The Kosovo Conflict

The Kosovo Conflict

Introduction

Kosovo is located in Sothern Serbia with a mixed population where the majority are Albanians. The regions enjoyed high-level independence within the former Yugoslavia until in 1989 when Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader, changed the region’s status when he subdued the autonomy of the region bringing it under the direct rule of Belgrade, the Serbian capital. Kosovar Albanians intensely opposed this move. In 1998, an open conflict between the Serbian police and military forces and Kosovar Albanians led to the death of one thousand five hundred Kosovar Albanians forcing the displacement of over four hundred thousand people from their homes. There was concern from the international community about the spread of the conflict to other countries, including issues dealing with humanitarian consequences (Rodman, T., 1999). The international community also brought the issue with, Milosevic, the Serbian president who ignored all efforts aimed at a peaceful end to the conflict and also destabilising efforts of the Kosovar Albanian militant forces. 1999. In May 1998, a meeting by Foreign Ministers from the North Atlantic Council put in place two main objectives to deal with the conflict in Kosovo – first, to assist in attaining a peaceful resolution by being part of the intervening international community and second to promote security and stability within the region with more emphasis on Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. In June 1998, a meeting by Defense Ministers deliberated on further on possible military intervention. The conflict only ended after a series of airstrikes by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in October 1999.

Part 1: Analysis of the Involved Parties

There are two primary parties in the Kosovo conflict – the first is the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Kosovo Albanians) which was formed in the 1990s. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, began a policy of peaceful protest against the abrogation of the constitutional autonomy of Kosovo by then Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. The KLA, formed by the radical Kosovo Albanians, were fighting against the persecution of Kosovo Albanians whereby 1995 saw the initiation of KLA’s campaign against the Serbian law enforcement in Kosovo. The second primary party was the Serbian Government (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Milošević was for a long time against the idea of Muslim Albanians controlling an area regarded as sacred to the Serbs. Kosovo was the capital of the Serbian Orthodox church, including the location of the Turkish defeat of the Serbs in 1389 and the Serbs defeat of the Turks in 1912 (Rodman, T., 1999). Thus, the Serbian government sought a mass expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from the region.

The other party involved in the conflict was the NATO and the United Nations who can be considered as a secondary party to the conflict. A North Atlantic Council meeting in March 1998, by Foreign Ministers, spelt out particular objectives of the NATO, they include the first attainment of a peaceful resolution to the conflict by taking part in the international community response and second, advance security and stability within the neighbouring countries to Kosovo specifically, former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia and Albania. The failure of diplomatic solutions saw the intervention of NATO in March 1999 where their Kosovo campaign was justified under the banner of humanitarian war. NATO intervention involved a series of airstrikes against Serbian military targets which lasted eleven weeks and saw the obliteration of Serbian infrastructure in Belgrade. This strategy was intended to back up diplomatic efforts where it required Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo, and cooperate into ending violence and allowing the refugees to return home. In June 1999, Yugoslavia and NATO signed a peace treaty that saw about one million ethnic Albanians return to Kosovo. The UN Security Council expressed concern over the excessive use of force by the Yugoslav army and the Serbian force. Thus, the UN called for a cease-fire between the warring fronts. UN peacekeeping mission was sent into Kosovo which came to their administration.

Part 2: Theory of International Relations

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo started as (OAF) Operation Allied Force on 23 March 1999. It went on until 10 June 1999 when Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a UN resolution that required a NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. The goal of OAF was to “halt and reverse” the “humanitarian catastrophe” overseen by the Serbian and Yugoslav forces led by Milosevic forcing the displacement of Albanian Kosovars (NATO 2012). NATO abstained from sending ground troops but was in favour of airstrikes to attain its goals in the region. Three theories under international relations dissect the factors behind NATO’s intervention. First, constructivism sheds light on the role of NATO in changing the preferences of states into learning the norms of the organisation and taking part in the intervention for the protection of these norms. Second, Neoliberal institutionalism examines how NATO managed to mobilise the cooperation of all member states while discouraging defection from the intervention strategy. Finally, International Organizations (IOs) are usually perceived as Hegemonic Tools and the theory that examines this assesses the role of the United States in NATO, including US’s specific interest.

Constructivists view the international system as archaic. However, states have not been pushed by anarchy to act following their self-interest but act concerning their socially constructed identities and preferences (Hurd 2008, 299). “A major factor to the construction of these preferences and identities are the state’s internal social influences, and not just material interest” (Hurd 2008, 303). Additionally, external “institutionalised” and “intersubjective” ideas provide the state with information about other countries or actors within the international system, thus dictating its behavior. These ideas are usually intersubjective due to their acknowledgement by several actors; they are also institutionalised because of their support from institutions. Thus, IOs are a central focus in the formation of institutionalised and intersubjective because they provide a forum for their discussion of such concepts (Coleman 2012). Smaller IOs act as tools for persuasion, whereas larger IOs influence socially the preferences of the state by naming and shaming states that do not subscribe to the overreaching organisational norms.

When this is applied to the intervention of NATO in Kosovo, constructivism shows how NATO, which is a collection of several states, influenced the preference of its member states into intervention in Kosovo. Being that NATO is only a small organisation, it could have been used just as a persuasion tool, where member states conform to the norms of the organisation (Johnston 2001, 499). NATO ability to dictate the actions of states and instil relevant interpretation of actions in the world establishes its foundation of state persuasion into adapting its norms (Gheciu 2007, 175). Thus, NATO has the necessary institutional ability stemming from its intersubjective structure of decision making to point the Kosovo disaster as a humanitarian. Being that member states have already incorporated the normative ore of NATO, they would easily take part in defending these principles and norms. Thus, constructivism depicts how NATO interpreted the Kosovo disaster and shows that the commitment and responses of the member states show the incorporation of NATO’s principles and norms.

The intervention of NATO in Kosovo gave the organisation an opportunity to pronounce its role and normative value in the world no longer divided across two superpowers. According to Gheciu, the focus of NATO after the Cold War centred on spreading of “western-based norms” to the larger parts of Europe (2007,171). The absence of liberal democracy and ethnic tensions in Kosovo provided a case through which NATO could spread western norms, thus strengthening its roles. In 1999, NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, stated that “the crisis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a challenge to the values that NATO has successfully defended for the past 50 years: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” (NATO, 1999). Thus constructivism presumes that all NATO member states would respond in defence of these values and maintain strong support to the interventionist’s efforts because of the violations of these values in that they had already been incorporated within the member states.

However, a few NATO members showed any evidence of having incorporated the norms of the organisation and seemed an unconcerned interventionist success. The United Kingdom was among only a few states that that showed evidence of support to the interventionist effort founded on normative motivations. Tony Blair, the former UK Prime Minister, accepted that while there were “big strategic interests that would have justified intervention in their own right,” he was driven to intervene because “this was the closest thing to racial genocide that [he had] seen in Europe since the Second World War” (PBS 2012). Moreover, in a statement to the British Parliament, Blair affirmed that Britain would act “until Milosevic chooses the path of peace” (PBS, 2012). Thus, from Blair justification of UK’s intervention based on humanitarian need highlights the commitment of the UK in upholding the norms of NATO. The ultimate commitment of the UK in the success of the interventionist efforts was highlighted by its willingness to include ground troops, thus supporting the belief that the UK incorporated the norms of NATO (Erlanger 1999)

The major trend among the NATO member states was an absence of commitment to reinforcing the normative norms of the organisation. In spite of Gerhard Schroder, the German Chancellor, a stance that NATO intervention efforts would “prevent a human catastrophe” (Rodman 1999, 45), Germany was against the prolonged efforts of air campaigns in Kosovo. Therefore, while Germany may have in the beginning supported OAFs protection and defence of NATOs values, it was against the idea of troop increment to increase the chances of success of the intervention efforts, thus highlighting the lack of incorporation of the normative values of NATO by Germany. Moreover, Italy and Greece showed an unwillingness to increase OAF abilities. Unlike Germany who publicly supported the intervention efforts, Italy and Greece only publicly reinforced their unity to the NATO alliance, but critically spoke of the role of OAF “to reporters from their own countries for domestic consumption.” Therefore, if these states had incorporated the values of NATO, they would have publicly justified OAFs efforts and would be willing to increase OAFs in the protection and defence of the humanitarian principles.

The incorporation of NATO’s values suggests that states would have on their own inclination increased OAFs scope through an increase of the size of intervention in defence of the values of NATO. Considering that several states showed reluctance in guaranteeing NATO’s success, it might be said that their interest in OAF was as a result of strategic options. Therefore constructivism fails to assess the factors behind Greece, Italy and Germany motivations in the intervention efforts, thus implying that NATO was a poor persuader.

Neoliberal institutionalism is another classification of the theory of international relations. Neoliberal institutionalism has the assumption that “sovereign states within the archaic world are rational egoists making the cooperation among states difficult only possible if these states are working towards a common purpose.” (Keohane 1984, 65). However, cooperation among states is not easy as states as states are constantly unaware of the other states intended action or preferences. Despite the fact that states may be aiming at mutually beneficial goals, a state will consider defecting taking part in a contribution towards an outcome if they see possibilities of free-riding on the participation of other states. Thus, IOs can contribute towards states cooperation by providing a forum for negotiating a collective agreement (Keohane 1984, 107). IOs can facilitate the compliance of the accord through playing the role of a monitor and through the extension of the shadow of the future whereby the reputation of the state is dictated by future inter interactions within the organisation (Martin 1992, 770).

Neoliberal institutionalism examines how NATO advanced cooperation among all member states towards a mutually beneficial outcome of Kosovo stabilisation. However, Kosovo intervention presented a “collaboration problem” where defecting incentive lead to “immediate pay-offs” – “not having to go war but still getting protection.” Smaller and weaker states would receive military protection from the bigger countries; thus have the highest defection incentives. The lower states defected through the provision of less material or military troops than would be considered in correspondence with their abilities. OAF was successful in securing military contributions from thirteen out of the nineteen members, whereas the United States bore the greatest burden where their contribution corresponded with their abilities.

Part 3: Conflict Resolution

Several mediation attempts have been conducted to settle the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. This section provides an examination of the whole case, including the current situation. This section will also attempt at providing an alternative solution in the case of Kosovo. This section takes into action all that has already occurred and justifies any intended solution alternative. This sections also identifies several concepts in international relations, for instance, how nationalism could lead to separation and how a county can be created and recognised globally. The Kosovo-Serbia conflict was based on persecution on particular ethnicities which thus called for IOs such as NATO, EU and the UN to take action where statistics estimate that more than one million were displaced from their homes and became refugees within the neighbouring countries.

Kosovo is regarded as a fundamental part of Europe and should be defended by the whole community. This is why the EU and the UN stressed on settling the dispute. Several factors raised the profile of Kosovo to the international arena, first, during the 1980s, Albanian and Kosovars populations demanded a change of situation within their provinces. Thus, increased Serbian nationalism where Serbia sought to return Kosovo under its direct control. Second, many international actors were interested in preventing the escalation of the war in the Kosovo conflict, thus raising its profile. Third, several questions regarding the actions of the Serbian government in Kosovo. Finally, the Kosovo conflict intensified ethnic discords and differences raising challenges about ethnic co-existence between ethnic Albanians and Serbs.

In 1999, the UN Security Council ratified a resolution seeking withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. It also formed the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which was tasked with the development and formation of a new state structure in Kosovo. In 2005, the final stage of the resolution was introduced by the UN by Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari. Kosovo attained its independence in 2008 with countries like the US, U.K, Germany and France recognising Kosovo. However, Serbia and Russia denied it recognition and considered it an illegal state. Serbia requested the intervention of the ICJ through the UN general assembly to deliberate on the legality of the state of Kosovo. The court gave an advisory ruling stating that Kosovo independence was legal and should be separated from international law.

The EU played a significant role in solving the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. Negotiations facilitated by EU led to the Brussels Agreement of 2013. This was attained after several mediation efforts to resolve the conflict. The delays to the agreement were due to the rejection by the Serbian government to the proposals aiming to grant independence to Kosovo. This rejection was because it was expected that with Kosovo independence, a city in Northern Kosovo which was composed of majority Serbs would come under Albanian control. Thus Mitrovica, the Northern Kosovo City lost the opportunity of becoming self-governing. The elites in the area were only interested in the maintenance of the status quo.

Currently, it is projected that Kosovo will remain dependent politically and economically on international actors. The nature of its dependence is depicted by its nature to go by the willingness of these global actors. Compared with the rest of the European states, Kosovo is not yet a state but hold a position of state-building within the international arena. A third of the world wishes to see Kosovo as independent and a real actor in the international stage. Serbia will ultimately have to accept the autonomous nature of Kosovo.

However, Kosovo is still suffering from several challenges; there are several obstacles from being part of the international organisation and the international community. International relations experts foresaw the declaration of Kosovo independence as a function of international actors. This is evident from the recognition of states that portray more than just declaration only. The UN is the most representative global organisation. The UN states that for a state to be considered as part of the organisation, it should be a peace-loving state and endorse the principles of the charter. In the future, UN membership will be a significant achievement for Kosovo. This will legitimise the country with the backing of IOs.

The nature of conflict has evolved over a period of time. New kinds of conflict arose in the ground employing different techniques and approaches. New organisations are formed for purposes of resolution of such disputes (Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997). When undertaking conflict resolution, it is essential to be knowledgeable about the demographic and social statures within a country. It is important also to consider people’s political affiliations. The Kosovo crisis is political but with deep roots in ethnicity. Thus, a dispute within the state would not be resolved without reconciliation among all groups.

The intervention of NATO into the conflict was appropriate because Serbia had zero intention of considering negotiations. There were mass killings of civilians in Kosovo, and this would have continued if the international community had not acted (Bercovitch, J. 1996). Kosovo was committing war crimes, and therefore the intervention of NATO-led by the dominant powers led to its end. However, the use of force in conflict resolution is only appropriate in the short term basis. However, it is ineffective in the long term basis.

Adjudication can be an essential approach to resolving the Kosovo conflict. This is because Serbia rejected negotiation and mediation; thus, the statutory body would present an appropriate technique for both sides. Adjudication is the cost-effective and accelerated form of conflict resolution that unlike other methods involves a third-party intermediary, and the decision of the third party is binding unless reviewed by either arbitration of litigation. Adjudication is important because the decision and rules are binding to all parties thus high possibilities of trust to the system

Conclusion

The first section of the essay assessed the background to the escalation of full-scale war in Kosovo which was conducted through the onion analysis. The theory of international relation, particularly constructivism, was used to explain the interventionist approach employed the Kosovo conflict. The third section determined the most appropriate methods of conflict resolutions by referring to the first section of the paper.

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