The Fact/Value Distinction
The philosophical theory that resonated with me the most during the module is the discussion on the fact-value distinction. When we want to talk about facts and value, we have to make it very clear that they belong to very different domains. For instance, fact belongs to the realm, while the value belongs to the realm of the ideal (Gorski, 2013). Value exists in the relationship between people and reality. The real consists of a series of facts. One can define fact as what is, with being, the real, the describable, the event, that is, the fact is that which does not require discussion since it is objective. The term value has a very different idea. For instance, value is what something should be or what is better or correct. Value also refers to what counts since it is possible and preferable. It is both quality and positioning. Values are like rules that we must comply with since they are subjective as we create, maintain, or use them (Gorski, 2013).
Values are present in most of our speech because whenever we talk about something, we are usually taken by opinions, and we are not limited to just describing the fact. For example, if we say “a skirt is pink,” it is a fact that nobody can counter. Don't use plagiarised sources.Get your custom essay just from $11/page
The distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value can be used in real-life applications. We are always making judgments about the things we see and observe or even about people (Davydova & Sharrock, 2003). However, there are two different ways of making judgments about something or someone. These two forms are the de facto judgment and the value judgment, which, although they appear similar, have different characteristics. Hence, the fact-value distinction can be used to evaluate and make judgments or decisions.
References
Davydova, I., & Sharrock, W. (2003). The rise and fall of the fact/value distinction. The Sociological Review, 51(3), 357-375.
Gorski, P. S. (2013). Beyond the fact/value distinction: ethical naturalism and the social sciences. Society, 50(6), 543-553.