Policy Brief on Russia’s Interference with EU Elections

Policy Brief on Russia’s Interference with EU Elections

Summary

Russia has recently adopted a high stakes approach to enforcing its international and ge-political agenda in different parts of the world (Delcour, 2016). By meddling in, or sometimes even interfering with election in these target countries, Russia can alter the outcomes according to predetermined objectives aligned with its own agenda or those of tactical allies.

The West is currently concerned about Russia’s recent change in tactic; more so after reports that the same strategy may have influenced President Trump, Prime Minister Theresa May and other political leaders in their respective capacities. While the US appeared conflicted in its reactions to the Russian activities, the EU is not keen to allow its long-time arch-nemesis to tamper with any of its electioneering activities.

Several EU countries have been identified as having suffered or being targeted by Russia in the same manner. Some of these countries were targeted due to national elections, while others were targeted due to their affiliation with the EU (Averre, 2007). The UK, Germany, and France were victims based on the former reason while countries like Montenegro faced such interference due to ambitions of joining the EU.

Several policies have been formulated to respond to Russia’s election interference strategies. First, many EU and non-EU countries situated in Europe have ramped up their electoral processes cyber security preparedness (Bazhanov, 2018). Regional coordination in the form of inter-agency cooperation has become common among most EU countries who view Russia and China as common enemies who are likely to target their electoral processes. Tighter controls for social media and other online information access and repository points have been enacted to prevent misinformation, which is one of the tools of Russian interference.

Introduction

Reports from cyber security companies involved in election processes within Europe state that Russia has repeatedly interfered with the election processes of European Union member states and other European countries for almost two decades (Forsberg & Haukkala, 2016). The processes have changed from simple misinformation for the sake of voter bias through social and mainstream media, to more complex and direct hacks into software and hardware-based resources. Additionally, the scale of attacks as well as their complexity has grown based on learned information and developments in Russia’s cyber warfare capabilities (Averre, 2007). Interestingly, the majority of its initial attacks were meant to affect the ambitions and strategies of former Soviet members states keen to partner with NATO or the EU. Although the agenda has shifted to national and regional electioneering processes, Russia still carries out tactical attacks such as what was witnessed in Montenegro recently.

The decision by Russia to begin using interference in electioneering processes as a tactical resource was not by accident. A recent White House report detailing the history, growth, and scale of Russia’s use of election interference tactics in its geopolitical strategies states that Russia refers to the method as an asymmetric arsenal (Tolstrup, 2014). It has grown from attacking the relatively weak and poorly protected election processes of former Soviet states such as Georgia and Ukraine, to full-scale attacks on superpower nations such as the United States and UK in their presidential elections. Therefore, this tactics seem to be part of a well-planned and orchestrated shift in geopolitical weapons available for use by Russia.

Further investigations into the origins of the methodology suggest that President Putin may have been practicing it locally in Russia to improve it before actual deployments (Zagorski, 2013). There are distinct similarities between his previous interference with journalist groups, mass media outlets, the civil society and even independent opposition groups and its current application characteristics in countries such France and the UK (Delcour, 2016).  Both scenarios include almost similar attributes in the form of hacked political party communications, fake social media accounts, misinformation, and character assassination through online and offline financial activity.

Cyber-Security and Warfare Preparedness

The first policy suggestion that could spearhead the continued ambitions of EU members and other European countries to repeal Russia’s election interference tactics is a concerted cyber-security and cyber-warfare effort. For the last three decades, several rogue nations such as Russia, China, and North Korea have been developing full-fledged cyber-warfare tactics that rely on the internet-of-all-things and other related digital innovations (Suchkov, 2015). China’s recent use of discrete server parts it manufactured at the behest of US partners to hack major US companies is a clear demonstration of the potency of these developments (Bazhanov, 2018). Russia’s meddling in both American and European elections depends heavily on its ability to hack the official and non-official communications of major political players as well as contenders.

Many European countries, regardless of whether they are EU members of not, have identified the seriousness of cyber-warfare and the need for cyber-preparedness. Their threats are not limited to rogue nations alone as allies such as the UK, Germany, and the United States routinely rely on cyber weaknesses to gather intelligence from other countries (Zagorski, 2013). Therefore, these countries have invested heavily in terms of hardware, software, and human-ware. Most of them have entire teams in the military and intelligence agencies dedicated to sifting through all cyber communications seeking for and neutralizing cyber threats.

This policy suggestion calls for a united approach towards repealing the Russian threat. Russian cyber warfare capabilities are massive and lethal, perhaps only rivaled by those of the United States and China. (Fischer, 2007) However, a unification of all cyber preparedness initiatives dedicated to Russian threats could improve the EU and Europe’s ability to sniff out and repeal such elections interference. Combining the skills and capabilities on all matters related to this Russian threat is one of the best avenues to successful repulsion.

Tactical Partnership with Social Media and Internet Companies

The majority of Russia’s election interference ambitions rely on access to social media and other online companies related to productivity, communication, and connectivity such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Recent pressure by the United States government has forced Facebook and Google executives to release findings related to Russia’s activities focused on US elections. The findings were damning in that tens of thousands of fake accounts on social media and communications websites were existent and operational. Therefore, the companies seemed aware of these accounts but did not have the impetus to act on them based on the terms and conditions technicality. Interestingly, many of the fake accounts Russia uses all operated within the terms and conditions meaning although they may be flagged for unconventional content and operations, they are legitimately operational.

The US also found out that some selfish American companies such as Facebook was in the business of discretely collecting unique information related to certain organizations and individuals for sale to state security agents or business organizations keen to optimize their CRM strategies. Such information could be accessed by able agencies such as Russia’s intelligence bodies compromising the integrity of many business and political organizations.

Another policy that could come on board against this Russian election interference problem would be strategic partnerships with internet and social media companies. After the US presidential elections fiasco, Google, Facebook, Twitter, and other similar companies were ordered to improve their cyber security and integrity policies (Ogneva, 2018). Additionally, all initiatives meant to mine user data for intelligence, commercial, or prosperity uses would be outlawed. The EU has already began pressuring Facebook and other similar companies to disable tens of thousands of fake accounts as demonstrated recently by France and Britain. Additionally, Sweden and other EU countries have collaborated with Google, Twitter, and Facebook to help all users identify propaganda content, which is disseminated to schools and other social outlets. This policy demands for a proactive rather than reactive initiative in tandem with the same companies that Russia manipulates in its election meddling activities.

Social and Public Avenues

One of the most common weaknesses that Russia utilizes during its election interference activities in Europe is the fragmentation of society. Unlike the United States, much of Europe is composed of different cultures, languages, ethnicities, religions, and political persuasions. This fragmentation makes social poisoning easier than a united society such as the United States. These differences make it easier for Russian operatives or pro-Kremlin individuals to change the narrative in different places for the sake of disunity. The consequences, as demonstrated in France’s recent Presidential elections where a pro-Kremlin candidate lost to Macron, can be dire for the security of Europe and the EU.

Many EU countries are beginning a social awareness drive among their student and youth populations who are the major users of social media accounts such as Twitter, IG, and Facebook. Sweden has launched a program in all schools to educate its students about propaganda and help them identify Russian content (Ogneva, 2018). Lithuania and Belgian have facilitated several social initiatives among scholars and industry professionals in corporate communications and computer science to research modern social media tactics used by rogue states such as Russia. The findings are published in social platforms that educate the youth, students, and adults about what to to look out for when online. Such initiatives educate the voter community about the effects ofn Russia’s misinformation and other tactics it employs in election tampering.

The third policy suggestion utilizes social awareness and sensitization that serves to empower the voter groups with knowledge of Russia’s tactics. Using such tactics not only weakens misinformation methods used by Russia; it also raises the awareness levels of social and mainstream media users against fake online account activity (PASTUKHOV, 2006). Such strategies would weaken the main operations that Russian operatives use to discredit legitimate candidates in its plot to meddle with elections. It could also prevent Russia from influencing certain candidates’ social scores through misinformation and mudslinging.

Diplomatic Options

Although no country wants to engage Russia directly in diplomatic conflicts without the geopolitical or diplomatic clout of large, powerful countries such as the US and China, the option must be used (Michalik, 2015). After discoveries concerning Russia’s actions in the last US presidential elections surfaced, President Trump himself was shy in confronting his more experienced rival to demand for answers. However, intelligence agencies in countries such as Israel and China were aware of the activities but nobody confronted President Putin directly.

The United States reaction to Putin’s actions demonstrated the current reluctance by affected countries to demand for answers from Russia. The EU itself has been victimized both in national presidential elections and in EU election processes (Kuzio, 2005). However, there was never a concerted effort by the EU to collectively face off with Russia over the matter. Many of the demands occurred from individual countries such as the UK when Prime Minister May informed Moscow about their actions and told them they would fail in their strategies.

While the EU is currently engaged in subtle conflicts with Russia over Ukraine and other territorial matters, it should consider raising the matter of election interference in a more direct manner. Several countries have reported being in possession of strong evidence to support the claims and could even present them to international arbitration and justice courts. However, Russia is a powerful, unpredictable dictatorship with a seasoned spy at its helm (Hagemann, 2013). This combination makes direct confrontations hard because of the fact that the country has demonstrated its ability to ignore diplomacy in the past. Unfortunately, smaller countries that were former Soviet member states such as Latvia and Ukraine continue to suffer the consequences of trying to assimilate into capitalism and the EU. Russia targets them repeatedly in a move meant to threaten bigger, more decisive action from the EU and its more powerful countries such as Germany, Spain, and UK (Smith, 2015). However, these countries also seem suspicious of one another’s intent with respect to the collective agenda against Russia. The resultant reluctance is perfect for Russia’s continued operations.

The entire European Union needs to rally behind their collective power, influence, and face-off with Putin over his continued election interference actions.  Using leverage from NATO, Ukraine and Georgia diplomatic negotiation, the UN, and allies such as the USA, European Union countries could succeed in convincing Russia to stop its nefarious activities (Smith, 2015). The time to apply such direct and powerful international diplomatic and even military options has come, before more presidential and regional bloc elections are affected. Such reluctance continues to accord the Russian intelligence machine time to recoup its losses from previous mitigations by affected countries.

Application of Proposed Policies

While there are many methods of applying policy suggestions to a problem, how the beneficiary country or organization chooses to implement them has a direct bearing on successful outcomes (Suchkov, 2015). Russia’s continued meddling in presidential, national, and even regional bloc elections is a complex issues due in part to its power, technological abilities, and diplomatic approach. However, these policies could be implemented in a tactical manner that systematically erodes the large, powerful country’s operations forcing them into negotiations or tactical disadvantage.

First, all victims, or potential targets must sanitize their election integrity systems from malware or other direct methods that Russia could be using to compromise their management and security systems. This approach disengages all vulnerable and critical resources used during major and minor elections from Russian operatives.

After disengaging Russia from major and critical infrastructure used in election processes, the countries must boost their cyber warfare and cyber preparedness capabilities to prevent a shift from election interference to direct attacks (Forsberg & Haukkala, 2016). If Russia has access to election management systems, which are some of the most sensitive systems in any sovereign nation, it could potentially have access to management systems controlling financial, economic, military, and industrial, or infrastructural resources (Hagemann, 2013). Therefore, a complete audit of the country’s entire online database, hardware, software and even human-ware could be necessary. Russian spies and sleeper agents are an innovative bunch of professionals.

These EU and European countries also need to unite in one common goals to confront Russia as a united bloc. Doing so individually has little effect on the large powerful nation or its intelligence activities. However, uniting and enrolling the help of their collective military and diplomatic resources may be successful in repealing Russia.

Finally, these EU and European countries need to enroll the assistance of international justice, human rights, and military organizations to enable them ward off Russia. Russia has demonstrated its effectiveness in circumventing combined efforts to push it towards foreign agenda and intentions, but the combinations of UN, NATO, and EU resources as well as their collective will power might succeed in ending the interference(Smith, 2015). Major allies of the US such as Germany, France, Spain, and the UK should also enlist the help of their equally large and powerful ally, more so because it has been a major victim of such attacks recently.

The West is currently concerned about Russia’s recent change in tactic; more so after reports that the same strategy may have influenced President Trump, Prime Minister Theresa May and other political leaders in their respective capacities. While the US appeared conflicted in its reactions to the Russian activities, the EU is not keen to allow its long-time arch-nemesis to tamper with any of its electioneering activities. These policy suggestions might be useful in preventing continued interference in election processes, but they also complement the universal viewpoint that calls for a more unified approach in the EU to external attacks(Smith, 2015). Russia is just one of the many modern threats that have come up targeting then democracies of the region.

References

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