Regional command during hurricane Katrina

Regional command during hurricane Katrina

Nature changes from one day to another causing difference in lives. Sometimes nature changes bring forth great outcomes, and other times bring adverse events. Hurricane Katrina is one of the extraordinarily catastrophic and deadly events that happened in Florida and Louisiana specifically the city of New Orleans. In the event of catastrophic events, rescue operations are conducted to save lives and salvage property. During hurricane Katrina, tens of thousands of volunteers and federal agencies were deployed to manage the disaster. Did the troops manage to handle the catastrophe effectively?

Metereologists notice

d a tropical depression and warned people about it. The tropical depression later became Hurri cane Katrina.  New Orleans city was at the highest risk due to its level below the sea level and the fact that it is surrounded by water (Cutter & Emrich, 2006). The army had however built levees and seawalls to prevent the city from flooding. Walls built along river Mississippi were solid but walls built to hold swamps and the lakes surrounding the city’s east and west were not very reliable.  Although the meteorologists foresaw the floods, they did not predict the magnitude (Rodríguez, Trainor, & Quarantelli, 2006). Failure to determine the extent was a significant shortcoming since if they had anticipated the magnitude, appropriate measures would have been put in place to reduce the impact on the people. The officials were concerned that the tide movements could overtop the levees to cause short-term floods but did not think that the levees could collapse below their designed height. Before the storm hit land, an evacuation order was issued by the mayor to the people of New Orleans. Thousands of people fled, but others remained especially the poorest in the city and the elderly mainly because they lacked a means of transport. Although the army played a massive role in preventing floods by building a system of levees and seawalls, the fact that some of them were less reliable was detrimental.

On the onset of hurricane Katrina, American military mobilized emergency rescue operations. The commander who had experience with floods and hurricanes noticed that the landfall along the border of two different states under different commands would be an issue. The commander, therefore, requested Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to establish a joint area of responsibility (Schumacher, 2011). The establishment of a common centre of command was quite crucial in handling the menace as conflicts regarding power and control between troops from different estates were eliminated. The soldiers immediately began the rescue operations along Mississippi alter the Katrina landfall. Once the levees collapsed, another force was mobilized to begin rescue operations in New Orleans. Having troops along Mississippi and Louisiana gulf coast alone was however a poor strategy since the New Orleans was at risk from the beginning. Soldiers should have been sent to New Orleans at the onset of the operations. The troops, however, used their experience to contain the confused situation.

Troops from the airborne division began arriving seven hours later after getting the deployment orders, which was a launte response since the situation at hand was an emergency that needed critical attention. The airborne troops worked for hand in hand with the airport staff by facilitating passenger departure through security screening. Although the forces were late, thousands of people were evacuated through the airport. The signal battalion was also tasked with connecting military and commercial communication to ensure smooth flow of information in the affected areas. A steady stream of communication facilitated rescue operations and helped in maintaining order. To take care of the survivors, another troop set up a medical camp where the injured were being taken to receive treatment. A lot of people were attended to, and it helped save the lives of those who had remained. The people were however rendered homeless. The army assisted in setting up centers that acted as temporary residence to the people who were forced out of their houses due to floods. The military also mobilized resources to aid in the delivery of food and water. The rescue mission played a vital role in the lives of the survivors.

Engineers within the army began operations after the storm had calmed. Activities included draining of water in New Orleans city and removing the debris. The federal military provided refrigerated trucks to help in the removal of bodies in the town. The efforts were aimed at making the areas affected by the hurricane habitable once more. With the aid of troops from other countries, the process took a short period which was indeed commendable. Forces were also engaged in the building of new levees and seawalls to reduce the impact of a calamity like a hurricane Katrina. Army officers are more cautious since they learned a lesson from the Hurricane Katrina experience.

Having tried their best, the army, however, has had a lot of lessons to learn from Hurricane Katrina experience. Among the lessons learned is that training is essential. Trooped should be adequately trained to respond to emergencies. During training, the complexity of the disaster should be put into consideration to make them more prepared. Troops should also be ready to react swiftly to reduce the impact of catastrophes. The soldiers had a weakness in responding in time. Through training, late responses will not be experienced in the future.  The troops also suffered challenges after communication breakdown. Top army officials need to be trained on how to act when there is a communication crisis so that instructions reach those on the ground.

Officers ought to be grouped within the same command. Grouping will help in defining roles which will lead to increased efficiency. Officers will be deployed accordingly, and response to emergencies will be swift. Officers should also take advantage of the available groups to begin rescue operations. In the case of hurricane Katrina, the forces should have made use of National Guardsmen who are readily available while the federal assistance comes by. Decisions should also be made hastily to contain emergencies. Officers should also not wait for situations to get worse to make critical decisions. During the hurricane, decisions were delayed, and circumstances got out of hand. Lack of coordination among political leaders, the military, and relief organizations as evidenced by the chaos after the hurricane also derailed rescue operations. Political leaders blamed other stakeholders in crisis management (Boin, Hart, McCONNELL, & Preston, 2010). Lack of proper coordination hindered rescue missions, and the victims end up in situations that would have been avoided in the first place.

Although regional commands played a huge role in containing hurricane Katrina disaster, Commanders did not handle the disaster effective as it is observed that there were mistakes regarding their mode of response. Preventive measures were not adequately placed on reducing the impact of the menace. Officers lacked coordination in their responses creating some hitches and waited for the problem to get worse to take adequate measures. Decision-making processes were not effective thus derailing the process. Based on the experiences during hurricane Katrina, officers need to improve their efficiency in handling emergencies.

References

Boin, A., Hart, P. ‘T, McConnell, A., & Preston, T. (2010). LEADERSHIP STYLE, CRISIS RESPONSE AND BLAME MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF HURRICANE KATRINA. Public Administration, 88(3), 706–723. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01836.x

Cutter, S. L., & Emrich, C. T. (2006). Moral Hazard, Social Catastrophe: The Changing Face of Vulnerability along the Hurricane Coasts. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 102–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716205285515

Rodríguez, H., Trainor, J., & Quarantelli, E. L. (2006). Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe: The Emergent and Prosocial Behavior following Hurricane Katrina. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 82–101. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716205284677

Schumacher, L. J. (2011). Dual Status Command for No-Notice Events Integrating the Military Response to Domestic Disasters. Retrieved from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/25063