Realist Perspective of the Syria Crisis

Realist Perspective of the Syria Crisis

Introduction

Though the photos showing the Qubair and Houla Massacres are sad and gut-wrenching, one can understand why the public opinion of Americans have shifted to the support for increased military interventions in Syria. More than 15,000 Syrians have succumbed to bloody deaths in the past one year. This resulted in a number of individuals suggesting that Syria was comparable to the Srebrenica of the previous United States administration. The objective of writing this paper, therefore, is to present a realist perspective to Syria so as to be able to effectively assess the crisis. The realist point of view, in relation to conflict resolution, asserts that there is a need for Syrians to avoid the interventions so that they may resolve their challenges devoid of the United States and other nations getting deeply involved than they already are, in relation to arms supply, support for the rebels and leading from behind.

Discussion

The realist’s perspective with regards to the Syrian crises entails the view that the United States desires that President Assad be deposed as a means of reducing Iran’s power given that Syria remains the only nation with closer ties to Tehran (Börzel, Dandashly & Risse, 2015). Thus, Syria only remains important when it is allied to Iran, which is the Arab world’s emergent hegemon. In the last decades, though its foreign policies, the United States has regularly called on the sharing of power by Iran and Iraq, and the two nations have at certain times enjoyed the support of America with regards to arms sales and military expenditure. However, given the current status of Iraq as a non-factor (Seeberg, 2015). Iran has gradually emerged as the Middle Eastern regional power. So as to maintain the checks on the power and also to avert Iran from increasing its influence in the region and afar, the power balance geopolitics calls on the isolation of Iran and the subsequent diminishing of the nation’s aptitude to influence both state and non-state actors. For instance, Iran is reliant on Syria so as to effectively channel resources to Hezbollah, and this implies that any changes in Syria’s regime would compromise Iran’s aptitude to antagonize Israel, United States and Europe through an increasingly willing proxy (Seeberg, P. (2015). This, therefore, can be considered as a noteworthy objective and a justifiable employment of the United States military resources.

Moreover, given the results of the regime change that was observed in Iraq, it is important that the involved states understand the best way to win any war, as well as lose peace (Tezcür, 2013). Thus, the realist perspective hast to, therefore, account for the various effects of the destabilization, or it might remain incomplete. To attain this, one must ask questions such as, who will take charge in case of Assad’s fall, and between the cure and malady, which one will be worse. And importantly, from the realist perspective, one should ask whether the regime change will enable the interests of the United States to be served better, and if there are other means through which the United States might partake in sustainable re-development (Börzel, Dandashly & Risse, 2015). The realist perspective has to account for the questions given the no-existence of clarity on the same. Nevertheless, there is a single factor that appears certain, in case Syria is taken over by the radical Islamist, then Israel is likely to be coerced to defend the Golan Heights. In addition, it will also be coerced to proactively attack Syria and Lebanon with the objective of eradicating Hezbollah prior to it becoming increasingly powerful even devoid of the Iran-Syria arms and resources pipelines (Seeberg, 2015).

The likelihood of the radical Islamist Syria tends to be unbearable. Consequently, the realist perspective has to take into account the need not intervene in the Syrian crisis with the aim of forcing out Assad. This is mainly as result of the view that there are no realistic military resolution to the Syrian challenge. Moreover, the realists are at times forced to depend on diplomacy to attain their objectives. In this regard, the economic sanctions couple with the carrot and stick strategies that are short of war tend to be important.

Russia has remained key to such a scenario given that it has continuously stressed on the need for internal change devoid of the United States and allies’ interventions. As such, Russia has made its position palpable: Syria remains one of Russia’s important allies and the only Arab nations with close ties with Russia. An increased number of the Syrian military officers always receive their trainings in Russia and the government of Russian has the desire to sustain its influence in Syria. President Putin, together with other hard liners,  were seen to be increasingly  critical of Medvedev when he allowed Libya to fall to the NATO armies, and this, therefore, is one of the reasons why he is very unlikely to change his stance with regards military support and sanctions for the rebel groups.

Still, Russia might be considered as the premier realist country globally as it has replaced China as it condemned the violence in Syria after the massacre at Qubair. Putin comprehends the most apt time to support different horse, and Russia may only be convinced by the occurrences that President Assad has to leave. Even as they have been able to stomach the massacres and the other notable exhibitions of power against the rebel factions, Russia is unable to disregard the history’s tide that is gradually turning of President Assad’s regime (Tezcür, 2013). However, the United States and the allies have to exercise care and diplomacy given that the Russian position remains to be the ;chicken and egg case; thus, Russia is likely to support the rebel factions in case they prove to be adequately strong regardless of the support that they are offering President Assad. For that reason, the rebel factions have continued fighting and uniting, as well as placing immense pressure on President Assad. In such a scenario, while the United States is capable of offering support and arms, it is unable to intervene (Tezcür, 2013).

Assad is only prone to fall with Russia’s push and interventions and Russia will only do that in case the United States and the allies do not intervene. This, therefore, demands that the United States and the allies wait. However, by working with Russia, the Assad regime will view the US and the allies as being more of partners than rivals within the Middle East region thereby enabling it to move close to the United States than to Iran. However, one thing is still certain with regards to the Syrian crisis; the United States and allies have to be ready for what might come next (Seeberg, 2015). In this regard, the realist perspective call on the US to develop plans aimed at convincing Russia to back free and democratic elections in Syria even though the elections might not be completely free. This necessitates the insistence on either bullets or the ballots. To prevent what happened in Egypt and Gaza from occurring in Syria and other parts of the Middle East, there is also a need for the making of tacit agreement between the bullets and the ballots. Free elections are untenable in instances where armed militias are involved (Tezcür, 2013). As such, the global community has to arrive at clear distinctions; one can choose the ballots over the bullets and cannot select both. Further, the process of reconciliation is mainly supported through the working jointly of groups that are accountable and non-violent. Thus, the replacement of an aggressive regime with another aggressive regime is not a solution to the Syrian crisis.

President Assad’s Shi’ite Alawite sect tends to be one of Syria’s minority populations. Owing to this, one might ask questions on the price that the minority Alawite population might pay with regards to President Assad’s progressively brutal actions, as well as the fate of other minority groups such as Christians (Börzel, Dandashly & Risse, 2015). In case of the non-existence of a conflict resolution framework prior to the removal of Assad, more bloodshed will be witnessed in Syria. This, therefore, necessitates an agreement between the US and Russia on the matter and the Russian peacekeepers have to be allowed to join the UN peacekeepers and the Arab League so as to ascertain it. Still, the question remains whether the removal of Assad and the isolation of Iran is worthwhile. The thousands of the civilian deaths in Syria tends to be pale when contrasted against the issues regarding geopolitical uncertainty. In case the government of Syria falls like Baghdad did, the US must understand that there will be bloodshed and reckoning, insurgency as well as a counter-insurgency, disorder, failure in leadership, external intervention from groups such as al-Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah (Tezcür, 2013). Thus, the US should learn from its past errors in the Iraq conflict.

Conclusion

The realist perspective demands that the United States and allies global power, dominance and influence remains intact. However, attaining this requires that the United States should covertly go on supporting the rebel groups devoid of any military action and intervention. Moreover, there is a need for the United States to work jointly with Russia in the creation of a smoother transition between the Assad regime and the subsequent regime in Syria. In this regard, the US should back the next regime as long as it is founded on election and ballots as opposed to bullets. Lastly, there is also a need to make certain that Iran remains safe within its boundaries and not beyond. These appear to be intricate, overlapping and intertwined objectives; however, they tend to be pragmatic and attainable, and are prone to reinforce the United States’ global position.

References

Börzel, T. A., Dandashly, A., & Risse, T. (2015). Responses to the ‘Arabellions’: The EU in          comparative perspective—Introduction: 1-17.

Seeberg, P. (2015). The EU and the Syrian Crisis: The Use of Sanctions and the Regime’s             Strategy for Survival. Mediterranean Politics, 20(1), 18-35.

Tezcür, G. M. (2013). Prospects for Resolution of the Kurdish Question: A Realist            Perspective. Insight Turkey, 15(2).