The film “Thirteen Days”

The film “Thirteen Days”

The film “Thirteen Days” starts with the scene where the United States is discussing the hazards of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Immediately, intensive discussions on how the United States government can respond begun. During these discussions, members of ExCom opposed, proposed, and advocated for different alternatives that could be used to approach the situation. Without the knowledge that the United States government had discovered the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Soviet representative maintained that their intention was that of defensive nature. After intervention and consultation, President Kennedy decided on the way forward. The military officials defied the president’s orders while disputes stirred among ExCom members. The Soviet representative continued pushing for a war between the two sides, and the movie ends when the Soviet withdraws its missiles from Cuba on reasons that were not clear. The Cuban Missile crisis and the decision that was made during this time were critical and displayed different decision-making process models, which will be discussed.

One of the

concepts of the decision-making process that were consistent and were validated

in the movie was the organizational process model. The model was exhibited when

the Soviets did not take precautions to hide their transportation and

construction of their missile sites in Cuba. In this case, it can be concluded

that the field representative of the Soviets that was responsible for the

mission only followed protocols that were applicable in the USSR and not Cuba (Peltonen 82).

This was the first attempt of the Soviet Union establishing a missile site

outside its borders, and they did not formulate procedures that blended with

those of Cubans, thus ignoring the consequences of their actions. Therefore,

the Soviet Union failed to consider the requirement of camouflage since they

did not require that back in their country.

Furthermore, the way the Cubans set up their missile base in Cuba was the

same way they did back in their country, thus, making it easy for the American

government to detect the missiles in Cuba. Consequently, the concept of

“trained incapacity” applies since the Soviets failed to change their skills in

different conditions. They used the same process that was used in their

country, which was not applicable in Cuba. Their inflexibility to adapt to the

changing environment rendered their mission invalid, and the consequences were

detrimental outside their country. Peltonen (71) postulates that when the President

issued conflicting direction to the lower-ranking military officials, it was

evident that there was a difference in the organizational cultures in the

different sectors of the government.

Typically,

the low-rank military officials are expected to follow instructions from their

leaders in the high ranks in the hierarchy. However, when the decisions were

made on the fate of the Soviet ship that had passed the set blockade, the

president hindered with the instructions that were already issued by the

military general. The general had commanded the officials not to fire the ship.

If someone else had interfered with these orders, the general would have

followed military procedures to punish the individual accordingly.

Additionally, the attempt of the military general to follow the “rules of

engagement” was another reflection of the organizational culture in the

military. According to that rule, the military was expected to counter-attack

the perceived enemy, Soviet, who was responsible for shooting down the U-2

plane, despite President Kennedy insisting on confirmation that Soviet had

taken that course of action deliberately (Waters 70). If the military general had been allowed

to make the final decision, he would have directed the confrontation of Soviet

despite the objection of the member of the ExCom.

The critical question that President Kennedy was facing was either to strike or to negotiate peace with the Soviet Union. It was nauseating that majority of the members of the ExCom were proposing that the country goes to war with Soviet Union, ignoring the wide range of alternatives that was at their disposal during this time of crisis. According to Graham Allison’s rational actor of the three conceptual lenses, statesmen are accountable to act rationally to make the best decisions favoring the interest of the nation. The concept proposes that high ranking officials in the government should be apolitical, meaning they have the will to support whatever they deem rational. However, citizens have the perception that political leaders act in their own interest instead of the interest of the country.

Bureaucracy is the main concept that has been used to explore the flaws of foreign policy decision making in the film, “Thirteen Days.” During the Cuban missile crisis, rational decision-making was presented in a number of ways through President Kennedy’s decision and rationality (Robarge 1098). One of the challenges was the pressure that the president was facing regarding the situation at hand. He was either to choose and follow the protocols of the military, which would lead the country into war with the Soviet Union, or consider the number of available options that was at the disposal of the United States government. If President Kennedy had followed the guidelines of the organizational process, the Cuban missile crisis would have ended with a lot of damages.

Consequently, majority of President Kennedy’s advisors where advocating for war, which Kennedy did not take as an option for the crisis at hand. Although we cannot say that he was rational actor, or that he free of intragovernmental politics and the organizational process of his office, but the decision that he made was the best option (Waters 70). Therefore, the challenges were either to act on his own and be blamed for acting according to his personal interests or take into consideration the proposal of the members of the ExCom and lead the country into war. The president was not sure if the Soviet Union was competing for nuclear power or they were acting in defense of Cuba. President Kennedy was faced with the tough choice of deciding the intentions of the Soviet Union

In conclusion, according to the decision-making processes that have been proposed by Graham Allison, there is no single approach that can explain the Cuban missile crisis. Rather, a bunch of concepts come together to explain the rationality of President Kennedy’s decision. The film “Thirteen Days’ focuses on the bureaucracy as an approach that reflects on the flaws of the decision made during the crisis. Organizational model is also exhibited when the Soviets did not take precautions to hide their transportation and construction of their missile sites in Cuba.