George Ball

George Ball

1. Drawing on James Bill, pp. 157-164, Janis, Vietnam chapter, pp. 114-117, and Burke & Greenstein, pp. 195-196, write a summary of George Ball’s role as a dissenter on Vietnam. What were Ball’s key arguments against escalation? How did he view McNamara?

George Ball working under the secretary of state, raised a policy discussion for the decision that had been made to escalate war efforts. He wrote as much as 20 memoranda to challenge the involvement of the Americans in Vietnam. In the argument against the escalation, the memoranda were clear with a paper titled, “cutting our losses in South Vietnam,” being of greater priority (Bill 158). He argued that South Vietnam was peripheral among the American interest considering the support offered by South Vietnamese and the U.S. military was ill-prepared to face the guerilla opponent. He firmly recommended a slow withdrawal of the American military.

Ball did not have an absolute belief that most of the issues in Vietnam were of greater interest to Americans. That explains why he made various moves to focus on eliminating the U.S. from being part of them. Most of George Balls’ decisions were formed from observing some of the historical happenings. He considered the decision made by the U.S. to be inappropriate, and they had found themselves in a quagmire with Vietnam (Bill 158). The war was very costly at other people’s benefit, and this was a loss to the Americans. He had all the belief that the best way is to quit completely from the war.

According to Burke & Greenstein, Ball understood very well that he had little influence on the entire idea; however, he had the belief that if he could convince the president with policy, things could change (196). He presented a well structured and designed policy that focused on major highlights to bring positive change. He argued in different alternatives, such as giving reasons why the U.S. soldiers could never defeat Vietnamese soldiers and also the interference of China later. Later, Ball was really criticized, and most of his expertly designed information failed. It is seen that Vietnam was defeated not because of strong soldiers but because of the political authority of America. Also, Ball helped a great deal because of the moral influence he established. He was responsible for later on to draft blueprints of future plans for the nation (Burke & Greenstein, 196). Ball viewed McNamara as being murky. He believed he could bring policies that could influence them in a more dynamic way and better the decisions they made towards the war.

1. Drawing on Larry Berman’s chapter on Lyndon B. Johnson, “Paths Chosen and Opportunities Lost,” discuss how Johnson’s personality and operating style, his insecurity, and his legislative as opposed to executive temperament impacted his leadership and his approach to Vietnam policy.

Johnson’s operating style and personality were that of a strict, detailed, and insecure person. As the president, he had to deal with people giving them very tight commands and required instant responses. His leadership wave led to extraordinary and complex responses (Berman, 138). The personality he carried made him an overpowering president and would influence decisions very quickly using talent and inspired motivation to lead. Many people credited his actions as very positive kin making policies work best withing a very short response time. For example, his insecurity about the Vietnam war made him take instant actions, which brought clear most of the doubts and limitations.

According to Berman, it is claimed that the source of Johnson’s drive did not result in negative options in the presidential leadership framework; there was scholarly attention that pointed towards his personality (137). It is considered that he did not clearly transition from being a legislative leader to a presidential focus. He knew when and how to undertake various decisions. This move made most of his implementation strategies against the Vietnamese policy to be effective. Most of the policies he accepted and provided were properly focused on the good of the citizens. At one time, Johnson tried to win the hearts of Harvard faculty and see the type of academicians the U.S. could produce. Needless to say, he was a popular president who felt the style of his leadership was compared to that of Kennedy unfavorably, and he could justify himself to be better.

Works Cited

Berman, Larry. “Lyndon B. Johnson: Paths chosen and opportunities lost.” Leadership in the modern presidency (1988): 134-163.

Bill, James A. George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy. Yale University Press, (1997): 157-164.

Burke, John P., and Fred L. Greenstein. How presidents test reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954, and 1965. Russell Sage Foundation, (1989): 195-196.