Introduction to Libya International Crimes

Introduction to Libya International Crimes

The three ICC fugitives: Muammar Gaddafi, Abdullah Al-Senussi, and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi stood accused of serious international crimes from the year 2011. These crimes include the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment, Murder, and outrages upon personal dignity, and the crimes against humanity of persecution, imprisonment, pain, and other inhumane acts. Libya is not a Rome Statute state party. Nevertheless, on February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) universally referred Libya’s situation from February 26, 2011, to the International Criminal Court (ICC), in Resolution 1970 (2011) (Schneider et al. 2014). Therefore, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction over the listed crimes in the Rome statute committed on Libya’s territory or by the countries nationals from February 15, 2011, onwards.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referred this Libya situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), where it condemned application of force and violence against the civilians, deploring the systematic and gross human rights’ violation, such as peaceful demonstrators’’ repression, expression of hearted concern at the civilians’ deaths, as well as unequivocally rejecting the incitement to violence and hostility against civilian people made from the Libyan government highest level, and then under Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi (Schneider et al. 2014).

Further, the referred Libyan situation by UNSC to ICC, noted that the systematic and widespread attacks against the Libyan civilians might amount to the crimes against humanity, and also expressed concern at refugees’ plight that were forced to flee the scene of violence as well as at the reports of medical supplies shortages meant to treat the injured victims (Schneider et al. 2014). The referral further underlined the need to hold responsible all those alleged with the attacks, including through forces under their authority, on the civilian population.

Description of Relevant Case

Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi

Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’s warrant of arrest was issued on June 27, 2011 (Mancini, 2011). The Pre-Trial Chamber I in issuing Gaddafi’s arrest warrant found that there is reasonable grounds for them to believe that, under Rome Statute, Article 25(3) (a), Saif AL-Islam Gaddafi is responsible as co-perpetrator for two crimes against humanity, including murder and persecution, violating the provisions of Article 7(1)(a) and Article 7(1)(h) of Rome Statute respectively (Schneider et al. 2014).

Following the occasions in both Egypt and Tunisia in the early months of the year 2011, a state policy was deliberated at Libyan state machinery highest level, aimed at quelling and deterring, by all means, the use of deadly force, civilians’ protests against Muammar Gadaffi’s regime that started early February 2011 (Western & Goldstein, 2011). Further, on the same state policy mentioned above, from February 15, 2011 until at least February 28, 2011, the security forces of Libya which encompass military and security systems units, carried out all over Libya, particularly in Misrata, Benghazi and Tripoli as well as Benghazi’s nearby cities including Al-Bayda, Tobruk, Dema, and Ajdabiya, an arson attack against the civilians participating in Gaddafi’s regime demonstrations or the perceived dissidents, injuring and killing while arresting and imprisoning a large number of civilians (Schneider et al. 2014).

Further, the Pre-Trial Chamber I also established that there is reasonable evidence to consider that: Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, even though without an official position, is unspoken successor of Muammar Gaddafi and the senior-most influential personality in his inner circle, and due to the same, exercised control over state apparatus’ critical parts, such as logistics and finances and a de facto Prime Minister’s powers (Augustínyová, 2014). Besides, Muammar Gaddafi, in coordination with Saif Al-Islam together with his inner circle, schemed to quell and deter, by any means, civilian protests against the horrible regime, and both controversial individuals made a significant contribution to implement the plotted plan.

Analysis of the Case

Libya’s international crimes have significant impacts ranging from economic and political to the social effects (Crook, 2011). The modalities and forms of Libya’s war economy differ across the republic. In the West and South, the lack of significant security performers or state enforcement in the hybrid security sector of Libya has permitted the development of illicit markets and a vivacious smuggling sector (Crook, 2011). For instance, in Tripoli, where local militias have been incorporated into the capital’s security construction, the war economy transforms into sets and persons seeking to maximize opportunities for predation and graft of the state revenues. In the East, the security is broadly under the control of Haftar’s self-appointed Libyan National Army, a system of military rule has been formed (Crook, 2011). The civilian municipal leaders have been substituted with military governors.

Further, smuggling of human and fuel are recorded on less critical in the East, which are both also from target destinations of human-traffickers in Europe and near Egypt (Crook, 2011). Furthermore, in the East, political difference with Tripoli-based establishments has transformed into antagonism for control of state revenues and the struggled formation of corresponding institutions. The fuzzy line between non-state and state armed groups more complicates the condition (Augustínyová, 2014). The groups that are precisely affiliated to and frequently in opposition with the state units, function autonomously in various cases, they benefit from the war economy despite their technically endorsed mandate, at the expense of other citizens.

Conclusion

The Libya international crimes fugitives have been able to withstand their activities through predatory activities and illicit sales (Mancini, 2011). These undertakings are closely associated with the violence dispensation and are, therefore, an outgrowth for conflict. Through the comportment of the activities, the criminal injustice propagates painful spurs for those who benefit from the dysfunction of the state (Mancini, 2011). Neither a profit to develop the security sector nor the central operational governance that is appropriate for the ideal purpose, but in the interests of those who yield from the current situation. The political competition and predation of resources practiced by those involved in criminal activities are having a devastating impact on the formal economy of Libya and demoralizing what remains of its establishments.

As the criminal injustice persists, thus, the projections for the restoration of central operational governance in Libya become infinite. This threatens to generate a malicious cycle that will hasten state failure. In my opinion, the policy opportunities exposed to Libyan authorities for confronting the political and economic war comprise either co-opting or combating Libya’s networks of swindlers (Western & Goldstein, 2011). Yet owing to limited capacity for coercion accessible to any entity or entity connected with the state, an approach of cooptation has ultimately triumphed to date. Therefore, drawing on the lessons from the previous efforts, a more effective policy should apply a combined methodology. There is also a need to pursue targeted measures to combat the permitting structures of Libya’s criminal injustice and where possible and prosecuting the culprits of crime at both national and international levels where necessary.