b). Sen (1999b) asserts the need to discuss economic inequality/equality not only in terms of the relative quantity and basic utility of distributed entitlements, but also of their quality, including mechanisms for determining their distribution and rights of access to them. Hence, questions of equity, or social justice, emerge organically in the discussion of inequality of these distributions (Sen, 1980, 2002). Consideration of a func-tioning, community life and freedom linked with ‘equality of what’ is obviously a contex-tually dependent and relative concept and, on this basis, we posit that the badli workers are set in a position of economic inequality, not simply through financial inequality, but through their lack of access to economic, social, political, legal and civil entitlements that are available to others of seemingly equal economic value to the society.

Whilst Sen (1980, 2002) relates economic equality with issues of equity and broad social justice, early writing on equity theory in the business field (e.g. Adams, 1963) was focused primarily on issues of fairness in relation to remuneration. Similarly, much of the organizational discourse in (in)equality focuses on wage differentials. Drawing on Marx (1976), critical management scholars argue that such inequality is inherent in the processes of organizational control and domination in pursuit of profit accumula-tion, and in related employment mechanisms and exchange relations between waged workers and employers (see Clegg, 1981; Prichard and Mir, 2010; Willmott, 2005). Acker (2006: 441) argues that such ‘inequality regimes are interlocked practices and processes that result in continuing inequalities in all work organisations’. Whilst ine-quality of entitlements is inherent in and foundational to these exchange relations, according to Willmott (2005) this is not necessarily indicative of antagonistic relations. Hence, we might posit that workers accept this situation, as long as they view their accrued entitlements as fair exchange for the value created by the organization’s appro-priation of their labour power (see Marx, 1976). Whilst workers’ apparent acceptance of such inequalities might be taken as indicative of a balance of exchange relations between workers and employers, Sen’s (1997b) capability framework requires us to consider issues of equity and fairness, and whether or not the outcomes contribute to capability

building for the workers. Sen (1999a, 2002) argues that equity is grounded in the distri-bution process and that equity implies social justice. According to Sen, addressing the issue of equity requires us to consider whether there is equality of opportunity to access and enjoy the basic entitlements, rather than merely of what the stated entitlements are. This approach to equity, as concerning issues of social justice and fairness in how enti-tlements are determined and allocated relative both to other workers and to the value created for the organization, aligns with more recent considerations of equity in man-agement literature (see Hatfield et al., 2011).

Questions of equity therefore require us first to consider the badli workers’ percep-tions of the (un)fairness of how they are treated relative to others undertaking similar work within the same organization (see Adams, 1963) – here, the permanent workers. We must then consider management processes of determination, allocation and distribution of entitlements in terms of fairness and social justice. In the context of our study, this raises further issues such as gender, race or ethnicity, since issues of social justice and inequality are also dependent upon degrees of segregation and marginalization within a society (Sen, 1999b).

Emergence and development of the badli system

According to de Haan (1999), the badli system and badli workers were first estab-lished respectively as practice and participants in the jute industries of the subconti-nent before they were defined in legal frameworks. Publications from the field of subaltern studies on the jute industry during British imperialism (e.g. Chakrabarty, 1989; Sen S, 1999) show that fluctuations in the demand for jute goods in the global market and lack of interest in industry renovation by jute entrepreneurs provided the impetus for appointment of an unskilled but capable workforce. This saw the emer-gence of the category of badli workers, initially termed ‘relatively casual labour’ in the literature of subaltern studies (Sen S, 1999: 7). Badli labour was employed using informal channels of recruitment through ‘jobbers’ – those who held posts as Sardars (head workers) and Babus (clerks/time-keepers/dealing assistants) (Chakrabarty, 1989; Sen S, 1999).

Legal distinctions between permanent and badli workers underwent stages of refine-ment, reform and systemization under the British Empire from 1937 to 1939 (de Haan, 1999; Gupta, 1981). However, it was not until some 60 years later that the badli workers of Bangladesh were formally recognized in legal frameworks under LLB 2006. The leg-acy of the colonial badli system, with attributes of a differential pay system and depriva-tion of other socio-economic entitlements, was embedded from the outset in the practices of the badli system in the SOJMs of Bangladesh (see LLB 2006). Writing about the jute mills after initiation of the JSAC, Bhaskar et al. (1995, 2006) suggest that both those workers who were initially recruited as badli workers and also those who were retrenched and later re-employed as badli workers have been working with this status for years, reflecting the features of an industrial reserve force available for work at any time (see Uddin and Hopper, 2001). Drawing on the badli workers’ narratives, we will discuss how these and other changes under the JSAC have brought new conditions of economic ine-quality in Sen’s terms.

1136                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

Field study

Research site

Sonali Jute Mills were established in 1954–1955 in Khalishpur Industrial Town under the auspices of the City Corporation of Khulna, the third largest metropolitan city of Bangladesh. In essence, Khalishpur developed and grew with the establishment of the mills (Chowdhury, 2007). The Profile of the Mill (19 June 2009) indicates that Sonali Mills cover 300 acres of land, including: the mill premises; a workers’ colony of different types of residence; a school for the children of the mill officials, staff and workers; and mosques and temples. Workers are formally appointed to work on one of two shifts in the mills: A- or B-shift. A third, C-shift, operates from 10pm to 6am and is considered an extra shift, as will be discussed further. At the time of this study, 6984 workers were employed in Sonali Jute Mills. Of these, 3382 were permanent and 3582 badli workers, with about 70 women as permanent workers and 144 as badli workers (Management Information System Report, 31 December 2010). From these figures, we see that the number of badli workers exceeds that of permanent workers.

Methods

This research is a part of a larger study by the first author – the ‘I’ of the text hereon – on actors’ perspectives on their involvement and engagement with the restructuring process of JSAC. Within this broader study, Sen’s (1980, 2002) conceptualization of ‘rights’ was the overarching analytical framework, within which the notions of ‘capability’ and ‘eco-nomic inequality’ addressed here are encapsulated. The case study research was con-ducted across the jute sector of Bangladesh, with participants from government, ministries and executives of BJMC (Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation) at the central level, and from management, union, workers and their household members, and affected commu-nity members at the local level across all the mills, aggregated here as Sonali Jute Mills. Lists of participants had to be reorganized numerous times in response to suggestions from them. For example, the leader of the badli workers suggested adding a few influen-tial individuals with whom they negotiate issues, including the local Member of Parliament, who is also the State Minister of Labour Affairs. However, formal interviews and discussions with the workers were arranged by the Service Babu of the Labour Office.

The research design involved multiple methods: document collection, including cir-culars and gazettes from Ministries and BJMC, and local newspaper reports; participant observation; semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; and numerous infor-mal ‘chai stall’ (tea stall) discussions. The narratives were gathered in the period from September 2010 to April 2011, and again in November 2011. This article is built primar-ily on analysis of the following: two in-depth interviews with the leader of badli workers; focus group discussions involving 50 senior and junior badli workers – both male and female – and their household members; and union leaders. In addition, I held an in-depth interview with the leader of the female badli workers. She later accompanied me through-out my fieldwork whenever she did not have to work a shift – in her words, having ‘No duty!’ Her companionship helped me gain penetrating observation into the life-world of badli workers beyond the mills. Whilst these sessions engaged representatives of the

broad badli worker community, I was unable to undertake discussion with the minority Hindu and Bihari groups, so their views are largely absent from the discussion.

Generally, recorded discussions lasted 60–90 minutes and, in total, 126 hours of recorded material were transcribed in Bangla language and later translated into English. In addition, eight notebooks comprising 300 pages of field notes contain my observa-tions. Analysis of the transcripts followed interpretive techniques (Alvesson, 2011) and grounded analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Through close reading of the accounts, emergent themes were identified and these were then merged into broader categoriza-tions and sub-categorizations. Themes were communicated and discussed with the sec-ond author of this article. Finally, the validity of these categories and themes was checked with respondents in Bangla language during chai stall discussions and home visits in November 2011. The methodology can thereby be considered one of reflexive co-crea-tion, engaging the involved actors in an iterative process of formation and reformation of narratives of their socially constructed reality (see Hardy and Clegg, 1997). Whilst respecting the themes and drawing on the content of the grounded analysis (see Dacin et al., 2010; Khan et al., 2010), for clarity of this discussion we structure our presentation around categories that relate to Sen’s (1997c) discussion of economic inequalities, basic issues of entitlements, (in)equitable distribution of these entitlements, and the constitu-tion of capability.

Case narrative

Based upon the methods outlined above, we identify those themes that encapsulate the badli workers’ perceptions of their status as being in a state of economic inequality. We then discuss these in relation to theoretical dimensions of economic inequality and capa-bility deprivation in Sen’s terms. The identified themes are: (i) restricted economic enti-tlements; (ii) ambiguity and inconsistency; (iii) political mechanisms of management; (iv) marginalization and exclusion; and (v) security and belonging.

Restricted economic entitlements

Dispossession from the outset. The badli workers must register their names before they receive a gate pass from the designated service Babu, representing their identity card as a badli worker. However, no letter of employment is given and nothing is mentioned or written down about what they will receive as entitlements, compensation and benefits, or the grounds on which they might be terminated. This pass must be renewed every quarter and individuals must pay to be registered as a badli worker. I was told of demands for payment of up to 8000 taka (US$ 100) for registration, and of individuals having to mort-gage village homes to obtain money for this. In relation to where these payments go, according to Munir (a newly recruited badli worker; no real names are used in this article):

Money is distributed through the channels from trade union leaders, employees of labour offices, time-keepers, and production officers to the Head of the mill – we mean the GM (General Manager) … I paid 1400 taka (US$ 17.50) because I used to know a Sardar.

1138                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

The final part of this statement is Munir’s acknowledgment of how his personal con-nections affected the amount he paid relative to others. So, we find that the process of getting work for many starts through some type of dispossession, such as mortgaging land, selling jewellery or paying out from savings. Whilst, according to LLB 2006, badli workers are entitled to receive a letter of employment, identity card and service book, the accounts provided indicate systematic non-compliance by management.

Wage and benefit inequalities. LLB 2006 states that badli workers are entitled to receive wages as set out by the Wage Board and have the right to a festival bonus if they work for 180 days for the same employer. However, Majid Mia, leader of the Badli Workers Committee (an informally constituted and unregistered organization of badli workers), stated:

Our basic mojuri [wages] is 2450 taka [US$ 28.00; rate established 2005] if we can work regularly for 26 days of a month. But we are not provided with mills-provided housing facilities, paid leave, insurance facilities, retirement benefits, Provident Fund and gratuity facilities and Hajira bonus [bonus for attendance].

These and other additional allowances are routinely paid to permanent workers, bringing their minimum monthly wage to 3890 taka (US$ 48.63). As a result, badli workers carrying out the same tasks identify immediate inequity in terms of access to distribution. Further evidence of inequity was offered in relation to events such as equip-ment failure and serious accidents. According to badli worker Salam:

If a machine is out of order … this is not a problem for the permanent workers. They receive their wages. Their families receive compensation if there is any accident and they lose their lives, while they are working in the mills. In our case nothing … no work, no pay, no money.

Here, Salam highlights lack of equity, whereby any break in production leads the badli to lose pay whilst a permanent worker can stand by and be paid. However, he also high-lights that inequity persists even after death in the event of an industrial accident, when the permanent worker’s family will receive compensation whilst the badli workers will receive nothing. Abdour Rouf, a badli worker for more than 16 years, further commented: ‘We work and have to work as long as we are physically capable to work. We do not have provision to have retirement benefit or applying for golden handshakes.’

In the current context, when the price of daily necessities is continually increasing and there are no provisions for them to receive food under the state-provided ration system, the badli workers are concerned about the lack of any announcement of revision to the 2005 wage scale for workers of the SOJMs. One group questioned:

Why has government still not declared our new wage scale while they announced pay scale [for employees and executives in the public sector] in 2009? We also buy our daily necessities from the same bazar with the officers. Because of their revised pay scale now there is huge price hike.

As such, the workers’ self-assessment regarding issues of basic entitlements as work-ers within the SOJMs is not limited only to comparison with others within the industry.

Here we see that they identify a lack of formalization of revised wage structures for the SOJM workers whilst other public sector employee groups have gained increases. Similarly, one female badli worker spoke of government policy for distribution of rice to the workers of the ready-made garment (RMG) sector under the ration system. Noting that this ration system is provided to the RMG sector, where mostly female workers are employed, she asked, ‘Why does government apply discriminatory policy for the work-ers of its own mills?’ So, we see that consideration of issues of inequity reaches beyond the SOJM context.

Restricted social entitlements. Sonali Jute Mills are located at the side of a railway line. Beyond the boundary wall we find the slums and the life-world of the badli workers of the mills. Their children’s playground is the railway track and the moving trains. Their entire living space is illegal as the space belongs to the Bangladesh Railway Corporation. Despite this, they have to pay rent that varies between US$ 7.50 and US$ 20.00 per month. Workers receive around US$ 3.10 per month as rent expenses, and this exact amount is deducted from the consolidated wages of those permanent workers who reside in the workers’ colonies, and who do not have to pay for their electricity. As a result of this inequity, badli workers, females in particular, indicate that having a proper dwelling, reasonable rent and affordable electricity bills are the major challenges of their lives. According to Kohinoor − a senior female badli worker − ‘We just try to manage the monthly rent, otherwise those landlords start swearing at us’, implying that it is a strug-gle to maintain the monthly rent payment and that, for female badli workers, such verbal abuse by landlords causes social embarrassment.

Severe shortages of affordable accommodation raise questions among newly recruited female badli workers, with one group stating, ‘Management could distribute those run-down buildings, announced risky to live in, among us’, referring to vacated and aban-doned blocks. They then told how they are sometimes cheated by permanent workers through sharing with them the ‘cost of allotment of a mill quarter’, with the promise of being offered a sublet later. Cost of allotment is money paid to the Babus, union leaders and officers as a bribe for receiving the allocation. Since the badli workers are not legally entitled to such allocations they have no legal or formal redress against the permanent workers when the promised sublet fails to materialize. Some single male badli workers and others whose families live in villages occupy the abandoned blocks, referred to above, along with permanent workers. According to them, ‘This is living by gathering’. In summarizing their situation, the workers indicated that around 50 per cent of badli workers’ income is spent to maintain rent payments, and hence some family members informed me, ‘We work with all our four hands and feet’. In response to my bewildered expression, they explained that this means that all family members, including children, need to work for their survival. These accounts suggest that badli workers’ lack of enti-tlement to housing provided by the mills at a rent level equivalent to the rent expenses allowance contributes to their economic deprivation.

The badli workers also expressed difficulties in supporting their children’s education. According to them, the quality of education in the mill school has been deteriorating over the years since the JSAC has been initiated. However, they cannot send their children to public or private school. As one stated: ‘With this amount of wages and facility for edu-cation, can a badli worker even think about sending his children to kindergarten school, or that one day his children will become engineers or doctors?’

1140                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

Access to the mill medical facility is also now limited, offering only regular check-ups by the mill-appointed doctor. Asia, a senior badli female worker, recalled that she delivered her three children in the mill hospital in the 1980s when her husband worked as a permanent worker. According to her, ‘In the hospital we had been provided with food and on Friday [weekly holiday] they used to give us an improved diet’. The Babu responsible for the badli workers informed me that the government changed policy in 1982, withdrawing free access to medical facilities and distribution of medicines. Instead, an allowance for medical expenses was added into wages. Whilst this change impacted all workers, it had a greater impact on the badli workers because of their lack of regular earnings and lower levels of wage payments, resulting in them receiving lower and irreg-ular medical expense allowances.

Ambiguity and inconsistency

Rights of permanency. Restricted financial and nonfinancial entitlements are accepted facts, but under current conditions badli workers also have no clear idea about their defined rights to permanent work, or to security and continuity of employment. The badli workers informed me that the pattern and mode of permanency had been regular before 1994. Humayun, a third-generation jute worker born here in 1984, commented, ‘Why are we not appointed systematically as permanent workers; what went wrong?’ Similarly, there was frequent reference to ineffectual legal frameworks, lack of compliance with employment practices, and consistent crises in the mills as reasons for badli workers not being absorbed as permanent workers. The prevailing view at the mill level is:

Badli workers should be 25% of total permanent workers … They [the management] have ignored the law [Labour Law] and have recruited equal numbers of badli workers. Also if we work for a full 90 days under the same employer, then according to the law we are entitled to have regular employment. (Field notes: Discussion in chai stall and with Service Babu)

Despite this claim of entitlement to regularization of employment, the group went on to tell me that some workers had been engaged under badli conditions for over 20 years, with no transfer to permanent status. Similarly, there was frequent reference to ratios of permanent and badli workers as the formal legal basis of workers’ appointment. However, I could find no clear statement in the LLB 2006 or in any circulars about the maximum number of badli workers that a mill should have, or when and how badli workers should be appointed as permanent. Review of various circulars reveals that practice now is that no permanent workers are to be appointed without BJMC’s approval. Hence, the pres-ence of a large number of badli workers has become embedded practice.

Uncertain employment. Under this current practice, badli workers indicated that they must have good relations with managers, Babus, and union leaders in order to have regu-lar work. One confirmed, ‘Otherwise getting regular work is impossible’. Conversations with female workers revealed that in their case the degree and nature of ‘amicable rela-tions’ required varies and they have to pay a higher price to be on the duty roster. Overall, badli workers view management and union leaders as aligned in suppressing and exploit-ing them. For example, Towhid narrated:

Today in our batching section five permanent workers are on leave. We were told no badli workers would be appointed today. When I asked the Babu why, he did not bother to listen, and leaders also did not consider it as an important issue. Rather they sent us to Admin office for this interview. (Talking to me)

Dominated and de-motivated. I was told at various times of inconsistency and lack of trans-parency in wage payments. Najma, Sheuli and Protiva work in Grade 1 as helpers and receive US$ 2.31 daily, whilst Rani and Kohinoor, also Grade 1 helpers, receive US$ 2.00. Knowing of these differences and of the rates paid to permanent workers, Nurani added:

Working in [the] sewing section, it is on a per piece rate basis. We think our mojuri [wages] must be at least 300 taka [US$ 3.75] per day if we finish sewing 800 sacks while what we receive as mojuri varies from 250 to 240 taka [US$ 3.10–3.00].

Many spoke of having money deducted from their wages by the clerks who oversee their employment, commenting that, ‘Babus take their part from our wages’. In addition to wage irregularities, badli workers think that management does not consider them as ‘real’ workers of the mills, since any issues they raise are not listened to. According to Nasir, a young badli worker, ‘If I tell Babu that the machine has a problem, their response is “OK get lost”’, adding, ‘It will make us more secure and we will be more motivated to produce more if the Babus do proper supervision’.

Whilst most would see the role of a trade union as ensuring equal rights for all work-ers, nepotism, partisan attitudes and parochialism were presented here as major traits of trade union politics. Although trade union members espoused that badli workers have rights to become permanent workers, I was informed that the union advised management not to appoint an experienced badli worker as Sardar on C-shift. Calling for change, young female badli workers said union leaders should, ‘Take care or look after all people irrespective of their status as rich or poor … Don’t consider issues that only belong to their own people’. By this, they implied that union leaders’ concerns are only for those who are their relatives, friends or people who belong to their own home district. Divisions between badli workers and both union and management are further reflected in com-ments such as, ‘If we raise our voice about supplying us lower quality of raw jute or materials, union leaders and management threaten us, “What is your authority for raising such issues, just keep silent”’. So, the badli workers find themselves in a position where they cannot even make representations to seek to bring about improvement and, as Majid Mia concluded, ‘Such activities union leaders consider as over-smartness and in such cases we have to come back and ask them for forgiveness’.

Scepticism and cynicism. There is broad scepticism about the fairness of management of SOJMs, in terms of whether the prescribed process for appointment of permanent workers (Circular, 13 January 2011) will be followed and the serial run of seniority be properly maintained. One stated, ‘Leaders are asking for money to make us permanent workers. Now, how can we manage 20 to 30 thousand taka (US$ 250–350)?’ Recent recruitment of many new staff at officer level and as security guards, along with the reap-pointment of laid-off workers, also raised questions about management’s capability. Majid Mia stated:

1142                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

We do production. We do not cost the mill 20,000 taka (US$ 250) per month as salary like the mill is currently providing to each of its newly recruited officers. Do you think a responsible management would do this? … These people live on us. We give production, we earn money and they deprive us.

The badli workers expressed some cynicism about management calls for greater com-mitment to the mills. Referring to a management campaign launched during the produc-tion season from December 2010 to February 2011, encouraging permanent workers not to take leave during the production season, they commented, ‘We see the banner and campaign. We just laugh. For us, every day of the year is a production day … If we do not work we cannot survive’. Such comments indicate the badli workers’ awareness of the inequity of their employment conditions, with the permanent workers being asked to forego a right to which they themselves have no entitlement.

Lack of recognition and involvement. Not only are badli workers concerned that they do not receive proper income entitlements, but also that they are not recognized as workers of the mills. Recognition for them implies voting rights in union elections, rights of association and formal acceptance of their informally organized committee, the Badli Workers Committee. However, LLB 2006 states that they are neither allowed to be associated with the union, with membership and voting rights, nor to formally register their own committee. Therefore, in the case of both the formal organization and the informal operation of trade unions, union leaders and management, badli workers are excluded. Referring to this, Majid Mia, a leader of the badli workers, stated, ‘They [union leaders] think once we have one committee as officially recog-nized (for permanent workers), there is no need for another’. The reason for this dis-parity is not clear to badli workers and they argue: ‘If we can vote in parliamentary elections and in local elections for electing our candidate to look after our issues, then why are we not allowed to elect our leaders who will look after our rights as workers?’

Female badli workers also conceive that the right to vote for union leaders could eman-cipate them, making union leaders accountable to them for looking after their safety and security.

As stated above, the badli workers seek formal recognition of the Badli Workers Committee, allowing it to be registered under the law of the country. They regard this formal recognition as workers as essential for their survival. However, the State Minister of Labour, also the local Member of Parliament, commented, ‘Badli workers are like floating workers. If they are allowed to be unionized, managing the mills will become chaotic then’. Whilst mill management remained silent about badli workers and their performance, the Marketing Director of BJMC expressed his discontent with the badli system, as negatively affecting performance and production. For him, adjustment between worker and machine over time is necessary for smooth production, whilst under the badli system such adjustment is impossible since there are no allocated machines for the badli workers, ‘because badli system is a temporary mechanism’.

As an overall result of ambiguity in law and rights to permanency, coupled with lack of legal rights of union membership and association, badli workers are excluded from

participation in the management of the mills. As such, basic issues such as their conditions of employment and provision of work are not systematically and transparently addressed. The badli workers recognize the inherent inequity of their status in terms of access to and distribution of wages, benefits and entitlements, and through associated feelings of inse-curity that they may lose their jobs at any moment. From these conditions we also identify clear inequalities between the badli workers and their permanent counterparts.

Political mechanisms of management

Violation of entitlements. Government intervention in the mills’ employment processes became more intense during the interim government regime from 2007. This army-backed caretaker government called for layoffs in the SOJMs, cancelled gate passes for the badli workers and forced them to work on a daily, casual basis at a reduced rate (US$ 1.87 per day). By 2008, the number of permanent workers had also been reduced by 50 per cent (Moazzem et al., 2009). According to one group of permanent workers, most current female badli workers were first employed on a daily basis during this caretaker regime. They explained, ‘Government wanted to run the mills with the female workers on a daily-wage basis, because they don’t have to be paid much’. When the democratic government came to power in 2009, on the one hand it withdrew the daily basis work mode but, on the other hand, required appointment of 50 per cent of the workforce under the badli system (7 July 2009). According to Majid Mia, ‘This was the election agenda of the current ruling party’. However, rather than seeing this as a reversal of policy to benefit the badli workers, he considered it as benefiting management and union leaders, since the policy provided them an opportunity for extracting money. He explained that recruitment of large numbers of badli workers who then had to pay for gate passes pro-vided funds to the elected union leaders to recover their expenses from the November 2010 election. At the same time, this recruitment provided an understanding that the rul-ing party was fulfilling its election mandate in creating more jobs. Explaining this fur-ther, Majid Mia added, ‘There is a huge number of unemployed people all over Bangladesh … They understand they are going to be employed in state-owned enter-prises. It is just that they have to pay minimum 4000 taka. It is a business’.

Contested entitlements. The badli workers considered the most severe threat facing them to be the lack of regular employment, with a regular job for at least two days a week essential for their survival. However, this was deemed impossible owing to the large num-bers of new badli workers who have been recruited. The older and more experienced badli workers said, ‘Now, even a worker like me who has been working for more than 18 years is told, “Baba (Father), can you please take a break for this shift”’. The reason for this request was to make way for these new workers who, having paid money to the Sardars to be taken onto the badli list, expected, not unreasonably, to be given paid employment in return.

Similarly, reappointment by the current government of workers laid off during the caretaker regime, again on a permanent basis, posed a challenge. The concern here was that, ‘These people are very old and already became deskilled as they had been laid-off for almost three years’. The oldest and most experienced badli workers thus found them-selves disadvantaged both by the reinstatement of older, retrenched permanent workers and also by the appointment of many new, young badli workers.

1144                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

Further explaining their loss of entitlement, badli workers stated that it had been accepted practice in the mills that working on the C-shift was their right. However, there was now a conflict of interest because the permanent workers considered working this shift as a way of earning overtime. In response, management practice was that all work-ers on C-shift, irrespective of their position, received badli workers’ wages. So, the per-manent workers felt that they were treated inequitably, being deprived of their right to earn overtime at double rates whilst management made savings in overall labour costs. However, the badli workers remained the most disadvantaged by having their access to the work, and associated wages, removed completely.

Within the reality of their life-world, taking on a second job was a necessity for many badli workers. However, every worker, irrespective of his/her working tenure, had to come to the mills early in the morning to be in the queue to get the call for work. In the case of male badli workers, if their labour was not required for that day, they could go for any temporary job, like pulling a van or rickshaw. Finding a temporary job was difficult for the female workers, however, because they mostly work as domestic household workers, which requires regularity in attendance. Nevertheless, most of the female badli workers I met were single women and many the breadwinners of their families. Salma commented, ‘If we have fixed days of work, I mean at least two days in a week, we can earn 600–700 taka/week [US$ 7.50–8.75] and can survive’. Seeking some security of income, female badli workers proposed the following option:

Why don’t they [the permanent workers] take one-day leave in every week? They have this facility for paid leave and thus, they can give us the opportunity to work at least one day in a week. Also, the senior badli workers have to think about our situation.

Then, considering other options for some form of regular work and earning, they contin-ued, ‘Even if they [the authority, permanent workers and the senior badli workers] give us duty on C-shift, we can survive’. With this proposal, the female badli workers per-ceive that equity and equality, in terms of access to work and wages earned, could be ensured to some extent, but at the expense of other groups who would be required to give up some of their work rotas.

Adding further pressure to the availability of regular work, the government increased the retirement age of workers from 57 to 60 years. Referring to this, a group of young female badli workers stated, ‘We are 22 to 25 years old now, so by the time our turn for appointment as permanent workers will come, we will exceed the age limit for being appointed in SOJMs’. With the maximum age limit for new permanent employees in the government sector set at 30 for males and 32 for females, respectively, in a note of despair they then continued, ‘We don’t have any future’.

In summary, the policy and practices for management of the mills indicate systematic violation and removal of recognized entitlements, previously established both formally under law and informally over time through practice.

Marginalization and exclusion

Social humiliation. Humayun, a third-generation badli worker, told me how, in the 1980s when jute mill workers went to the Bazar for shopping, the fishermen would say, ‘OK

take this fish’, or just give the fish to them, knowing that as jute mill workers they had money. After working for almost two decades under the badli system, many now have frustrations and feelings of failure in life through loss of this social respect. One group narrated:

A permanent worker can do shopping on credit because owners of the shops and restaurants know they are the permanent workers and they can feed their children better. If I want to buy sweets I need to have money. I cannot buy on credit.

However, despite this loss of respect, badli workers could not avoid the socio-cultural norms of Bangladesh society. One such condition, that caused humiliation for many, is arrangement of a daughter’s marriage. Jahangir Mia, a senior badli worker, commented, ‘Because of working as badli workers we even face embarrassment to arrange the mar-riage of our daughter. No one is interested to get married to a badli worker’s daughter’. Arranging a daughter’s marriage with associated conditions of giving a dowry requires ‘sufficient savings’, which is impossible for badli workers. Sufia, a 50-year old female badli worker, stated, ‘Government should make some allocation for us in the budget, so that we can have some money for the arrangement of our daughter’s marriage. We don’t have the facility of taking a loan from the [Provident] Fund’. In reality, having to pay to secure a gate pass as a badli worker, whilst having no certainty of work and earning, in itself makes borrowing inevitable. But, badli workers have no access to borrow from Provident Funds, or to have membership of the Samitis (according to Bangla usage implies ‘community organization’) of NGOs that conduct micro-credit programs. Instead, several stated that they borrow from the Babus and influential permanent work-ers. According to Kohinoor and Protiva:

We are badli workers … We neither have permanent job nor a permanent address, so we cannot be involved with the Samitis. Samitis of BRAC … or ASA … [Both are NGOs] are not interested in lending money to us. We borrow from Babus or from the rich permanent workers … If we borrow this week, next week they can deduct that amount from our wages.

Divided families. I was told that many badli workers living with their immediate family rarely visited their rural home and relatives and were also unable to remit funds to their extended family from their earnings, as expected according to social custom. Some told me:

With these earnings it is difficult to maintain our own family. Our parents, siblings, nephews and nieces – they have expectations. For instance, my nephews expect that as an Uncle I would bring watches for them. My nieces or sisters or sisters-in-law expect I would bring sarees [ethnic dress for the women] for them and my parents expect that I should give some cash to them. They know we work in the government owned mills. They do not understand the division between permanent and badli system.

Many of the newly recruited female badli workers considered the only solution to be leav-ing Khalishpur in search of work in the RMG sector in Dhaka or Chittagong. However, to do so they would have to leave their children behind. Halima, who left her village with her children four years earlier and was now considering another migration, stated:

1146                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

Apa [sister], believe me, before we came to work here [starts sobbing] … I couldn’t manage even two taka. After I got this job, every Thursday our children wait for us – ‘Ma will definitely bring something today’. And at least at the end of the day we can have one meal together. Do you understand that pleasure, Apa?

Security and belonging

Despite being discriminated against through unequal pay and benefits for equal work, badli workers recognized both that they form the majority of the workforce and that they provide a major contribution to maintaining production in the mills. As they explained, ‘If one department has 10 machines to run, on those machines there are 10 permanent workers and 30 badli workers – this is the ratio’. This led a group of senior badli workers to question:

We give the same labour, then why are we paid less than the permanent workers? We should also receive whatever the permanent workers receive such as at least fixed days for work, leave with pay, housing facility, retirement pension, compensation for accidents.

These differences between badli and permanent workers’ conditions raised questions not only of inequality between the groups, but also of the basic inequity or lack of justice of the badli workers’ situation. However, despite this, Batil Matbbor, who had worked for 18 years as a badli, explained that he had never looked for a job as a permanent worker in the private mills. He explained, ‘The job is not secure like the job as badli in the SOJMs’. I met a number of badli workers who were retrenched from SOJMs that had been closed down then privatized. One of them told me, ‘Here, as a badli weaver I receive 200 to 250 taka (US$ 2.50–3.10), whilst in private mills they give 165 taka (US$ 2.06)’. Comparing their situation with that of permanent workers in the private mills, the badli generally viewed the latter not only as having less secure jobs and lower wage rates, but also as lacking implementation of statutory rules and regulations and being subject to greater levels of mental, physical and sexual harassment.

Whilst there are many negative aspects to their situation, the badli workers of the SOJMs saw their own community as the source of their strength. They feel belonging-ness with the community, and relationships become stronger because they face similar challenges together. They collect money to support other members’ families with inci-dental expenses, for arranging the marriage of a daughter or the funeral of a family member. Whilst most of their narratives provide evidence of economic inequality in Sen’s terms, the badli workers expressed feelings of pride in the community life, free-dom and security that they derive from perceiving themselves as the key workers of the mills – that through their labour they maintain not just their own families but also the 20,000 jute mill workers of Khalishpur.

Discussion

In this article, we give voice to the badli workers of the SOJMs of Bangladesh, describ-ing their feelings of basic inequity in terms of their limited access to basic entitlements

in return for their labour input, and of inequality in relation to permanent workers under-taking similar work. We then discuss these narratives to question how organizational norms and management practices within the mills constitute and perpetuate economic inequality for the badli workers relative to permanent workers of similar economic value to the organization and society. Our broader discussion then shows how macro-level legislative practices and political mechanisms have contributed to establishment and maintenance of this inequality.

This work contributes at two levels. First, the article contributes to theoretical discus-sion of economic equality from Amartya Sen’s broad perspective of capability. In addition, through giving voice to the most disadvantaged workers of the SOJMs of Bangladesh, it contributes to debate in the domain of subaltern studies.

Contributions to discussion of economic inequality

Economic inequality as process and outcome. Sen (2002) argues that economic inequal-ity comprises not only wage inequality but also lack of social, political and civil entitle-ments that he discusses as ‘capability’. In the narratives of the badli workers, the desire for a secure livelihood is intrinsically linked with issues of capability, as they aspire to regular work, enjoyment of family life, access to affordable housing, and security after retirement. Beyond that, they also seek formal recognition as workers within the mills, to have the right of association with a trade union, the legal right to form their own commit-tee, and the ability to negotiate and participate in the mill management. In summary, they seek freedom and capability in terms of capacity to build a community life for them-selves in the present, and to make plans for both their and their families’ futures.

The bases of unequal exchange relations between badli workers and management – which includes Sardars, Babus, union leaders, officers, executives, bureaucrats and pol-icy-makers – are identified in ill-defined legislative frameworks and ineffective implementation of these. It is on these bases that inequitable management practices are designed. First, badli workers are discriminated against in terms of basic economic enti-tlements that constitute the capability of the individual, thereby placing them in a posi-tion of social, legal and political inequality with the permanent workers. Second, with a quasi-legal status as the basis for determining their entitlements and the limitations of these, the badli workers’ employment, both individually and collectively, remains in the hands of more powerful actors within the SOJMs. Drawing from Sen (1997b), we infer that both the process and the opportunity for constructing capability – getting work, and receiving financial and non-financial compensation – are derived of patron–client rela-tions with union and management. The badli workers are subject to inequity in their lack of access to entitlements, to inequality with others undertaking the same work and con-tributing the same economic value, and thereby to hindrance in the process of capability constitution in both the organizational and social contexts. As such, we find that on the one hand economic inequality causes deprivation of capability through subjugation to the system, whilst on the other hand this inequality can be viewed as a consequence of deprivation of legal and political entitlements within the system. Hence, we argue that, in the case of the badli workers, economic inequality emerges both as a process and as an outcome, and leads to social marginalization.

1148                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

Existing in a ‘perpetually temporary’ state. The narratives of the badli workers indicate their historical understanding of badli employment as a point of transition towards perma-nent employment. In this transition status, they have always been subject to income ine-quality. However, under the JSAC, with its economic rationale of efficiency, they have been subjected to very different work arrangements and to profound change in their self-identification as badli workers. Here, organizational practices and inertia normalize and embed the temporary nature of their employment and over the years they remain as badli workers (see Stainback et al., 2010). The reflective narratives indicate that individuals’ categorization and identification as workers of the SOJMs during the 1970s–1980s were marked by social respect. Now, comparing their economic and social status with that of their fathers, young badli workers identify systematic inequity through failure to appoint them as permanent workers.

Badli workers’ representation of a negative present is set against accounts of a fairly positive past – one in which they had greater social recognition as jute workers in the streets and markets, where they were valued for their identity as formal workers of the public sector jute mills, and where they had access to accommodation, education and health provisions in the mill. Now, they see themselves as lacking social value and recognition, and deprived of entitlements that were previously granted systematically. Such discussion of continuous deprivation of entitlements emerged naturally in their narratives.

By analysing the regimes that the workers of the SOJMs have been exposed to, it can be argued that, under the regime of the JSAC, experiences of inequality by the badli workers emerge as outcomes of interrelated practices of multiple organizations: the mill management, the state and the global policy regime (see Acker, 2006). It can further be argued that these practices and policies are designed to raise tolerance regarding unem-ployment (see Sen, 1997c) and, thereby, eliminate capability as the jute mill workers, or Chatkal Shrramik, of the SOJMs. As such, the badli worker’s status is (re)produced and retained as the category that we term ‘perpetually temporary’.

In addition to structural inequalities within the industry and state systems, the badli workers are also deprived of opportunities to access NGO-provided micro-credit pro-grams. This lack of access arises as a direct result of management policy in sustaining the badli workers’ quasi-legal and under-employment status and it further magnifies their economic inequality and social marginalization. It seems ironic that such inequity is produced by organizations professing a key commitment to eradicating poverty. As a result of these various processes and practices, badli workers find themselves, both within the mills and in the wider community, in a state of economic inequality relative to others whilst providing cheap labour within the dominant model of capitalist value-extraction (see Marx, 1976).

Gender dimension of inequality. According to Sen (1997b), gender adds a further dimension to economic inequality. Here, our reading of the narratives of male badli workers shows how they feel socially humiliated because, as fathers, they are unable to provide education for their children. In addition, lack of social recognition hinders the opportunity for their daughters to be married and settle down in life. Such considerations that he is an unsuccessful father indicate an individual’s ongoing internal repression. In the case of female badli workers, the necessity of having patron–client relations with male management members in order to secure work and housing causes feelings of moral

disgrace. The high psychological impact of this is accepted as long as they can live in Khalishpur with their children. However, with diminishing access to regular work and lack of inter-sector mobility within Khalishpur, some must consider moving to the RMG sector in Dhaka or Chittagong, whilst others fear the prospect of being trafficked to Middle Eastern countries (see Ali et al., 2002). Many female workers sense that the exchange relations of wage-employment represent an exchange of life (see Prichard and Mir, 2010), and that life appears as ‘a floating raft in the flowing water’.

Equity, equality and capability. As their narratives show, the badli workers identify themselves primarily as workers of the SOJMs, even in preference to permanent jobs in the private jute mills. As such, they consider that they should have the same entitlements as permanent workers undertaking similar work in the SOJMs. According to Sen (1983), considering capability in a given context requires relevant comparison as the basis for understanding. Here, the badli workers identify not only inequality of basic entitlements, but also inequity in access to and distribution of these, and in the impacts of declining state spending on medical and educational facilities. From their narratives, issues of political entitlement emerge as a condition for defining capability. Referring to their citi-zenship right to elect political representatives to parliament, badli workers urged that they should also participate in the mill management through associating with the union, broadening the union remit and pursuing their agenda items. These include pension ben-efits, a rationing system for food distribution and equal provision of leave. It is in the lack of fairness of access to and distribution of these entitlements, as well as the inequality of their substantive content, that consideration of basic social justice leads us to argue that the badli workers are subject to basic socio-economic inequity (see Yates, 2004).

Through their narratives, badli workers outline both their aspired capability (see Sen, 1997a) and the means for attaining it, linked to their perceived political, legal and civil enti-tlements (see Dèrzè and Sen, 2002). Whilst the badli workers express their own sense of community, freedom and security in their knowledge of themselves as key workers in the mills, we argue that this pride reinforces their narratives elsewhere of lack of equity in access to basic entitlements, and of economic inequality relative to other groups – specifically the permanent workers undertaking similar work.

In summary, we posit that the badli workers’ narratives illustrate context-specific issues related to standards of living and central to debate on development of capability in the context of the postcolonial state. These collected narratives show how multiple inter-twining organizational mechanisms work to institutionalize both flexibility of the labour market as management preference (see McCallum, 2011) and organizational inertia for the badli workers’ situation (see Stainback et al., 2010), as a result of which their status is (re)produced and retained as being ‘perpetually temporary’. This perpetually tempo-rary life-world, and related capability deprivation, is derived of micro-level practices of management, including the union, but is grounded in macro-level contextual elements of policies and legal frameworks (see Sen, 1997a, 1997b).

Contribution to subaltern studies

The historiography of labour analysis in the period of the British Empire (Gupta, 1981 [cited in the novel by Saroj Bandyopadhyay]: 1793) suggests that the life-world of the jute

1150                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

mill workers then circulated around individual figures that oversaw aspects of community life, namely Kisti-wala (money lenders, as Kisti implies loan instalments), Basti-wala (owners of the slums) and Khisti-wala (users of abusive language, because Khisti means abusive language). Considering the current life-world of the badli workers of the SOJMs from the perspective of subaltern studies, the impacts of the JSAC program on labour market dynamics in Bangladesh might be seen as a continuation of a global market doc-trine for managing labour that created and has maintained this working class community since the colonial period (Chandavarkar, 1994). Hence, key issues – including fragmenta-tion of the working class community of the mills, management non-compliance with policy and historical practice, union leadership as a tool of management, and ambiguities in legal frameworks – all play roles from the colonial to postcolonial eras.

However, badli workers’ exposure to issues of inequity and inequality in contempo-rary industrial culture has prompted a critical understanding by them of their life-world and aspirations for greater levels of capability. They reflect on the significance of key elements of change, including: union politics as a platform for collective negotiation; formalizing the badli workers’ own platform, the Badli Workers Committee; networking with political leaders; and organizing support systems within their own social group. These reflections illustrate the features of a postcolonial, ghettoized but empowered industrial community, as discussed in the limited literature from subaltern studies in the context of Bangladesh (see Chowdhury, 2007).

Conclusion

In this article we present narratives of the badli workers of the SOJMs of Bangladesh. Seeking to do so in their own terms, we draw on their perceptions and interpretations of their situation to discuss the issue of economic inequality in the context of the postcolonial state. We consider how the badli workers perceive their current status in relation to their historical accounts as a ‘different category of worker’, linked intrinsi-cally to the mill and its work across generations. Discussing changes to the badli workers’ socio-economic status over recent decades, we point to management’s focus on issues of production efficiency and cost minimization under a structural adjust-ment program (JSAC). We show that badli workers’ restricted entitlements constrain their negotiation capability and recognition as workers of the SOJMs – Chatkal Shrramik − in the social context. As a result of their inability to negotiate terms, con-ditions and entitlements, badli workers are thereby unable to attain their desired capability.

Considering the subject of economic inequality from the capability perspective of Amartya Sen, which extends beyond wage inequality to consider issues of social justice and equity, we argue that the badli workers are clearly subjected to such inequality rela-tive to others of similar economic value. Furthermore, our study indicates that female badli workers as a vulnerable category are more deprived and are in a more disadvan-taged situation. In addition, we infer that the absence of the Bihari and Hindu community

– the ethnic minority and religion-based community whose members were visibly pre-sent but were neither invited formally to engage, nor forthcoming themselves in engag-ing – is indicative that, in the context of the postcolonial state, racial aspects (issues of

ethnicity and religion), like gender, contribute to capability deprivation and hence eco-nomic inequality. We propose that further study is merited to bring these and other mar-ginalized groups into a broader discussion of economic inequality.

Acknowledgements

We are deeply indebted to the workers, both badli and permanent, and the communities of the jute mills. Without their support this research would not have been possible. We would like also to thank the two anonymous reviewers of our article, and the guest editors of the special issue, Dr Hari Bapuji and Dr Suhaib Riaz, for their valuable comments, specifically on our theorization of Amartya Sen’s writing on equality, equity and capability in the context of organization and man-agement studies. Finally, we also thank AKM Masud Ali and Professor Martin Wood for their comments on drafts of our text.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

References

Acker J (2006) Inequality regimes: Gender, class and race in organizations. Gender & Society

20(4): 441–464.

Adams JS (1963) Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology 67: 422–436.

Ali AKMa, Ali AKMu and Sarkar R (2002) The RMG Sector of Bangladesh and Its Female Workers: Awaiting a Neo Global Movement. Dhaka: INCIDIN Bangladesh.

Alvesson M (2011) Interpreting Interviews. London: SAGE.

Bagchi KA (2007) De-industrialisation in India in the nineteenth century: Some theoretical impli-

cations. Journal of Development Studies 12(2): 135–164.

Bhaskar V and Khan M (1995) Privatization and employment: A study of the jute industry in

Bangladesh. American Economic Review 85(1): 267–273.

Bhaskar V, Gupta B and Khan M (2006) Partial privatization and yardstick competition: Evidence from employment dynamics in Bangladesh economics of transition. American Economic Review 14(3): 459–477.

Chakrabarty D (1989) Rethinking Working-class History: Bengal, 1890–1940. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press.

Chandavarkar R (1994) The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chowdhury MS (2007) Situation of industrial zone in Khulna. Notun Digonto 5(4): 211–219.

Clegg S (1981) Organization and control. Administrative Science Quarterly 26(4): 545–562.

Corbin J and Strauss A (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for

Developing Grounded Theory (3rd edn). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Dacin TM, Munir M and Tracey P (2010) Formal dining at Cambridge colleges: Linking rit-ual performance and institutional maintenance. Academy of Management Journal 53(6): 1393–1418.

Dasgupta P (1990) Well-being and the extent of its realisation in poor countries. The Economic Journal 100(400): 1–32.

de Haan A (1999) The badli system in industrial labour recruitment: Managers’ and workers’ strat-

egies in Calcutta’s jute industry. Contribution to Indian Sociology 33(1): 271–301.

1152                                                                                                            Human Relations 68(7)

Dèrzè J and Sen A (2002) Democratic practice and social inequality in India. Journal of Asian and African Studies 37(6): 6–37.

Gupta DR (1981) Structure of the labour market in Colonial India. Economic and Political Weekly 6(44/46): 1781–1806.

Hardy C and Clegg S (1997) Relativity without relativism: Reflexivity in post-paradigm organiza-

tion studies. [Special issue] British Journal of Management 8: 5–17.

Hatfield E, Salmon M and Rapson RL (2011) Equity theory and social justice. Journal of Management, Spirituality & Religion 8(2): 101–121.

Khan FR, Westwood R and Boje MD (2010) ‘I feel like a foreign agent’: NGOs and corporate social responsibility intervention into Third World child labour. Human Relations 63(9): 1417–1438.

Lévi-Strauss C (1952) Race and history. UNESCO Courier 4(5).

McCallum JK (2010) Organizing the ‘unorganized’: Varieties of transnational trade union col-laboration and social dialogue in two Indian cities. Journal of Workplace Rights 15(3/4): 399–419.

Maron S (1954) The problem of East Pakistan. Pacific Affairs 28(2): 132–144.

Marx K (1976) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Moazzem KG, Rahman T and Sobhan A (2009) Jute manufacturing sector of Bangladesh:

Challenges, opportunities and policy options. Paper 78. Dhaka: CPD.

Perrow C (1991) A society of organizations. Theory and Society 20: 725–762.

Prichard C and Mir R (2010) Editorial: Organizing value. Organization 17(5): 507–515.

Sen A (1980) Equality of what? In: McMurrin S (ed.) Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Salt

Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sen A (1983) Poor, relatively speaking. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 35(2): 153–169.

Sen A (1997a) On Economic Inequality (enlarged edn). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sen A (1997b) Inequality, unemployment and contemporary Europe. International Labour Review 136(2): 155–172.

Sen A (1997c) From income inequality to economic inequality. Southern Economic Journal 64(2):

383–401.

Sen A (1999a) Economic policy and equity: An overview. In: Tanzi V, Chu K-Y and Gupta S

(eds) Economic Policy and Equity. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 28–43.

Sen A (1999b) The possibility of social choice. The American Economic Review 89(3):

349–378.

Sen A (2002) Why health equity? Health Economics 11: 659–666.

Sen S (1999) Women and Labour in Late Colonial India: The Bengal Jute Industry. Cambridge:

Cambridge South Asian Studies.

Sobhan R and Ahmad M (1980) Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime: A Study in the

Political Economy of Bangladesh. Dacca: Bangladesh Institute Development Studies.

Stainback K, Tomaskovic-Devey D and Skaggs S (2010) Organizational approaches to inequality:

Inertia, relative power, and environments. Annual Review of Sociology 36: 225–247.

Uddin S and Hopper T M (2001) A Bangladesh soap opera: Privatisation, accounting, and regimes of control in a less developed country. Accounting, Organizations and Society 26: 643–672.

Willmot H (2005) Theorizing contemporary control: Some poststructuralist responses to some

critical realist questions. Organization 12(5): 747–780.

Yates C (2004) Forum: Reorganizing unions: Rebuilding the Labour Movement by organ-izing the unorganized: Strategic considerations. Studies in Political Economy 74: 171–179.

Fahreen Alamgir gained her PhD from the School of Management at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Her thesis comprised a study of the implications and relevance of ‘rights-centric manage-ment’ in the case of the jute industry of Bangladesh, in the context of and in response to globalism. Fahreen joined the School of Management at Massey University, New Zealand, early in 2015. Her research interests centre on advancing organizational theory from the perspective of rights and capability for the involved and affected community in response to both globalization and sustaina-ble development initiatives. [Email: F.Alamgir@massey.ac.nz; fahreen71@yahoo.com]

George Cairns is Professor of Management at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. George trained as an architect in the UK and gained his PhD from the University of Glasgow. His writing spans a broad range of topics, and includes articles in leading academic journals that discuss under-standings of design in organization theory (Human Relations) and of social science theory in the field of design (Building Research & Information). With others, George has worked on the development of scenario methods and their theoretical foundations. In 2013, he co-edited a special issue of Technological Forecasting and Social Change, with contributions from leading scenario thinkers from across the world. He has co-authored two books on scenario methods and has facilitated sce-nario workshops on major projects in the UK, Europe and Australia. [Email: george.cairns@rmit. edu.au]